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ABSTRACT 
 
 
MUHAMMAD ADEEL ZAFFAR. An exploration of the diffusion dynamics of open 
source software (OSS): an agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach. 
(Under the direction of DR. RAM L. KUMAR) 
 
 
Despite the rising popularity of Open Source Software (OSS), there is limited 
understanding of the factors that affect the diffusion of OSS at the organizational level. 
Review of the literature suggests that previous empirical and analytical studies on this 
subject matter though valuable in their own respect, either did not address the full 
spectrum of critical factors in one model or did not investigate the impact of critical 
factors in enough detail leaving some gaps in the literature. In an effort to bridge these 
gaps, this dissertation develops a model to a) jointly investigate the effect of critical 
variables other than price on the diffusion dynamics of OSS, b) investigate the effects of 
social networks or inter-organizational relationships on the diffusion dynamics of OSS, c) 
propose a new software price discounting scheme and compare its effectiveness against 
traditional software price discounting schemes on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. An 
Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) approach is adopted to develop a 
comprehensive simulation model to investigate the aforementioned research problems. 
Although, desktop operating system software is used as an exemplar to investigate the 
diffusion of its open source and proprietary alternatives, the framework proposed in the 
dissertation is general enough to be applied in the investigation of diffusion of other kinds 
of software as well. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is increased interest in the phenomenon of open innovation in general and 
open source software (OSS) in particular. A growing number of servers and databases are 
already running on OSS (Wheeler, 2005). Furthermore, an increasing number of 
organizations are either looking to move completely to open-source systems or they are 
making their existing systems compatible with OSS (Wheeler, 2005). OSS has been 
studied from various perspectives such as adoption and diffusion (Bonacorsi and Ross 
2003), pricing (Kim et al, 2006), licensing (Tirole and Lerner, 2005), contribution 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2001), quality and release management (Michlmayr, 2005) etc. 
This research explores the diffusion dynamics of OSS. It recognizes that OSS 
diffusion is a complex phenomenon and emphasizes the need to study it using multiple 
theoretical perspectives. OSS is an innovation and hence can be studied from the 
diffusion of innovation perspective (Rogers, 1995). OSS can also be viewed as a type of 
standard and hence can be examined using the growing body of research on standards 
(Zhu et al, 2006). Since OSS is a software product, characteristics of software products 
such as upgrades (Ngwenyama et al, 2007), licensing and support also influence its 
diffusion. 
A review of the previous literature suggests that there is some understanding of 
the factors that affect adoption and diffusion of OSS (Bonaccorsi et al, 2006; Kim et al, 
2 
 
 
2006; Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006; Zhu et al., 2006). However, the manner in which 
these factors jointly influence the dynamics of OSS diffusion has not received adequate 
attention. Through a series of essays, this dissertation investigates the diffusion of OSS 
from various perspectives. 
The first essay identifies and examines the interaction effects between key 
determinants of diffusion of OSS. While drawing from the literature on OSS, standard 
diffusion and innovation diffusion, an agent-based computational economics (ACE) 
approach is adopted to develop a simulation model of OSS diffusion. The model 
illustrates the effect of the following key, yet under researched, variables on the diffusion 
of OSS: i) network topology; ii) network density, iii) variability in the support cost for 
OSS; iv) interoperability costs between different software; v) frequency of upgrades of 
competing proprietary software (PS); and vi) initial proportion of OSS adopters. 
Specifically, we address the following research question: How do key variables 
individually and collectively affect the diffusion dynamics of OSS? To the best of our 
knowledge, this is one of the first studies to examine the effect of upgrades on the 
diffusion of two competing software. The agent-based computational economics 
approach (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006) used in our model allows for significant agent 
(OSS or PS adopter) heterogeneity in terms of size, planning of upgrades, technical 
competence with OSS, and support costs of OSS and allows integration of both economic 
and social concepts in one model. The desktop operating system (OS) market is used as 
an exemplar since some empirical data regarding its cost components is available. 
The second essay shifts the focus from the importance of intrinsic firm-level 
factors to inter-organizational relationships on diffusion dynamics of OSS. A social 
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networking approach is adopted to investigate the effect of structural characteristics of a 
network of organizations on the diffusion of OSS. Previous research has demonstrated 
that network structure can affect dissemination of information, knowledge and other 
social processes. Our objective is to investigate the impact of network structure on the 
diffusion of OSS in a network of firms. More formally, we pose the following research 
questions: a) What is the relative importance of various individual-level structural 
measures in explaining the rate of diffusion of OSS b) What is the relative importance of 
group-level structural measures in explaining the rate of diffusion of OSS? c) Which of 
the structural measures are most effective in explaining the rate of diffusion of OSS? The 
model devised in the first essay is used to investigate these questions. 
The findings of the second essay motivate the third essay which demonstrates the 
effectiveness of pricing PS based on knowledge about the social network of consumers, 
in influencing the diffusion of OSS. Traditionally, software vendors offer discounts to 
encourage sales based on usage, quantity, and/or location. We explore the question that if 
the network structure of consumers is known, would it be more profitable for the vendor 
to offer network structure-based discounts than any other type of traditional discounts? 
Again, the simulation model developed in the first essay and the findings from the second 
essay are jointly used to explore this research question. Table 1 provides a broad 
overview of the three essays. 
The remainder of this document has been organized as follows: The next two 
sections in Chapter 1 provide an overview of the literature on Open Source Software 
(OSS) and Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) in the light of this dissertation.  
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Since OSS remains a very broad area of investigation, it is only appropriate that 
its understanding and scope of investigation is laid out in the context of this research. 
Furthermore, since agent-based modeling has been adopted as the method for 
investigation, it is necessary that this choice is described in detail and justified at the 
outset as the most appropriate methodology given the context of this research.  Chapters 
2, 3 & 4 discuss the three essays. Each of these chapters provides a brief review of 
relevant literature to motivate the research questions. This is followed by a description of 
the planned experiments and analyses. At this point, the first essay is complete. 
Therefore, Chapter 2 also provides a detailed analysis of results, discussion and 
contributions of the study to both research and practice. Chapter 5 concludes the 
dissertation proposal with an update on the progress in the second and third essays, and a 
timeline for completing the remaining work. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The following subsections provide a review of the relevant literature on OSS, diffusion of 
OSS and agent-based computational economics. 
1.2.1 Open Source Software (OSS) 
Open source software (OSS) is any piece of software whose source code is made 
publicly available under terms that follow the „Open Source Definition‟ (Perens, 1999: 
pp. 171-188). Generally, such software is freely available online. 
However, companies such as Red Hat and Ubuntu charge a fee for providing 
support and complementary services. There are certain aspects of OSS that are distinctly 
different from proprietary software. We have modeled some of these aspects in our paper. 
These include license costs, upgrade costs, timing and frequency of upgrades, support 
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and required level of technical expertise (Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Gray, 
2005; Guth, 2007; Hissam et al, 2002; Kamhorst, 2002; Leading Edge Forum, 2004).  
License and Upgrade costs: OSS adopters face zero or low license/upgrade (Kim et al, 
2006; Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006; Tirole and Lerner, 2005). For example, Ubuntu‟s 
desktop Linux distributions can be downloaded for free from Ubuntu‟s website. In this 
paper we assume zero license/upgrade costs for OSS. Timing of Upgrades: In the case of 
PS, upgrades tend to be vendor-driven, whereas in the case of OSS, upgrades are 
generally demand driven. As a result there is uncertainty regarding the timing of new 
releases in the case of PS, whereas OSS upgrades are released more frequently and on a 
regular basis (Michlmayr, 2005; Raghunathan et al, 2005; Tawileh and Rana, 2006; Zhao 
and Elbaum, 2003). Recently “Microsoft said it would return to a goal of releasing major 
OS [operating system] upgrades every four years, with at least one minor release between 
each major” (Keizer 2007). It is important to note that here we are only referring to major 
upgrades since minor upgrades or patches are frequently released by both proprietary and 
open source software vendors. Furthermore, with a PS upgrade, the vendor eventually 
withdraws support for the previous version, thus, in many cases, forcing the customer to 
upgrade to the latest version (Bowman, 2006) or support the software on its own. For 
example, over the last few years Microsoft has withdrawn support for Windows 98 and 
ME (Bowman, 2006). On the other hand, with an open source operating system such as 
Linux, there is little or no coercion from the vendor to upgrade to newer versions. To 
model these differences related to upgrades, we assume that i) the support cost for a PS 
customer increases if its version is two or more versions older than the vendor‟s current 
version. There is no such increase in support costs for OSS customers using older 
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versions of OSS. ii) OSS upgrades are available more frequently than PS upgrades. 
Support: Practitioner literature indicates that there is uncertainty regarding the support 
costs of OSS. 
However, there is guaranteed support for PS. For example, in addition to vendor 
support, firms using OSS have the option of supporting the software on their own based 
on their technical capabilities or seeking help from online OSS development 
communities. Hence, it is difficult to ascertain overall support costs for a typical OSS 
adopter. However, there is guaranteed support for PS. For example, Microsoft offers an 
initial period of free unlimited support followed by paid support per incident [Microsoft‟s 
website]. We incorporate this difference by charging variable support costs for OSS and 
fixed support costs for PS. Technical expertise: Given the nature of development and 
support of OSS, a certain level of technical expertise is required to use OSS. Customers 
who do not have sufficient level of technical expertise will rely more on external support 
which tends to be uncertain in the case of OSS (Kim et al, 2006; Leading Edge Forum, 
2004; Lin, 2008). This is less of an issue in the case of PS. We incorporate this important 
aspect in our study by modeling the level of technical capability for OSS adopters which 
is tied to the support costs faced by the adopter.  
Given these differences between OSS and PS, OSS has been studied from various 
perspectives such as diffusion (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003), pricing (Kim et al, 2006; 
Mustonen, 2003), licensing (Tirole and Lerner, 2005), contribution (Lerner and Tirole, 
2001; Xu, 2006), development (Chakravaty et al, 2007; Mockus et al, 2000; Norris, 2004; 
Ruffin and Ebert, 2004; Scacchi, 2002), trust (Hissam et al, 2002), knowledge sharing 
(Sowe et al, 2008), quality and release management (Michlmayr, 2005; Raghunathan et 
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al, 2005; Tawileh and Rana, 2006; Zhao and Elbaum, 2003), and evolution of software 
(Kamhorst, 2002; Yu, 2008). However, in this study we limit our attention to the 
diffusion of OSS and focus on key findings in the literature on OSS diffusion in the 
following subsection. 
1.2.2 Diffusion of OSS 
Diffusion of innovations is a very broad area of investigation. Fichman (2000) 
and Westarp and Wendt (2000) provide detailed reviews. The body of research within 
this area can be whittled down to the investigation of “three basic research questions: 
RQ1: What determines the rate, pattern, and extent of diffusion of an innovation across a 
population of potential adopters? RQ2: What determines the general propensity of an 
organization to adopt and assimilate innovations over time? RQ3: What determines the 
propensity of an organization to adopt and assimilate a particular innovation?” (Fichman, 
2000: pp. 106-107). We address both RQ1 and RQ3: the specific innovation is OSS with 
firms forming the population of potential adopters. According to Westarp and Wendt 
(2000), i) some diffusion models investigate direct impact of neighbors; whereas ii) some 
investigate the impact of social structures on a firm‟s decision to adopt a given 
innovation. Our proposed model investigates both the direct impacts of neighbors as well 
as social structures, on a firm‟s adoption decision regarding OSS.  
Prior studies have developed empirical, analytical and simulation models to 
investigate the factors that affect OSS adoption and diffusion. Bonaccorsi and Rossi 
(2003) developed a simulation model to study adoption and diffusion of OSS. They 
simulated a network of N firms (agents). All firms were using proprietary software at the 
start of the simulation. The software adoption decision was based on the perceived 
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intrinsic value of open source software, the network externality and coordination factors 
(based on other member-firms in the network). The study concluded that OSS diffusion 
depended on the initial distribution of intrinsic values assigned to the technology by the 
agents. Dalle and Jullien (2001) proposed that any firm would choose OSS over PS if its 
local and global benefits outweighed its idiosyncratic preferences. The concept of 
„idiosyncratic preferences‟ is in some ways similar to the one that was later used by 
Bonaccorsi and Rossi as „intrinsic value‟ (2003). Both the local and global benefits were 
considered to be a function of the number of participants in a firm‟s network (including 
firms using the same or different standards). Mustonen (2003) showed through 
mathematical modeling that under certain market conditions both proprietary and open 
source software could co-exist. However, the firm selling the proprietary software must 
carefully evaluate pricing strategies. Kim et al (2006) studied two types of consumer 
firms (high/low-type based on internal technical capability) and three different types of 
pricing schemes for OSS (commercial, dual licensing, and support) under different 
market conditions (monopoly and duopoly). Using mathematical modeling, they were 
able to demonstrate various feasible pricing strategies in both monopoly market and 
duopoly market for PS as well as OSS vendors. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the main studies on diffusion of OSS. Due to the 
lack of space, some of the column headers had to be abbreviated. Here they are in order 
from left to right: perceived value/benefit, network effects (local and global), network 
density (measured as the number of connections with neighbors), price (license cost), 
switching cost, support cost, other costs (training costs, setup costs etc.), risk (of adopting  
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another software), consumer heterogeneity, network topology, length of PS upgrade 
cycle, firm size and technical capability (with respect to OSS). On a cursory level 
diffusion of OSS in an organizational network can be compared with the diffusion of a 
product or a virus or epidemic throughout a network. It can be argued that traditional 
diffusion or epidemic models can be applied to investigate OSS diffusion (see for 
example, Dodds and Watts, 2005). SIS (Susceptible, Infected, Susceptible) and SIR 
(Susceptible, Infected, Removed) are two common classifications of such models (see 
Delre et al, 2007 for a more detailed review). However, there are some important 
differences between the spreading of an epidemic or a virus and software or innovation 
diffusion which limit the applicability of the traditional models: a) unlike viruses or 
epidemics, software does not diffuse merely by virtue of a connection with other firms 
that have adopted the same software, b) in software diffusion, firms may not be equally 
„susceptible‟ to the adoption of a software. Furthermore, the susceptibility is dependent 
on a multitude of social and economic factors such as number of inter-organizational 
relationships, the importance of those individual relationships, the size of the 
organization in question, internal cost benefit analysis etc. Therefore, instead of 
simplifying the diffusion process at the micro level, it is more appropriate to incorporate 
the complexity of the individual nodes, their diverse inter-organizational relationships 
and their decision-making process. Ultimately, these factors collectively drive network-
wide diffusion. Agent-based simulation models facilitate the modeling of such complex, 
heterogeneous behaviors at the micro (agent) level to investigate macro-level phenomena 
(Miller and Page, 2007). 
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1.2.3 Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) 
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is a relatively new and growing 
area of economics (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). At its core lies the notion of agent-based 
modeling and simulation. This section introduces ACE and discusses its use to study 
diffusion dynamics of OSS. ACE can be applied to a problem by defining a set of agents 
with related attributes, behaviors and fitness function; the simulation environment and the 
overall performance-measuring objectives of the environment. Depending on the nature 
of the system being modeled, there can be many types of agents (cells, species, 
individuals, firms, nations etc) and each type of agent can behave differently. These 
agents could act independently, collaboratively or competitively. Over time, as a result of 
repeated interactions, aggregate behavior is likely to emerge that was not originally 
programmed in the system (Waldrop, 1992). 
The open source market exhibits similar characteristics: consumer firms, 
proprietary software vendors, open source support-providing firms (all acting as agents), 
working towards their individual goals (profit maximization and/or sustainability in the 
market) while taking different actions (adopting different standards, pricing strategies 
etc.). In this research, each agent represents a consumer firm. All agents have a set of 
attributes (such as whether the firm uses OSS, its license, support, training costs etc.). 
Each agent can be influenced by the behavior of other agents to different degrees. The 
agents have to choose between upgrading their existing software and switching to the 
alternative software based on their objective or fitness function, which measures the 
average net annual cost savings over a planning horizon. Any meaningful behavior 
exhibited by the system arises from the collective behavior of the group of agents. 
13 
 
This research makes use of simulation modeling to investigate the diffusion 
dynamics of OSS. There are several reasons for choosing this methodology given the 
context of the research. First, in experimental contexts where significant amount of 
empirical research is lacking, simulations can illuminate or eliminate avenues for future 
research. To that extent, the actual numbers used in the simulations are not as important 
as the framework and resulting insights. This is an established notion in simulation based 
studies especially when simulations are used to “stimulate discussion” on a particular 
topic. Second, we find simulations being used in the literature on adoption and diffusion 
of OSS, standards and other phenomena (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Dalle and Jullien, 
2001; Delre et al, 2007; Mustonen, 2003; Wheeler, 2005). Third, agent-based 
simulations, which we intend to use, facilitate the development of more sophisticated 
models that are not limited by considerations of mathematical tractability. Such models 
allow joint investigation of a combination of social as well as economic factors 
(Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). Hence, agent-based modeling facilitates crossing boundaries 
(economic vs. social modeling) in diffusion research. Literature also suggests that agent-
based modeling may be most suited for modeling diffusion compared to other 
methodologies such as statistical models, analytical models and qualitative studies 
(Huang and Kapur, 2007). Finally, increasing computing power has made these 
computationally expensive simulations feasible (Srbljinović and Skunca, 2003) 
Simulation models, like empirical or analytical models have to be validated. Lazer 
and Friedman (2007) state four key criteria for assessing simulation based studies: a) 
“verisimilitude” or face validity i.e. the behavior of the model should closely follow 
reality. This is a well established practice in simulation based studies where some 
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intuitive results or results that corroborate theory or reality are used to build confidence in 
the model (see for example, Dutta and Roy, 2005; Manzoni and Angehrn, 1997; Ahituv 
et al, 1998; Abdel-Hamid 1992; Jones et al, 2006; Kwon et al, 2007). b) robustness, i.e. 
the results should hold in the face of trivial changes to the model c) replicable, i.e. other 
researchers should be able to completely replicate the results of this study and, d) “non-
obvious non-trivial results” i.e. the model should allow the researchers to make new and 
insightful observations. In each of the three essays, the model and the results will be 
assessed based on these criteria. There is an additional important point that needs to be 
emphasized with reference to the validation of agent-based models in particular. As 
mentioned earlier, the whole concept of agent-based modeling or agent-based 
computational economics revolves primarily around the behavior of the individual 
agents. Therefore, once the modeled behavior of an individual agent can be justified 
based on both theoretical and practical grounds that can lend implicit support to the 
validity of the model and possible generalizability of the results and behavior of the 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF DIFFUSION DYNAMICS OF OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is increased interest in the phenomenon of open innovation in general and 
open source software (OSS) in particular. A growing number of organizations are either 
looking to move completely to open-source systems or they are making their existing 
systems compatible with OSS (Wheeler, 2005). However, despite this rising popularity, 
there is limited understanding of the factors that affect the diffusion of OSS at the 
organizational level (Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006). Prior studies in this area have made 
a valuable contribution by identifying some factors. However, they either did not address 
a broad range of critical factors simultaneously in one model or did not investigate the 
impact of critical factors in enough detail leaving some gaps in the literature. This is 
particularly evidenced by a recent call for more research to identify “strategic variables 
other than price [to] better understand the drivers of adoption” and diffusion of OSS 
(Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006: p. 1083). This study recognizes that OSS diffusion is a 
complex phenomenon and emphasizes the need to study it using multiple theoretical 
perspectives. OSS is an innovation and hence can be studied from the diffusion of 
innovation perspective (Rogers, 1995). OSS can also be viewed as a type of standard and 
hence can be examined using the growing body of research on standards (Zhu et al, 
2006). Since OSS is a software product, characteristics of software products such as 
upgrades (Ngwenyama, 2007) and support also influence its diffusion. 
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We address the gaps in the literature by developing an integrated framework that 
simultaneously investigates a heterogeneous set of social and economic factors on the 
diffusion dynamics of OSS using an Agent Based Computational Economics (ACE) 
approach (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). We then apply that framework to illustrate how 
critical factors other than price affect the diffusion dynamics of OSS. 
The proposed model illustrates the effect of the following key, yet under 
researched, variables on the diffusion of OSS: i) network topology; ii) network density; 
iii) variability in the support cost for OSS; iv) interoperability costs between different 
software; v) frequency of upgrades for competing proprietary software (PS); and vi) 
initial proportion of OSS adopters. Specifically, we address the following research 
question: How do key variables other than price individually and collectively affect the 
diffusion dynamics of OSS? 
The desktop operating system (OS) market is used as an exemplar in this study 
since some empirical data regarding its cost components are available. Our results 
demonstrate that a) interoperability costs, variability of OSS support costs, and duration 
of PS upgrade cycle are major determinants of OSS diffusion; b) there are interaction 
effects between network topology, network density and interoperability costs, which 
strongly influence the diffusion dynamics of OSS; c) vendors should consider several 
strategic variables besides price such as interoperability costs, upgrade cycle, network 
topology and network density that significantly impact OSS diffusion; d) the proposed 
framework can be used as a building block to further investigate complex competitive 
dynamics in software markets in general and OSS markets in particular. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: the next section motivates the research 
problem. This is followed by the details of the proposed model, description of results and 
discussion. Finally, conclusions and ideas for future research are discussed along with the 
limitations of this research. 
2.2 Literature Review 
For a detailed review of the literature in the context of this essay, please refer to 
the literature review section in Chapter 1. In this section, an assessment of the literature is 
being provided in an attempt to motivate the research question. 
There are three key reasons that have motivated the development of our model. 
First, as mentioned earlier, there has been a call in previous research to explore “strategic 
variables other than price” to “better understand the drivers of adoption” particularly in 
the context of Windows and Linux (Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006: p. 1083). We model 
the effect of the duration of the PS upgrade cycle and threat of withdrawal of support 
from the PS vendor, which have been missing in the prior literature, on the diffusion 
dynamics of OSS. This is important because firms consider the timing and frequency of 
releases offered by vendors when making their own software upgrade decisions 
(Ngwenyama et al, 2007).  Second, the factors in Table 2 identified have never been 
investigated simultaneously in one study. We propose a comprehensive model that aims 
to study the individual as well as interaction effects of these factors on the diffusion 
dynamics of OSS. The factors identified in Table 2, such as network topology, network 
density and interoperability costs have been studied in prior research and that research 
serves as a theoretical basis for our model. However, given the interactive nature of these 
critical factors in the context of software adoption decisions, a model is needed that 
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allows simultaneous investigation of these factors. Third, we believe that even the factors 
that were included in some of the previous studies were not studied in depth or received 
inadequate attention. For example, the changing roles of factors such as network topology 
over time, the issue of variability or uncertainty regarding OSS support costs and its 
impact on diffusion of OSS have not received adequate attention. Therefore, we identify 
six key, yet under researched, factors and study the effect of a range of values of these 
factors on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. 
Therefore, we identify six key, yet under researched, factors and study the effect 
of a range of values of these factors on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. These factors 
include, network topology, network density, OSS support costs, interoperability costs, 
frequency of PS upgrade cycle and initial proportion of OSS adopters. The following 
subsections provide a more detailed literature review of each of these key variables. 
2.2.1 Network Topology and Network Density 
The effect of network topology and/or network density on diffusion of 
innovations has been studied from various perspectives (Delre et al, 2007; Fichman 2000; 
Harkola and Greeve, 1995; Lin, 2008; Westarp and Wendt, 2000). We examine OSS 
diffusion under three types of network topologies based on the previous literature: 
random, clustered and small world. These topologies exhibit different degrees of 
cliquishness (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Cliquishness is the degree to which a node‟s 
neighbors are each others‟ neighbors. The random network exhibits the lowest degree of 
cliquishness, followed by small-world and clustered networks. The clustered network has 
cliques which are highly interconnected with each other. In the small world network not 
all cliques are highly interconnected with each other. Network density is modeled in our 
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paper as the size of the local neighborhood or number of immediate neighbors. We used 
the Watts and Strogatz algorithm (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) to simulate the three 
network topologies, which have been used to study diffusion of fashions (Delre et al, 
2007) and effect of network topologies and network densities on contribution to OSS 
projects (Singh, 2007). Key studies investigating the impact of network topology and 
network density on the process of diffusion are discussed below. 
Westarp and Wendt (2000) demonstrated through simulations that network 
topology does have an impact on purchase decisions made by consumers regarding 
available software. However, in contrast to our model, their study did not take into 
account a) license, setup, and support costs, b) the heterogeneity of firms in terms of their 
size and interaction with neighbors which ensures that network effect benefits are not the 
same for all consumers and they vary in a non-linear fashion. Delre and colleagues 
(2007) studied the effect of social factors and word-of-mouth processes on the consumer 
decision-making process. In their model, the adoption decision was affected by “external 
marketing effort” and social pressures imposed on and by the consumers in their 
neighborhoods. However, in contrast to our model, their study has several limitations. 
First, the utility derived from adoption does not take into account the individual cost 
components of the software over a unique planning horizon for each firm. Second, the 
decision of each firm is being directly influenced by neighbors‟ neighbors, which is less 
realistic in the case of software adoption where the decision is being directly influenced 
by the immediate group of neighbors. Harkola and Greve (1995) compared the effect of 
cohesion and structural equivalence on the diffusion of technology innovations in an 
empirical study. They concluded that the effect of structural characteristics on diffusion 
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varied based on the different densities of the network. However, we believe that their 
approach is different from ours in two important respects. First, they study diffusion of 
innovation at the level of individuals whereas we study it at the organizational level. 
Second, they do not consider the possibility that other strategic factors such as 
interoperability costs may interact with the effect of network characteristics on the 
diffusion of innovation.  
In summation it can be said that there is some understanding of the effect of 
network topology and network density on the process of diffusion. However, as a result 
of some shortcomings and/or different contexts of research, insights from previous 
models cannot be directly applied to the investigation of diffusion dynamics of OSS. 
We examine OSS diffusion under three types of network topologies based on the 
previous literature: random, clustered and small world. Network density is modeled as the 
size of the local neighborhood or number of immediate neighbors – higher number of 
immediate neighbors results in an denser network. Watts and Strogatz algorithm (Watts 
and Strogatz, 1998) was employed to simulate the three network topologies, which have 
been used to study diffusion of fashions (Delre et al, 2007) and effect of network 
topologies and network densities on contribution to OSS projects (Singh 2007). In our 
network of firms, two firms have a link between them if they conduct transactions with 
each other. These transactions at the basic level could represent an exchange of 
documents, reports, data, or any other kind of electronic information between 
neighboring firms. On each link, the firms conduct a certain number of these transactions 
and as a result, the link is undirected. If the neighboring firms are using incompatible 
software, they will both incur interoperability costs per transaction. These interoperability 
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costs will in part affect the decision of each firm in upgrading its existing software or 
switching to the alternative software. In the clustered network, each firm‟s neighbors are 
likely to be each others‟ neighbors as well. This is highly unlikely in a random network 
where by virtue of having random connections, a firm‟s neighbors may have no 
relationship with each other. In the small-world network, both kinds of firms exist, i.e., 
some neighbors are well connected with each other and some are not connected to each 
other. 
2.2.2 OSS Support Costs 
The impact of support costs on diffusion has been recognized in the previous 
literature (see Table 2). However, this impact needs to be investigated further in the 
context of OSS since practitioner reports suggest that there is considerable uncertainty 
regarding the magnitude of OSS support costs (Leading Edge Forum, 2004). This is 
understandable since not all firms have sufficient level of technical expertise to support 
non-vendor-backed software such as OSS or even a vendor-backed OSS that may not be 
compatible with other software. Firms with programmers that participate in OSS 
development could have significantly lower support costs when compared to other firms. 
Therefore, not only do we consider the possibility of uncertainty regarding OSS support 
costs, we weigh it with respect to a firm‟s technical capability in managing OSS (Kim et 
al. 2006). 
2.2.3 Interoperability Costs 
Previous literature has indicated that interoperability issues play a significant role 
in standard adoption (Chen and Forman, 2006; Katsamakas and Xin, 2005; Wilkins et al, 
2004). In this paper we assume that when neighboring firms conduct transactions with 
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each other (i.e. exchange data), they incur overhead costs per transaction if they are using 
different systems. These costs are aggregated over a volume of transactions to compute 
interoperability costs incurred by each firm with each one of its neighbors. 
Switching platforms (operating systems) can have several implications on a firm‟s 
existing portfolio of applications (Gray, 2005). In the current desktop operation system 
market, Microsoft has a clear dominance. Thus, even supporters of Linux concede that 
the pool of compatible applications for Linux is smaller compared to the pool of 
compatible applications for Windows. This difference may diminish over time. However, 
right now firms can expect to incur some interoperability costs to communicate with 
partners using a different platform. These interoperability costs could take the shape of 
additional effort (labor hours) or software required to ensure interoperability of 
applications. None of the previous studies on diffusion of OSS have specifically 
addressed this issue. 
2.2.4 Duration of PS Upgrade Cycle and the Threat of Withdrawal of Support 
To the best of our knowledge, availability and timing of technology upgrades in 
the context of adoption and diffusion of OSS have not been studied. In this research, we 
only consider major upgrades. Minor upgrades and patches are frequently released for 
proprietary as well as open source software. However, it is when firms are making major 
technology upgrade decisions that they may decide to „jump ship‟ (McAllister, 2006). If 
firms neither upgrade nor switch to a different software, they anticipate that soon the 
support for the existing version will be withdrawn and they will have to reconsider their 
decision (Bowman, 2006). Availability of hardware upgrades also influences the decision 
of firms (McMillan, 2004). Furthermore, there has been extensive research on the release 
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cycles of open source software which points to the coordination issues in release 
management (Michlmayr, 2005). Although release management is beyond the scope of 
this model, it suggests that in the absence of vendors, OSS upgrades tend to be demand-
driven whereas PS upgrades are vendor-driven. This is understandable since with open 
source software, consumers have the option to initiate and/or become involved in the 
development of a desired upgrade. On the other hand, with proprietary software, 
consumers have to either wait for the vendor to release the upgrade, have the upgrade 
custom-made by the vendor, or purchase the required change through a third party.  
The timing of upgrades from the consumer perspective can affect the diffusion 
dynamics as well. Mukherji et al (2006) state that “unlike other types of investment 
decisions, firms would benefit from a long term “plan” for investment in IT upgrades” (p. 
1685). Furthermore, it is important that long-term costs are taken into account during 
upgrade decisions since choice of an operating system is more like a platform decision 
that affects hardware, existing application portfolio, staffing/training issues etc. (Gray, 
2005). The duration of this “long-term” may vary for firms depending on their size and 
industry. Hence, firms will face different annual upgrade costs and that must be factored 
into the decision-making process. As discussed earlier, in the context of the desktop OS 
market, OSS and PS vendors have different upgrade frequencies and PS vendors 
withdraw support for earlier versions once upgrades are released. 
2.2.5 Initial Proportion of OSS Adopters 
Literature on innovation diffusion suggests that the mass of current adopters can 
affect the non-adopters and vice versa (Markus, 1990). The concept of “critical mass can 
be defined as the minimum amount of some resource (people, money, etc.) needed before 
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another condition or product explodes into existence” (Dick, 2004: p. 235). This implies 
that the size of the existing base of adopters of an innovation can strategically impact the 
future diffusion process. 
In the desktop operating system market, Microsoft has by far been the most 
dominant player, becoming the de facto standard. Based on prior studies, we consider two 
different proportions for the initial number of OSS adopters in a population of consumers 
(10% in (Wheeler, 2005) and 30% in (Dalle and Jullien, 2001)). 
2.3 Research Methodology 
This research adopts an agent-based computational modeling approach towards 
the investigation of the research problem. Please refer to Chapter 1 for an overview of 
this modeling approach. This section provides a detailed description of the proposed 
simulation model and simulation parameters. 
In our diffusion model, agents are firms where each firm is using a proprietary or 
open source desktop operating system (for example, Microsoft XP and Red Hat Linux). 
Each firm has to decide whether to upgrade its existing software or switch to the 
alternative software. As is the case for desktop operating systems, we assume that the 
proprietary software dominates the network at the beginning of the simulation. Initially, 
firms using OSS represent a small percentage of the total population and are randomly 
distributed. Each firm will periodically evaluate its technology (hardware and/or 
software) based on its planning horizon. This notion of a planning horizon is based on 
Mukherji et al‟s statement that “in the case of frequent upgrades, it is important for firms 
to decide the frequency at which its technology must be replaced” (Mukherji et al, 2006 : 
p. 1685). Furthermore, they state that firms generally adopt a “long term „plan‟ for 
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investment in IT upgrades”. Therefore, in our model, firms decide whether to upgrade the 
existing software or switch to the other software at the beginning of their planning 
horizon. This notion of a firm‟s technology upgrade frequency or planning horizon is 
closely tied to the technology vendor‟s release cycle. As an example, consider a firm that 
has a Windows operating system deployed on its desktops. If this firm chooses to 
upgrade its existing desktop operating system, it will only choose to do so after a newer 
version has been released. In other words, the desktop operating system upgrade 
frequency of the firm cannot be shorter than Microsoft‟s Windows release upgrade 
frequency. Therefore, we model the length of a firm‟s planning horizon (PH) to be 
greater than or equal to the upgrade cycle (UC) of its respective vendor. The longer the 
PH, the more reluctant a firm is to consider software changes due to reasons such as 
organizational inertia, risk aversion or lower innovativeness. To simulate that behavior 
we chose a range of values of PH for the firms and these values were distributed across 
the entire population in proportions similar to a S-shaped curve (i.e., 20% firms have a 
PH=UC, 30% have a PH=UC+1, 30% have a PH=UC+2, and 20% have a PH=UC+3). 
Furthermore, firms are connected in a network in which each link represents a business 
relationship. Connected or neighboring firms conduct business transactions with each 
other which could represent an exchange of documents, reports, data, or any other kind of 
electronic information. If neighboring firms are using incompatible software (or software 
with interoperability issues involved) they will incur interoperability costs per 
transaction. Each firm considers whether to adopt the other software or upgrade its 
existing software, at time t based on the following decision function: 
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 represents annual costs if the firm decides to switch to the other software 
 represents the degree centrality of a firm 
n  represents the proportion of a firms‟ neighbors who use the proposed new software. 
The left-hand side (LHS) of Equation (1) represents expected annual cost savings 
or expected benefit from switching to the alternative software as against upgrading the 
existing software. These costs include license, setup, training, support and 
interoperability costs. . However, with new innovations such as OS, these costs could be 
uncertain [18, 21]. Hence, consistent with economics and innovation theory adopters 
could expect the value of the left-hand side to be different from zero depending on their 
risk preferences, and how they process uncertain information [6].  The right-hand-side 
(RHS) of Equation (1) represents a threshold unique to each firm. For example, if the 
left-hand-side for a firm A is evaluated to X then a firm such as Wal-Mart and a firm 
such as one of Wal-Mart‟s suppliers will value these savings differently and hence 
require LHS values to be greater than different thresholds (RHS values). Thresholds 
could represent risk preferences [6] and/or social influence [9], and are well-accepted in 
diffusion research. Furthermore, prior research also suggests that firms anticipate the 
decision of their neighbors when making their own technology decisions [48] and they 
may not place an equal level of emphasis on the decision of their neighbors. The RHS of 
our decision function combines economic and social perspectives to incorporate this 
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multi-level heterogeneity by stating that a firm‟s valuation of its savings will be 
determined by a combination of factors: its level of social influence (or centrality, 
captured by α) and the decision of its neighbors (captured by n). A highly 
influential/central firm such as Wal-Mart will not worry too much about the decision of 
its neighbors (who have low centrality) when it makes technology adoption decisions. 
Therefore, for a firm such as Wal-Mart, (1–α) will become a low weight attached to the 
decision of its neighbors (1–n). However, it could have a nonzero threshold as discussed 
above. On the other hand, let‟s say for one of Wal-Mart‟s suppliers, with low-centrality, 
the decision of its (few) neighbors might be more important so a low α will result in a 
higher weight (1–α) attached to the decision of the neighbors. The added interesting 
element is that the software choice of neighbors also affects the LHS of the decision 
function. If more neighbors are using the other software, then holding centrality (α) 
constant, a firm is more likely to be pulled towards the choice of its neighbors when 
interoperability costs are high. Interoperability costs reduce expected cost savings and 
make a firm likely to conform to its neighbors. However, the firm is not bound to 
conform. As mentioned earlier, a highly central firm will attach low weight to the 
decision of its neighbors, which would mean a lower threshold or lower RHS which in 
turn would mean that even a small proportion of cost savings will encourage the firm to 
switch to the alternative even if all its neighbors continue to use a different software. 
Furthermore, in our simulations, the most central firm makes an adoption decision prior 
to its neighbors because it is less prone to social influence in making its own adoption 
decision. However, once it has made an adoption decision, it influences all its neighbors 
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who make subsequent adoption decisions. For the same LHS and n, a more central firm 
(higher α or lower 1-α) is more likely to switch. 
Going back to the simulation process, since firms upgrade to keep up with the 
latest technology/features and/or to maximize the utility they can derive from the existing 
software (Ngwenyama et al, 2007), we assume that if they do not switch, they will 
necessarily upgrade to the latest available version of their existing software. Firms 
upgrade under the assumption that upgrades offer quality advantages and that if firms do 
not find the other software (PS or OSS) viable, they will avail the quality improvements 
offered by the upgrades. This eagerness to avail quality improvements may not be the 
same for all firms. Hence, each firm has a different planning horizon. 
A 3x3x3x3x2x2 study was designed in order to study six main variables. This 
study uses three different parameters each for the following: network typology (random, 
small world, clustered), network density (low, medium, high), OSS support costs (support 
costs slightly higher than PS on average with low variability; support costs slightly higher 
than PS on average with very high variability; support costs much higher than PS with 
very low variability), and interoperability costs (low, medium and high). Two different 
parameters are used for the length of the PS vendor‟s upgrade cycle (short and long) and 
the initial proportion of OSS firms (low and high). Fifty samples were drawn from 
respective distributions for each of the random variables, and the results were averaged. 
The simulation was run for 100 time periods, for each of the 324 combinations. Figure 1 
illustrates the flow diagram for our model. The key parameter values used in the 
simulation are summarized in Table 3. Wherever possible, we used numbers obtained 
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from the practitioner literature. The model was developed using NetLogo (Wilensky) – 
see Appendices C & D for details). 
Simulations were extremely computationally intensive and were run on a Linux-
based cluster which had 200 CPU cluster blade servers, Intel Xeon CPUs and gigabit 
Ethernet interconnections with 2TBs of dedicated network attached storage. 
2.4 Results and Analysis 
Two criteria were defined for diffusion: a) if the number of OSS adopters 
doubled, b) if the number of OSS adopters increased by 50% during the course of the 
simulation. All propositions remained the same under both conditions which indicates the 
robustness of the model. Actual numbers based on the first criterion of diffusion will only 
be reported here. Diffusion predominantly occurred with high initial proportion of OSS 
adopters and did not occur under very high OSS support costs. Out of 324 cases, 
diffusion occurred in 72 cases. Logistic regression was performed to test which of the six 
factors increased the likelihood of diffusion of OSS. The analysis revealed initial 
proportion of OSS adopters to be the most statistically significant factor in increasing the 
likelihood of diffusion of OSS, followed by interoperability costs, network density, high 
variability in support costs and network topology. The model correctly predicted about 
86% of the diffusion cases and 96% of the non-diffusion cases. Table 4 shows a summary 
of results from the logistic regression. 
Subsequent analysis focused on the cases in which diffusion did occur. Multiple 
linear regression revealed PS upgrade cycle to be statistically significant in predicting the 
diffusion of OSS as well. In order to determine the statistical significance within the 
levels of each factor, repeated measures tests were performed.  
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Figure 1 : Flow diagram for the basic simulation model 
 
Network level attributes are determined: 
 The upgrade cycle for PS (2 or 4) 
 The strength of interoperability issues 
 The distribution of OSS support cost  
Firm level attributes are determined: 
 Standard (OSS/PS) adopted (10% or 30% are initial OSS adopters) 
 Number of computers 
 Volume of transactions per year with each trading partners 
 Centrality 
 Planning horizon 
 OSS technical capability 
 License cost, training cost, setup cost, and support cost for current standard 
Is the firm at the beginning of its planning horizon (citeration % PH = 0)? 
Calculate (based on the descending order of centrality): 
Upgrade cost of the existing standard 
U
tC 1  
Switch cost of the new standard 
S
tC 1  
Threshold: (1-Centrality)*(1-Propotion of Firms using the new standard) 
Yes 
Is  (  - )/ >Threshold? 
U
tC 1
S
tC 1
U
tC 1
Switch to the new standard and obtain costs associated with the new standard. 
Proceed to the next simulation year. 
No 
No 
A network of 1000 firms is generated based on Watts and Strogatz algorithm (1998) 
Yes 
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Table 3: Key Simulation Parameters 
Attribute   Description 
Network size Number of firms in the network – 1000 
Firm size The number of computers each firm has is a proxy measure for firm size ~ U[100,500] 
Initial number 
of OSS firms 
Two different values were chosen : 10% (Wheeler 2005) and 30% (Dalle & Jullien 2001) 
Network 
Topology 
Three different network topologies were created using the Watts & Strogatz (1998) 
algorithm: random, small world and clustered.   
Network 
density 
This is measured by the average immediate number of neighbors of a firm. Three values 
were picked: 5%, 15%, 25% representing small, medium and large neighborhoods. 5% 
means that the local neighborhood of each firm will have 5% of the total firms in the 
network. This implies that larger neighborhood size will mean denser networks. With 3 
network topologies and 3 sizes of neighborhoods, 9 different networks were created. The 
values for the neighborhood sizes were chosen to ensure that structurally the networks 
were different. 
Upgrade cycle 
This represents the duration between successive major upgrades offered by the PS or 
OSS vendors. We chose an upgrade cycle of 4 (long) and 2 (short) years for proprietary 
software (Keizer, 2007) and fixed the upgrade cycle for OSS to 2 years. Keeping in view 
the demand-driven aspect of OSS upgrades, we kept shorter upgrade cycles for OSS than 
for PS. 
Planning 
horizon 
PH indicates how often a firm conducts a major software upgrade. PH depends on the 
upgrade cycle of the software the firm is adopting. A range of planning horizons were 
assigned such that some firms had very short or very long planning horizons, majority 
had planning horizons in between these two extremes. The range of values were UC, 
UC+1, UC+2, UC+3 where UC represents the upgrade cycle of the firm‟s  existing 
software (OSS or PS). 
Volume of 
transactions 
This represents the total number of transactions on each link in the network generated 
using a uniform random distribution U[100,500]. It was used to compute interoperability 
costs 
Level of 
interoperability 
costs 
If neighboring firms were using a different standard, we assumed that they incurred 
interoperability costs. The level of these interoperability costs was initially chosen to be 
1, 3 and 5. However, once regression revealed the importance of this variable, a bigger 
range of values was tried for sensitivity analysis (0.1, 0.2, 0.3 … 0.8). 
Current license 
Costs 
$199, $0 per machine for PS and OSS respectively (Guth, 2007; Vaughan-Nicholas, 
2006) 
Training Costs 
This was chosen to be $20, $30 per machine for PS and OSS respectively. A lower value 
for PS was chosen under the assumption that since PS already has a large installed base, 
new hires would be expected to be more familiar, hence easier to train, using PS than 
OSS. 
Setup Costs $325, $70 per machine for PS and OSS respectively (Vaughan-Nicholas, 2006) 
Support Costs 
Firms incur heterogeneous OSS support cost due to differences in degree of integration, 
customization, variability of OSS quality, lack of systematic version management and 
other factors (Kamhorst, 2002). Effective OSS support cost is determined by three 
normal distributions: N(60,15), N(60,60), N(250,50) depending on its mean value and 
variability. PS Support costs are kept fixed at $50 (Vaughan-Nicholas, 2006). Negative 
values were avoided by truncation to zero. 
OSS technical 
capability 
Firms‟ technical capability with respect to OSS are different (Kim et al, 2006) and are 
determined by a random variable drawn from N(0.3, 0.1) 
Degree  
centrality 
The more neighbors a firm has, the more powerful it is in influencing its partner‟s 
standard adoption decision and the more strongly it can be influenced by the decision of 
its neighbors. 
Withdrawal of 
support 
We model the threat of withdrawal of support by the PS vendor by doubling the support 
costs if the firm is 2 or more versions behind its vendor‟s current version. 
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Table 4: Beta weights, Wald statistic and Odds ratios from Logistic Regression 
 B S. E. Wald df Sig. Odds 
Ratio 
Network Topology 1 -2.183 .972 5.038 1 .025* .113 
Network Topology 2 .000 .780 .000 1 1.000 1.000 
Network Density -48.441 10.439 21.531 1 .000** .000 
OSS Support Costs 1 -28.120 2498.950 .000 1 .991 .000 
OSS Support Costs 2 3.754 1.032 13.232 1 .000** 42.685 
Interoperability Costs -2.961 .604 24.012 1 .000** .052 
PS Upgrade Cycle .000 .335 .000 1 1.000 1.000 
Initial Proportion of OSS adopters 53.979 10.986 24.141 1 .000** 2.772E23 
Constant .211 1.491 .020 1 .887 1.235 
In most cases the diffusion curves were clearly separate, hence repeated measures 
tests, with number of OSS adopters as the dependent variable, were performed. However, 
when the diffusion curves from different parameter combinations overlapped or reached 
the same endpoint, the speed of diffusion was computed as follows and used as the 
dependent variable in the repeated measures tests:
 
T
t
T
t
tf
tD
T
0
0
)(
)(
1
        (2) 
Where T represents the duration of the simulation (100 time periods in our 
model), “D(t) is the cumulative function of adopters at time t, and f(t) is the number of 
adopters at time t” (Delre et al, 2007, p. 193).  is useful when the diffusion paths to be 
compared reach the same endpoint (Delre et al, 2007). The following sections provide a 
detailed look into the main and interaction effects of these variables on OSS diffusion. 
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2.4.1 Main Effects 
The analysis revealed that high interoperability costs favored the dominant 
standard by locking-in its users. Low interoperability costs, on the other hand, shifted the 
emphasis to other factors such as costs, network topology and network density thus 
reducing the possibility of lock-in (Figure 2). This meant that at the start of the 
simulation, high interoperability costs always prevented firms from switching to OSS. 
However, if due to other cost factors, OSS did manage to gain critical mass, the same 
interoperability costs hastened the diffusion of OSS throughout the network. This leads to 
the first proposition: 
Proposition 1: When PS is the dominant software in the market, increasing 
interoperability costs reduces the diffusion of OSS 
 
 
Figure 2. Decreasing interoperability costs favor diffusion of OSS 
Small World; Small Neighborhood; PS Upgrade Cycle=4
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This is consistent with what we are seeing in the desktop OS market: 
interoperability issues are a major reason why many organizations are reluctant in 
adopting Linux or any other open source desktop operating system. 
Similarly, shorter duration of the PS upgrade cycle tended to favor the diffusion 
of OSS (Figure 3) because a) it encouraged PS firms to consider upgrades/switches more 
frequently; b) firms upgrading PS faced the possibility of incurring higher one-time costs 
(such as setup and training costs), averaged per year, than OSS and this makes it 
attractive for some firms to switch to OSS. Hence, the second proposition 
Proposition 2: Shorter PS upgrade cycles favor the diffusion of OSS 
 
Figure 3. Rate of diffusion of OSS is faster when the PS upgrade cycle is reduced 
Propositions 1 and 2 are somewhat intuitive and corroborate what we are seeing 
in reality. However, these results are valuable nonetheless as they establish face validity 
of the model (Lazer and Friedman 2007) and allow us to expound more interesting results 
with greater confidence in the validity of the model. This is an established practice in 
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simulation based studies where some intuitive results or results that corroborate theory or 
reality are used to build confidence in the model (see for example, Dutta and Roy, 2005; 
Manzoni and Angehrn, 1997; Ahituv et al, 1998; Abdel-Hamid 1992; Jones et al, 2006; 
Kwon et al, 2007). 
Significant diffusion of OSS occurred in the presence of high variability in 
support costs (N(60,60) in Table 3). This is not a readily intuitive result. Under high 
variability some firms incurred very low OSS support costs, thus their intrinsic value of 
OSS was large enough to motivate them to switch. When a sufficient mass of early OSS 
adopters was acquired, this further drove the OSS diffusion. It is worthwhile to note that 
if the proportion of OSS adopters was high (30%) to start with, then ceteris paribus, the 
critical mass was attained much faster than when the initial proportion was 10%. The low 
variability or very high magnitude of support costs (N(60,15), N(250,50)) was not able to 
make OSS seem more attractive than PS because most of the firms on average had very 
high support costs. Again, this result corroborates what is happening in reality. Despite 
having an established base of locked-in customers in the desktop market, Microsoft is 
slowly losing some of its market share to Linux. 
On the one hand, there are firms (at the high end of this distribution) which feel 
that (either due to their lack of technical capability or lack of available compatible pool of 
applications) the support costs for OSS are too high. On the other hand, in addition to the 
low upfront costs, there are some firms which are facing very low OSS support costs (due 
to their technical capability or involvement in the open source online communities, or the 
way they are implementing these systems, flexibility in customizing and independent bug 
fixing and lock-in avoidance). These firms are finding it more attractive to adopt OSS 
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than PS. Their adoption in turn influences other firms (Figure 4). Hence we state our third 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: High variability in support costs favors the diffusion of OSS. 
It is important to note that propositions 1, 2 and 3 were valid for all parameter 
conditions. The simulations revealed interaction effects between network topology, 
network density and interoperability costs that highlight the dynamics of diffusion. These 
are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
Figure 4. High variability in support costs favors the diffusion of OSS 
2.4.2 Interaction Effects 
Simulations indicate that the effect of varying network density is strongly linked 
to the strength of interoperability costs. When interoperability costs are high, less dense 
networks (small neighborhoods) encourage the diffusion of OSS the most (Figure 5), 
followed by denser networks (medium and large sized neighborhoods). As explained 
earlier in the context of the decision function, each firm simultaneously influences the 
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decision of its neighboring firms and gets influenced by their decisions. For example, in 
high density networks, firms on average have more neighbors. This means that 
simultaneously, the decision of a firm a) influences many firms (its neighbors) and b) can 
be influenced by many firms. The level of this influence is affected by the strength of 
interoperability costs. If most of the neighbors of a firm have adopted a particular 
platform, they will likely influence the firm in question to adopt the same software in the 
case of high interoperability costs. 
 
Figure 5. Rate of diffusion is fastest in small neighborhood (NB) or low density network 
with relatively high interoperability costs 
In a denser network, where firms on average have more neighbors, such influence 
will increase. However, with low interoperability costs high density networks encourage 
the diffusion of OSS (Figure 6). This is because with low interoperability costs firms are 
less concerned about the software being used by their neighbors and in a high density 
network one firm‟s decision to switch can influence many firms and spread the „news‟ 
quickly. Hence, we have the following propositions: 
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Figure 6. Rate of diffusion is fastest in large neighborhood (NB) or high density network 
with relatively low interoperability costs 
 
Proposition 4a: With relatively high interoperability costs, diffusion of OSS is faster in 
low density networks and slower in high density networks. 
Proposition 4b: With relatively low interoperability costs, diffusion of OSS is faster in 
high density networks and slower in low density networks. 
In these and subsequent propositions, relatively low interoperability costs mean 
per interoperability costs <0.4 whereas relatively high interoperability costs are ≥ 0.4. It 
is important to note that the above mentioned effects of network density, a) do not force a 
firm to switch or upgrade an existing software, b) are not the only effects that a firm has 
to contend with. The cost components on the left-hand-side of the decision function 
(Equation 1) and the centrality of the firm will ultimately dictate the decision. These 
propositions demonstrate the dynamics of OSS diffusion. The exact values of 
interoperability costs for which these dynamics appear in our simulation are less 
important. Hence we use the terms „relatively high‟ and „relatively low‟ interoperability 
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costs. As mentioned earlier, if the rate of OSS diffusion is too fast, it is hard to 
demonstrate the various effects of the key variables. Thus, the effect of network topology 
is more pronounced if the diffusion rate is slow. 
Further analysis of the simulations showed that the effect of network topology 
varies with the effect of network density and interoperability costs. It was found that 
when interoperability costs are high in high density networks, there is a clear difference 
between the diffusion curves of the three network topologies (Figure 7). However, when 
the network density is low, the difference is less apparent. Here the difference between 
the diffusion curves is defined in terms of the absolute distance between the curves for 
the three network topologies. The explanation lies in the fact that the effect of network 
topology is stronger when the diffusion rate is slower. When interoperability costs are 
high in dense networks, the rate of diffusion is slow (Proposition 4a).  
 
Figure 7.  The difference between rates of diffusion across network topologies is more 
pronounced with relatively high interoperability costs as we increase the size of 
neighborhood or density of the network 
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Therefore, how firms are connected to each other (network topology) strongly 
influences the overall diffusion process. On the other hand, if rate of diffusion is fast, as 
is the case in high interoperability low density networks, then network topology makes 
less of a difference. Hence, 
Proposition 5a: With relatively high interoperability costs, reducing network density 
reduces the effect of network topology on the diffusion of OSS 
Similarly, proposition 4b indicates that in the presence of low interoperability 
costs, high density networks will facilitate faster diffusion of OSS than low density 
networks. In this case, reducing network density will dampen the rate of diffusion of OSS 
and enhance the effect of network topology (Figure 8). Hence,  
Proposition 5b: With relatively low interoperability costs, reducing network density 
increases the effect of network topology on the diffusion of OSS. 
 
Figure 8. The difference between rates of diffusion across network topologies is more 
evident with relatively low interoperability costs, as we reduce the size of neighborhood 
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Propositions 4a and 4b demonstrate that the effect of interoperability costs on the 
speed of diffusion of OSS varies with the density of the network (two-way interaction); 
propositions 5a and 5b demonstrated that the effect of network topology on speed of OSS 
diffusion is closely tied to the effects of network density and interoperability costs (three-
way interaction). These results automatically raise the question: given that network 
topology makes a difference, which network topology favors the diffusion of OSS? 
Figure 8 shows that for the most part, regardless of the network density, rate of 
diffusion is fastest in a random network. However, in Figure 7, in low density networks, 
rate of diffusion is initially fastest in clustered networks, then in random networks and 
eventually in small world networks. In high density networks, rate of diffusion is 
considerably slower overall, but fastest in clustered networks followed by small world 
and random networks. These are very interesting results which have not been captured in 
earlier studies and warrant an explanation. Let us first consider the differences between 
the three network topologies. In a random network topology, the neighbors of a firm may 
not be well connected with each other whereas in a clustered network, the neighbors of 
one firm are very likely to be neighbors of each other as well. This means that the number 
of potential new adopters influenced in every time period is higher in a random network 
than in a clustered network. This can be understood by considering a PS cluster where 
every agent is connected to every other agent. When the first PS user switches to OSS, all 
of its neighbors are influenced by the decision. Thus, no new node will be influenced 
later on. On the other hand, in a random network, new nodes are more likely to be 
affected over time as firms‟ second tier neighbors (i.e., neighbors‟ neighbor) are less 
likely to overlap with firms‟ immediate neighbors. This has the potential of triggering 
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OSS diffusion in different parts of a random network. Furthermore, this potential would 
be present regardless of the density of the network. However, whether OSS diffusion is 
actually triggered or the extent to which it is triggered is also dependent on the strength of 
interoperability costs (as evidenced by the first and the last four propositions). In an 
initially PS dominated network with low interoperability costs, firms evaluate OSS and 
PS on other cost factors, which are more favorable for OSS, with only limited additional 
pressure from their PS-neighbors. This coupled with the potential of random connections 
to trigger diffusion across the network, results in rapid diffusion of OSS (Figure 8). 
Proposition 6: In the absence of or under low interoperability costs, random network has 
the fastest OSS diffusion regardless of the density of the network. 
However, as interoperability costs increase, initially if there is any diffusion in a 
PS dominated network, it occurs within the cliques of the clustered networks. Despite 
their low overall numbers in the network, some of the OSS firms may be in majority in 
cliques across the network and they will drive the diffusion in the early part of the 
simulation. That cannot happen in a random network where the same number of OSS 
adopters are widely dispersed throughout the network and cannot enforce any „social 
pressures‟ in the absence of cliques. Therefore, initially adoption is slowly driven within 
clusters in the presence of high interoperability costs. However, as the number of OSS 
adopters reaches a critical mass, the random networks use their „random‟ connections to 
drive diffusion globally throughout the network. 
Proposition 7: In the presence of relatively high interoperability costs, initial diffusion is 
driven by the local connections or cliques and later on the global or random connections 
drive the diffusion process. 
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The point where this changeover takes place is decided by the density of the 
network. Notice for instance that in the bottom three curves of Figure 6a, the rate of 
diffusion is the fastest in the clustered network throughout the course of the simulation. 
In this case OSS is never able to attain a critical mass of adopters from where diffusion 
can then really kick off. In a dense network with high interoperability costs, the OSS 
adopter may require a much longer period to attain that critical mass than in a less dense 
network (top three curves of Figure 7). 
From a practical perspective this implies that under high interoperability costs a) 
OSS vendors need to focus more on group-based adoption of OSS to gain critical mass, 
b) it will take longer to achieve critical mass in denser networks, c) once critical mass is 
achieved, group-based adoption may no longer be as valuable as before and small world 
networks will result in the fastest diffusion of OSS (Figure 9) By nature small world 
networks have elements of the other two types of networks. 
2.5 Discussion 
The objectives of this research were to a) devise a framework for simultaneous 
investigation of social and economic factors affecting OSS diffusion, b) explore the effect 
of network topology, network density, uncertainty regarding OSS support costs, 
interoperability issues, the length of the PS upgrade cycle, and initial proportion of OSS 
adopters on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. 
An agent-based computational economics approach was applied in pursuit of 
these objectives by modeling the market forces affecting software diffusion based on both 
academic and practitioner literature. To that extent, the actual numbers used in the 
experiments are not as important as the framework and resulting insights. 
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Figure 9. Rate of diffusion becomes fastest in small world networks as interoperability 
costs increase in less dense networks 
This is a well established notion in simulation based studies especially when simulations 
are used to “stimulate discussion” on a particular topic (Dutta and Roy, 2005; Manzoni 
and Angehrn, 1997; Ahituv et al, 1998; Abdel-Hamid 1992; Jones et al, 2006; Kwon et 
al, 2007). However, it is worthwhile to revisit key assumptions made in the study and 
briefly address their effects on the propositions. 
2.5.1 Assumptions and Propositions 
First, we had assumed zero license/upgrade costs for OSS. In reality, there might 
be some upgrade costs for OSS but they would still be very low compared to PS upgrade 
costs (Wheeler 2005) and would not have any significant impact on our propositions. 
Second we had assumed that support costs for PS adopters would go up if their existing 
version is two or more versions older than the latest release from the PS vendor. 
Although it is known that PS users do not have guaranteed support once support is 
withdrawn for older version of the software by the PS vendor, we re-ran our experiments 
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by removing this assumption and holding the support cost constant for PS adopters. We 
found that relaxing the assumption did not change our results. This result further 
establishes the robustness of our model and the resulting insights. Third, we assumed that 
OSS upgrades are more frequently available than PS upgrades and that upgrades mean 
more costs than benefits. Although, in our exemplar of Microsoft‟s Windows and 
Ubuntu‟s Linux releases it was evident that Linux releases are more frequent, we used 
two different PS upgrade cycles in our model – short and long. Although proposition 2 
showed that speed of diffusion was faster when PS upgrade cycles were shorter, there 
was no qualitative difference in the rest of the propositions as a result of the different PS 
upgrade cycles. As for the costs associated with upgrades, we do take the qualitative 
benefits from an upgrade into account by assuming that in light of the potential benefits 
afforded by an upgrade, firms will either choose to switch or upgrade. Proposition 2 will 
no longer hold if upgrades indeed bring significantly more quantitative benefits than cost 
(i.e., positive cost saving from upgrade in the left-hand-side of the decision function). 
However, such a case is rare in reality. Fourth, we assumed that if firms do not switch to 
the alternative software they will upgrade their existing software. In reality, however, it is 
possible that firms may not decide to upgrade their software as well and continue to 
support the software on their own. However, other than slowing down the eventual 
diffusion of software, this assumption should have no qualitative impact on the insights 
generated through the propositions. Fifth, we assumed that when firms conduct 
transactions with each other, they incur interoperability costs per transaction. In reality, 
firms may choose to handle interoperability issues differently. We chose to use some 
numbers to model varying strengths of interoperability costs to accommodate those 
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differences in reality. However, the point remains that some interoperability costs will be 
incurred. Again, changing the actual numbers of the interoperability costs will not affect 
the insights from our model. Sixth, we assumed that PS dominates the software market at 
the start of the simulation. This is a realistic assumption in the desktop operating system 
market. However, even if this assumption is relaxed, or the proportion of OSS versus PS 
is reversed at the start of the simulation, the propositions will not be affected. 
In summation it can be seen that barring one assumption that would affect one 
proposition, all other assumptions made in the model can be relaxed or modified without 
affecting the results and insights generated from the model. As discussed earlier in 
Chapter 1, Lazer and Friedman (2007) proposed four key criteria for assessing simulation 
based studies: a) face validity i.e. the behavior of the model should closely follow reality, 
b) robustness, i.e. the results should hold in the face of trivial changes to the model c) 
replicable, i.e. other researchers should be able to completely replicate the results of this 
study and, d) “non-obvious non-trivial results” i.e. the model should allow the researchers 
to make new and insightful observations. This research satisfies all four criteria. The first 
two criteria are met by modeling the behavior of the individual agents (instead of 
aggregate behavior in traditional simulations) and choosing specific simulation 
parameters on academic research as well as practitioner reports. In addition, some of the 
results produced by the model are intuitive (Propositions 1 & 2). The paper provides 
sufficient detail about the simulation process and parameters for any other researcher to 
replicate the study (third criterion). Finally, the propositions stated earlier, particularly 
those regarding the interaction effects are indeed „non-trivial‟ results that have not been 
highlighted in previous OSS research (fourth criterion). 
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2.6 Contribution to Research 
This paper has made the following contributions to the growing body of research 
on OSS. First, it has provided a framework that can be used to study the diffusion 
processes of competing software. The framework concurrently includes multiple under-
researched variables and could serve as a building block for diffusion dynamics under 
different pricing schemes. It was applied to specifically study the diffusion processes of 
OSS and PS where the former is characterized by low license costs, high variability in 
support costs, various OSS technical capabilities and no threat of withdrawal of support. 
Although the desktop operating system was used as an exemplar, we believe that our 
framework is general enough to be applied to the investigation of other software as well. 
For example, in the server operating system (OS) market, the initial number of OSS 
adopters, setup costs, support costs and training costs will be higher than those in the 
desktop OS market, but the model will still be applicable. Similarly, in the open source 
ERP market, the strength of interoperability issues may be higher than those described in 
our model in the context of the desktop OS, however the propositions should still hold. 
Second, it has demonstrated that the diffusion of software is dependent on strategic 
factors other than price, such as interoperability costs, network topology and density. 
This result has been demonstrated while incorporating significant heterogeneity among 
adopters and considering factors such as the threat of withdrawal of support by the PS 
vendor and the influence of centrality of neighbors on adoption decisions. Third, it has 
illustrated that variability in OSS support costs hastens the diffusion of OSS, given other 
factors. Fourth, it has incorporated the use of social networking concepts such as degree 
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centrality to study diffusion of OSS and standards. Compared to earlier papers, our model 
provides a richer depiction of the critical variables and their interactions with each other. 
2.7 Contribution to Practice 
In order to illustrate the effects of key variables on the diffusion of OSS we 
deliberately chose a PS vendor that did not react to the changes in the market. Earlier 
models that investigated various pricing strategies for a PS vendor in competition with an 
OSS vendor did so without realizing the significance of other variables such as 
interoperability costs, duration of PS upgrade cycle, threat of withdrawal of support, 
network topology and network density on the diffusion of OSS. As a consequence we 
have offered a model that captures the interesting effects of these variables and can now 
be used as a building block to better investigate the impact of various pricing schemes on 
the PS and OSS software market. Furthermore, by modeling the effects of these key 
variables we have shown that PS and OSS vendors need to focus on strategic variables 
other than price to compete against each other. The simulation results revealed that the 
PS vendor is only threatened by OSS if interoperability costs are low and there is high 
variability in OSS support costs. With high variability in OSS support costs, the OSS 
vendor can offer very low support costs to some firms and build a critical mass that 
drives diffusion across the network. Our result also suggests that the applicability of the 
group-based adoption strategies depends on the existing interoperability cost and network 
density. From a PS vendor‟s perspective the upgrade policy could be revised by changing 
a) the frequency of upgrades, b) the additional cost of upgrades and c) the timing of 
withdrawal of support for earlier versions, all of which can potentially impact the 
diffusion of its software. 
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2.8 Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
This essay proposes a model to better understand the impact of six key, yet under 
researched factors on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. We believe that our model builds 
on prior research and helps to create a richer theoretical foundation for studying OSS 
diffusion. Such modeling helps to structure the debate and open up the field for additional 
research (Liberatore et al 2000). The model presented in this paper could serve as a 
foundation on which different competitive actions by PS vendors can be superimposed. 
For example, different pricing policies and strategies for withdrawal of support can be 
examined. The results also indicated that apart from license costs, there are other key 
variables which the PS vendor can manipulate to prevent the diffusion of OSS. For 
example, the PS vendor could influence interoperability and upgrade costs, change the 
timing of withdrawal of support to influence the decision of existing and potential 
adopters. Hence, our model can be considered to be similar in purpose to the agent-based 
models that have been used in other domains such as supply chain management to create 
building blocks for studying dynamics (Swaminathan et al, 1998). Future research will 
focus on integrating competitive dynamics with the model presented in this paper to build 
a Complex Adaptive System (Miller and Page, 2007). 
There are some aspects of this study that limit its scope and applicability. First, 
some of the probabilistic variables in the simulation were modeled using uniform and 
normal distributions. While these are reasonable choices in the absence of other 
information, one approach would be to use multiple distributions to condition the results. 
Second, the decision function of the individual firms is based on net cost savings. These 
cost savings are used as a proxy for measuring benefits. We believe this is a reasonable 
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approach since benefits are typically difficult to quantify. However, some domain-
specific benefit modeling may be possible. Again, we view this as an extension that can 
be superimposed on the basic model proposed in this paper. Third, diffusion dynamics 
highlighted by the propositions regarding interaction effects may not always be visible if 
one or more parameters dominate the diffusion process. For example, at one extreme, if 
interoperability costs are extremely high, diffusion will not occur and interaction effects 
will not be visible. Similarly, at the other extreme if OSS license costs are zero and 
interoperability costs are close to zero then diffusion dynamics can be driven by these 
two parameters and the effect of network topology or density is not significant. Fourth, 
the network structure remains static throughout the course of a simulation. However, 
from a practical perspective, the business relationships between firms evolve over time. A 
firm that is forced into adoption of an innovation by its neighbor may not necessarily 
continue its business ties with that neighbor. Finally, it is assumed that firms will adopt 
open source or proprietary software and not both. In reality however, we see that large 
organizations may actually choose to deploy both types of software at some point in time. 
Though this paper has focused on OSS diffusion, we believe that the model is fairly 
general and is applicable to studying the dynamics of software diffusion in a variety of 
contexts.  Examining the generalizability of this model is another area of future research. 
In this essay we highlighted key firm-level determinants of the diffusion of OSS. 
In Chapter 3, while drawing on the literature on social network analysis, we explore the 
importance of interrelationships between firms in explaining the diffusion of OSS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFUSION OF OPEN 
SOURCE SOFTWARE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The acceptance of open source software (OSS) in private and government 
organizations has increased over the last few years (Blau 2006; Sayer, 2005; Shiels 
2009). For example, in 2003 the city of Munich announced that it would move 14,000 
PCs from Windows to Linux operating system (Shankland 2003). Around the same time, 
Paris (Sayer 2005) and Brazil (Kingstone 2005) moved towards OSS as well. Some 
practitioner reports attributed such large-scale OSS conversions to traditional one-vendor 
lock-in problems (Kingstone 2005; Moody 2008). Researchers offered explanations 
based on the literature on innovation diffusion (Bonacorsi et al 2006), software pricing 
and competition (Kim et al, 2006). However, these studies did not adequately model the 
effect of the organizational social networks within which a firm is embedded, in driving 
the adoption and diffusion of OSS. Growing emphasis on global collaboration and 
interdependence between organizations while making technology adoption decisions 
(Weitzel et al, 2006) warrant a better understanding of the effect of network structure on 
the social behavior of organizations and economic outcomes (Jackson, 2008). There are 
numerous studies that have already demonstrated the effect of organizational networks on 
individual firm performance, resource utilization, firm innovativeness etc. (Afuah, 2000; 
Kogut, 2000; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Gulati et al, 2000; Capaldo, 2007; Bell, 2005; 
Zaheer and Bell, 2005). 
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Our objective is to investigate how a firm‟s inter-organizational relationships or 
social network can influence the adoption and diffusion of OSS. In the analysis of social 
networks, entities being studied are viewed as nodes in a network. Two nodes are 
connected via an edge if they have a relationship between them. Network-wide 
phenomena can then be investigated based on an analysis of the various structural 
characteristics. These structural characteristics can be measured at the level of 
relationships between individual nodes or groups of nodes. The emphasis shifts from the 
internal characteristics of individual nodes to the interrelationships between the nodes 
and their importance in explaining network-wide behavior. In the context of our research, 
firms using an open source (OSS) or proprietary alternative (PS) of a desktop operating 
system are viewed as nodes in a network. Links between firms indicate that business 
transactions are conducted between pairs of firms (or partners). Firms have to decide 
whether to upgrade their existing desktop operating system or switch to the alternative. 
The premise is that the choice of software used in the transactions with a firm‟s partners 
should in part be influenced by a firm‟s inter-organizational relationships. In other words, 
technology adoption decision, particularly platform decisions that involve interaction 
with partner firms, cannot be made without considering the decision of the partners. 
Therefore, important nodes in the network need to be identified based on various 
structural characteristics and their impact in driving diffusion of software needs to be 
investigated. This knowledge can then be exploited by vendors as they target influential 
nodes in the network to kick start or promote the diffusion of their software. We pose the 
following research questions: 
1. What is the relative importance of various individual-level structural measures in 
explaining the rate of diffusion of OSS? 
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2. What is the relative importance of group-level structural measures in explaining the rate 
of diffusion of OSS? 
3. Which of the structural measures are most effective in explaining the rate of diffusion of 
OSS? 
While we focus on OSS, these questions and the approach presented in the chapter 
are applicable to diffusion of other types of software as well. We intend to use the agent-
based model presented in Chapter 2 to simulate the diffusion of OSS. UCINET, a tool 
commonly used in social network analysis, will be used to measure the structural 
characteristics of the various networks. The rest of this chapter has been organized as 
follows. The next section provides a brief review of the relevant literature on social 
network analysis. This is followed by a description of the planned experiments, analyses 
and current results. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Please refer to the literature review section in Chapter 2 for a detailed review of 
the literature on OSS and diffusion of OSS. Suffice to state at this point that most of the 
studies discussed in the review suffered from two basic drawbacks: a) they modeled the 
determinants of diffusion of OSS in isolation i.e. there was no study that jointly 
investigated the impact of the critical determinants of OSS; b) they focused primarily on 
economic aspects of diffusion of OSS such as pricing, total cost of ownership, etc. In 
Chapter 2 a more comprehensive model was developed that attempted to fill these gaps in 
the literature by examining the diffusion of OSS based on both social and economic 
aspects of diffusion (Zaffar et al, 2008). Our investigation highlighted several important 
issues in the context of diffusion of OSS (please refer to Chapter 2 for more details). In 
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light of the research questions stated above, the most important result from the study in 
Chapter 2 was that network topology, network density and interoperability costs both 
hampered and facilitated the process of diffusion of OSS at different points in time. 
Therefore, we decided to further investigate the precise nature of the network structure 
(network topology + network density) that, at any point in time, helps or hinders the 
diffusion of OSS. The concept of social network analysis is appropriate for this type of 
investigation as it evaluates the structure of a network in more detail. There are 
techniques in graph theory that help identify critical nodes or links in a network, which if 
removed, would disconnect the network. However, there are two issues with the 
application of those approaches in the context of present research: a) recent research 
suggests that it might be more meaningful to identify groups of nodes instead of 
individual important nodes in very large networks (Pandit et al 2008). If that is the case, 
then with the use of the traditional techniques our objective would be to find groups of 
nodes or links that might disrupt the network. This in turn might lead to an optimization 
problem (which is beyond the scope of what is under investigation) that what is the 
minimal set of nodes or links required to disrupt the network of a certain size, topology 
and density? b) the traditional graph theory techniques do not take into consideration the 
unique internal characteristics of the nodes in a network. We hope to incorporate both 
internal and external characteristics to determine structural importance specifically in the 
context of software diffusion. 
In the following subsection, the literature on social network analysis is reviewed 
in the context of our research problem. 
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3.2.1 Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
The analysis of social networks is concerned with the investigation of 
relationships between social entities (Wassermann and Fraust, 1994). In the context of 
inter-organizational relationships, these structural patterns are intertwined with the 
economic outcomes (Jackson, 2008). Under SNA, “the network structural environment 
[is viewed] as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action” 
(Wassermann and Fraust, 1994, p 4). In other words, instead of their unique attributes, 
the behavioral or structural patterns between individuals become the focus of 
investigation. In the context of inter-organizational relationships, Hite and Hesterly 
(2000), Zaheer and Bell (2005) and Gulati et al (2000) argued that the structure of a 
network can influence a firm‟s actions, its innovative capabilities as well as performance. 
These structural patterns “can also be used to study the process of change within a group 
over time” (Wassermann and Fraust, 1994, p 10). Several metrics have been proposed in 
the previous literature to describe the structure of various types of social networks: 
degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality etc.  (Ahuja and Carley, 
1998; Fernandez et al, 2006; Girvan and Newmann, 2002; Guo and Chang, 2007, 
Wassermann and Fraust, 1994). These structural measurements can be made at the level 
of individual nodes or groups of nodes. Recent research suggests that in case of very 
large networks it is more appropriate to study the structural measures at the level of 
groups of nodes instead of individual nodes (Pandit et al 2008). The rationale is that in 
very large networks the effect of important individual nodes is less significant to 
network-wide behavior than the effect of important groups of nodes. For example, in the 
context of software diffusion, where there is a large network of firms interacting with 
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each other, it would be useful for software vendors and third-party software providers to 
identify influential groups that can quickly affect the diffusion dynamics of software. 
Since our research is aimed at determining the appropriate choice of structural measures 
for investigation of software diffusion, we will analyze the structural measures at both the 
individual as well as group level. 
The choice of a suitable measure or measures is dependent upon the context of the 
research problem (Haythornthwaite, 1996). For example, Lazer and Friedman (2007) and 
Weitzel et al (2006) studied the effect of network density and network topology/path 
length on flow of information and standard diffusion. There are two important differences 
between their studies and our research: a) flow of information through a network is not 
comparable to the systematic evaluation, adoption and diffusion of software, b) network 
density and path length only provide one level of measurement of the network effect – in 
this study, we intend to investigate the network effect in more detail by studying the 
structural characteristics widely used in the literature on social network analysis. Guo and 
Cheng (2007) studied the impact of group level and individual level degree centrality, 
closeness, betweenness and aggregate constraint on the spread of a virus in a network. 
There is an important difference between their study and present research: in their 
network the virus spreads through contact whereas in our model, OSS spreads through 
the repeated evaluation of a decision function by heterogeneous firms in the network and 
this decision function takes both economic and social factors into account. In a recent 
study, Borgatti (2006) devised a new approach to identifying key players in a network 
that a) could facilitate diffusion of something in the network, and b) if removed, would 
severely disrupt the network. It is an interesting approach that goes beyond the use of 
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traditional centrality measures or approaches in graph theory to identify crucial nodes in a 
network. However, that approach relies on structural information of the network alone to 
identify crucial nodes whereas in our study the network, the inter-relationships and the 
nodes are more complex. A node may or may not be influential by virtue of its 
connections alone. There is an interplay between social and economic factors which is 
fluidly captured in our agent-based model which is essential to identifying important 
nodes for the purposes of software diffusion. 
Borgatti stated that centrality measures provide “expected values … of certain 
kinds of node participation in network flows. As such, they do not actually measure node 
participation at all but rather indicate the expected participation if things flow in the 
assumed way” (Borgatti, 2005: p. 70). Hence, if the network flow is not well understood 
or its workings are modeled on inaccurate assumptions, any centrality measure applied on 
such a network may lead to “incorrect” conclusions (Borgatti, 2005). 
Therefore, in the following subsections, we first evaluate the network flow 
process of software diffusion and then identify suitable centrality measures for evaluating 
the impact of network structure on diffusion of OSS. 
3.2.2 What Determines the Choice of Centrality Measures? 
Borgatti (2005) defined four attributes for characterizing network flow processes: 
a) mechanism of network flow or diffusion: does diffusion occur “via replication (copy 
mechanism) or transfer (move mechanism)” (p. 58). Under replication, the information or 
packet flowing through the network gets copied from one node to the next. Whereas 
under transfer, the packet physically moves from one node to the next; b) serial or 
parallel network flow: is the network flow simultaneous like a broadcast or is it serial? 
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This attribute is meaningful only if diffusion occurs through replication; c) deterministic 
or un-deterministic flow of traffic: does network flow strategically follow a deterministic 
path such as shortest route, or does it flow “in a blind, undirected way” (p. 58); d) flow 
trajectory: does network flow follow paths, trails or walks? A trail is “a sequence of 
incident links in which no link is repeated … [paths are] sequences in which not only 
links but also nodes are not repeated … [walks are] unrestricted sequences. All paths are 
trails and all trails are walks, but not every walk is a trial and not every trail is a path” (p. 
57). Borgotti recommended an appropriate choice of the commonly used centrality 
measures based on the characteristics of the network flow processes (Borgatti 2005). 
Let us first evaluate the software diffusion process in light of Borgatti‟s four 
attributes. Diffusion of software occurs through parallel replication, is un-deterministic 
and follows walks. Table 5 provides a more detailed assessment of each attribute in the 
context of our research problem. Given these characteristics, Borgatti stated that only 
three of the commonly used centrality measures are appropriate in the context of our 
problem: Freeman‟s (1979) closeness centrality, Freeman‟s (1979) betweenness 
centrality and Bonacich‟s (1972) eigenvector centrality (Borgatti, 2005). 
However, Borgatti‟s recommendations cannot be readily applied in the context of 
our problem for three reasons. First, software does not exactly replicate through the 
network – the deployment of the software be different from firm to firm. However, in our 
model we ignore the differences in deployment of the software and assume that two firms 
are OSS/PS adopters even if their versions are different. The fact that two firms in a dyad 
are using the same software eliminates the possibility of them incurring any 
interoperability costs in their transactions.  
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Furthermore, the actual versions used by the adopters are used to model the impact of 
threat of withdrawal of support by a vendor for older versions of its software (refer to the 
Simulation Model section in Chapter 2). 
Second, in our model of diffusion of software, one firm directly influences the 
decision of its neighbors and is simultaneously influenced by the neighbors‟ decisions as 
well. This second characteristic is very important in software diffusion and is captured in 
the decision function of each agent in our model. However, Borgatti does not consider 
this dimension in differentiating between different types of network flow processes 
(Borgatti, 2005: p. 59). Third, as acknowledged by Borgatti, the recommendations made 
for using certain centrality measures for certain network flow processes were limited by 
the assumption that the flows “have a source and a target” (p. 70). Furthermore, he stated 
that “we should also examine the case where flows originate at each node systematically, 
but have no particular target. This will pose some challenges for walk-based processes 
but is an important line of future research.” (p. 71). Since diffusion of software follows 
walks, it is unclear if Borgatti‟s recommended measures are most appropriate in the 
context of our research problem. Therefore, in the following subsections, we discuss our 
choice of centrality measures and analyze their appropriateness on theoretical grounds in 
the context of our research problem. 
3.2.3 Selected Individual and Group Centrality Measures 
In the absence of recommended centrality measures for evaluating software 
diffusion type processes, we decided to use and evaluate four commonly used centrality 
measures in the literature on social networks: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, 
closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality. As will be discussed later in this section, 
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these centrality measures are well defined for individual or node-level analysis. A typical 
approach to obtain group-level centrality measurements is to average the centrality 
measures of the individual nodes in a group (Guo and Chang, 2007). Although such 
aggregate measures might lose the nuances in some groups (Everett and Borgatti, 1999), 
practically more involved group centrality measures would be harder to compute for a 
large network of firms. Hence, this is a reasonable approximation for identifying and 
differentiating between groups of firms. 
Therefore, in the context of our problem, group degree centrality will be 
measured as the average degree centrality of all firms in a group. Similarly, group 
closeness centrality will be computed as the average closeness centrality of all firms in a 
group, and so on. Before going into the details of the various centrality measures, it is 
important to define the concept of a group in the context of our research problem. A 
group is considered to be a simple supply chain network, which includes a focal firm and 
its immediate neighbors. This is a practical definition of a group in the context of 
software diffusion since a firm affects and is affected by the decision of its immediate 
neighbors (Weitzel et al, 2006). Therefore, by this understanding, Wal-Mart and its 
immediate set of suppliers and partners would be considered as one group in our analysis. 
Table 6 reviews the definitions of the selected centrality measures and their meaning in 
the context of software diffusion.  
Degree centrality defines the importance of a node in terms of the number of 
relationships it is involved in (Wagstrom et al, 2005). Literature suggests that when firms 
make their own technology adoption decisions, a) they try to anticipate the decision of 
their neighbors (Weitzel et al, 2006), b) firms with high degree centrality (large number 
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of neighbors) tend to be less concerned about the decisions of their neighbors (Ashton, 
2004). Therefore, theoretically we would expect firms to contend with two kinds of 
effects: a) an individual decision made by a high degree-centrality firm will potentially 
influence the decision of a greater number of other firms (its immediate neighbors or 
direct partners) than it would in the case of a low-centrality firm, b) depending on the 
strength of the interoperability issues, there could potentially be greater pressure from the 
immediate neighbors on a high degree-centrality firm than there would be on a low-
centrality firm, in adopting a technology different from that of its neighbors. Therefore, it 
is natural to further explore the effect of degree centrality on the diffusion dynamics of 
OSS. Closeness centrality defines the importance of a node in terms of how close it is, on 
average, to other nodes in the network. The distance between a pair of nodes is measured 
in terms of the number of links or connections between them. Borgatti (2005) stated that 
closeness is suitable for „parallel duplication‟ processes. As stated earlier, in a parallel 
process the network flow can follow all possible paths. Under duplication, the network 
flow does not have to physically move or transfer through the network. Instead, it 
duplicates or copies itself from one node to the next. 
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In software diffusion the probabilities of spreading through all possible paths is 
dependent on a combination of factors wrapped up in the decision function of each firm 
and the software does not have to physically move or transfer through the network. Since 
it is not clear as to how closeness centrality might affect the software diffusion process, it 
is worthwhile to investigate its effect in our research. Betweenness centrality measures 
importance in terms of how often a node falls on the shortest path between pairs of other 
nodes (Guo and Chang, 2007). 
Borgatti (2005) states that betweenness centrality is an appropriate measure of 
centrality provided that there is a „target node‟ involved in the network flow process. 
However, in software diffusion there is no target node per se, yet conceptually, firms with 
high betweenness centrality (that may lie on critical paths and be part of multiple supply 
chains) would be expected to significantly influence the decisions of their neighbors and 
neighbors‟ neighbors. Therefore, it makes sense to quantitatively investigate this effect 
under various network conditions. Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972) measures the 
importance of a node in terms of the overall structure of the network instead of just the 
local connections (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). It is considered an ideal measure for an 
“influence type process” (Borgatti, 2005; p. 62) and our objective is to quantitatively 
investigate its effects in the context of software diffusion. Table 7 provides a numerical 
example of the centrality measures, further highlighting their different perspectives on the 
„importance‟ of a node. The centrality values have been computed for two types of 
network topologies: sample network topology 1 (SNT 1) and sample network topology 2 
(SNT 2).  
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SNT 1 is a star topology network. In terms of betweenness, closeness and degree 
centralities, node „I‟ in the center is the most important node. However, the relative 
importance of the nodes changes depending on which centrality measure is used. For 
example, under betweenness centrality node „I‟ is at one extreme (with a centrality value 
of 1) whereas all other nodes are at the other extreme (with a centrality value of 0); under 
closeness centrality, even though node „I‟ is still the most important node, other nodes are 
not completely unimportant (their centrality values are much higher than 0). Interestingly, 
eigenvector centrality does not help distinguish between the nodes. This is 
understandable because eigenvector centrality measures importance of a node on the 
basis of the depth and breadth of connections of a firm. In a star topology network, a) the 
center node has the whole network as its neighbors (and those neighbors have no other 
neighbors); b) the other nodes have one neighbor each and that neighbor is connected to 
the whole network. 
In SNT 2, node A is the most important node by all measures of centrality. 
However, as in SNT 1, the relative importance of the nodes varies depending on the 
selected measure of centrality. Also, it is important to note that nodes B, C, E, F, G and H 
are peripheral or leaf nodes in the network with just one neighbor and are treated to be 
equally important in terms of betweenness and degree centrality. However, with 
eigenvector or closeness centrality, the relative importance of these nodes changes by 
virtue of their neighbors‟ neighbors.  
Table 8 looks at the examples from Table 7 and displays group-level centrality 
values. As explained earlier, a group was defined as a simple supply chain: a firm and its 
immediate set of neighbors.  
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By this definition, each firm will be the focal firm of its own group. Therefore, in 
a 1000-node network, there will be 1000 groups. In the examples in Table 8, there are 9-
nodes in the two network topologies (SNT 1 and SNT 2), therefore, there are 9 groups in 
both these networks. The individual centrality values of the members of each group were 
averaged to compute the group centrality measures for each group. For example, for SNT 
1, the average degree centrality for firm „I‟ in the center is the average of the individual 
centrality values of all nodes in this network since the „group‟ of node „I‟ is node „I‟ itself 
and its immediate neighbors. Notice that just like in Table 7, in Table 8, the relative 
importance of the groups of nodes changes depending on the chosen group centrality 
measure. 
Furthermore, it appears that with our method of computing group centrality 
values, smaller-sized groups appear to be favored over larger sized groups. However, that 
is the nature of any „average‟ and if large-sized groups have very important firms (or 
firms with high centrality values, regardless of which centrality measure is chosen), then 
their average will not be seriously attenuated. Although there are other ways of 
computing group centrality measures (for some types of centralities, see for example 
Everett and Borgatti 1999), it is not clear whether those measures are appropriate in the 
investigation of inter-organizational relationships (Everett and Borgatti, 1999). Therefore, 
given the exploratory nature of our research problem, it is appropriate to select an 
approximate measure of group centrality at this point. 
Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that the importance of nodes and groups of nodes 
changes on the basis of network topology as well as network density (average number of 
neighbors). However, there is no basis to argue whether one (or which one) of the 
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centrality measure would be better than another in identifying structurally important 
firms or groups of firms in the context of software diffusion. To investigate this problem, 
the software diffusion model from chapter 2 was revised and a series of experiments were 
designed to study the impact of structural importance on software diffusion. The 
following section describes the revised model and experiments. 
3.3 Revised Simulation Model 
The software diffusion model proposed in chapter 2 assumed that OSS was 
randomly assigned to a small starting population of the network. The remaining firms 
were assigned PS. During the simulation, whenever a firm was at the start of its planning 
horizon, it had to decide whether to upgrade its existing software or switch to the 
alternative software. The decision was made on the basis of a decision function that took 
a combination of social and economic factors into account. Please refer to the section on 
the simulation model in chapter 2 for details. 
In the present study, the objective was to identify and investigate the effect of 
structurally important firms and groups of firms in the context of software diffusion. 
Therefore, instead of random selection, the initial population of OSS adopters was 
selected on the basis of structural importance (using the available centrality measures) 
and differences across the ensuing patterns of diffusion were investigated. Since the 
importance of nodes can be measured at the level of individual as well as groups of 
nodes, two separate variants of the model and experiments were designed: a) in one 
instance the starting population of OSS adopters was chosen using individual or node-
level centrality values, and b) in the other case the initial population of OSS adopters was 
chosen using group-level centrality values. 
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Given the exploratory nature of this investigation, it was decided to first investigate the 
importance of individual-centrality measures on the diffusion of OSS. The results of 
those experiments were used to determine what experiments to run for group-centrality 
measures. Although some recent research suggests that important groups instead of 
important individuals should be of interest in very large networks (Pandit et al, 2008), it 
was decided that in the absence of guidelines for a) appropriate selection of centrality 
measures in the context of software diffusion, and b) determining whether a network is 
„very large‟ for a particular research context, that both individual and group centrality 
measures should be investigated in this order. 
3.3.1 Individual Centrality-Based Experiments 
At the start of the simulation, OSS was systematically assigned to a small 
proportion of structurally important firms in the network. Structural importance was 
measured by computing individual centrality values for the four different centrality 
measures described earlier, using UCINET (Borgatti et al, 2002): a tool commonly used 
in social network analysis (see Appendix E for details). The rest of the model, including 
agent behavior and interaction between the agents, remained unchanged from Chapter 2. 
Figure 10 provides an overview of the revised model. In Chapter 2, different levels of six 
selected critical variables were analyzed over a series of experiments. The experiments 
had demonstrated that under some conditions diffusion did not occur. However, in that 
model, the starting population of OSS was randomly selected. In this study it was decided 
to retain most of the parameter values from those experiments to determine if strategic 
selection of the initial population of OSS adopters caused diffusion to occur in many 
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cases where it did not occur with random selection of the initial population of OSS 
adopters. 
 A network (with pre-specified topology and density) of 1000 firms is generated based on 
Watts and Strogatz algorithm (1998) 
 Network-level attributes such as frequency of proprietary and open source software 
upgrades, strength of interoperability costs etc. are assigned 
 Firm-level attributes such as size of the firm, current choice of software, level of OSS 
technical expertise etc. are assigned 
 For each firm the following steps are repeated for 100 simulated time periods 
Step 1: If the firm is at the beginning of its planning horizon, proceed to step 2, otherwise 
proceed to step 4 
Step 2: The firm evaluates its decision function to decide whether to upgrade existing 
software or switch to the alternative software. The decision function takes into 
account economic factors (such as costs in case of upgrading/switching the software) 
and social factors (such as the decision of the firm‟s neighbors) 
Step 3: If the firm switches to the alternative software, it obtains new costs (setup, training, 
license, support costs etc.); otherwise, it upgrades existing software 
Step 4: Proceed to next simulated time period 
Figure 10. Revised Simulation Process 
The original values included, a) three network topologies (random, small world, 
clustered), three network densities (low, medium, high), three OSS support cost 
distributions (low mean-low variability, low mean-high variability, high mean-low 
variability), three levels of interoperability costs (low, medium, high), two frequencies of 
PS upgrades (low and high) and two proportions of initial OSS adopters (low and high). 
Please refer to Chapter 2 for the exact parameter values. Apart from the following two 
parameter values, all other parameter values were retained for the analysis of individual 
centrality-based assignment of OSS to the initial population: a) clustered network was 
dropped because in a clustered network all nodes are structurally equivalent and cannot 
be differentiated based on the selected centrality measures, b) very high mean-low 
variability OSS support cost distribution was dropped because simulations in Chapter 2 
revealed that OSS diffusion did not occur with very high OSS support cost. As a result, 
the following experiments were run to investigate the effect of social structural measures 
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on the diffusion of OSS: 2x3x2x3x2x2x5=720: – network topology (random and small-
world), network density (low, medium and high), OSS support costs (low, high), 
interoperability costs (low, medium and high), duration of PS upgrade cycle (short, long), 
initial proportion of OSS adopters (low, high) and OSS assignment criterion at the start of 
the simulation (random, degree centrality-based, betweenness centrality-based, closeness 
centrality-based and eigenvector centrality-based assignment). Please refer to Chapter 2 
for the actual parameter values used for these variables. 
Network structure (topology + density) was randomly generated using the Watts 
and Strogatz algorithm (Watts and Strogatz 1998) and 50 samples were drawn for each 
network structure.
1
 During the simulation 50 samples were drawn for each one of the 
additional random variables as well, such as level of technical capability of the firms, 
OSS support costs, size of the firm etc. Consequently, 2500 sample paths (i.e. 
n=50x50=2500) were generated for each experimental condition
2
. These sample paths 
were generated five times for every experimental condition. In the first set of sample 
paths, OSS was randomly assigned to a predefined proportion of the network population 
and the diffusion of OSS was monitored over the course of the simulation. The 
simulation ran for 100 time periods and diffusion was said to occur when the number of 
OSS adopters doubled over the course of the simulation (Dalle and Jullien, 2001). In each 
of the next four runs, OSS was selectively assigned to the same proportion of the network 
population based on individual centrality measures: degree, closeness, betweenness and 
                                                          
1 There were 6 unique network structures: 2 topologies x 3 densities and 50 samples for each 
resulted in 300 different network structures. 
2 “A sample path is a collection of time-ordered data describing what happened to a dynamic 
process in one instance.” (Hyksova 2003) 
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eigenvector centrality – each time the simulation was run for 100 time periods. For 
example, if the initial proportion of OSS adopters was defined to be 30%, then in case of 
degree centrality, the firms were sorted in descending order of degree centrality and 30% 
of firms with the highest degree centrality were designated as initial OSS adopters. The 
rate of diffusion of OSS, defined as the time it takes for diffusion to occur, was measured 
at the end of each run and compared across the different runs using repeated measures 
ANOVA. All reported results were significant at p<0.05. 
Given their computationally expensive nature, the simulations were run on a 
Linux-based cluster which had over 200 CPU cluster blade servers, Intel Xeon CPUs and 
gigabit Ethernet interconnections with 2TBs of dedicated network attached storage. 
3.3.1.1 Individual Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
Diffusion occurred in 234 or about 33% of the 720 experiments. Diffusion did not 
occur in most cases when the interoperability costs or OSS support costs or both were 
too high or when the initial proportion of OSS adopters at the start of the simulation was 
low. Overall the results demonstrated that when diffusion of OSS did occur, it was always 
faster with strategic selection of the starting population of OSS than random selection of 
the starting population. This is an important, albeit seemingly trivial, result as it validates 
the findings from the literature on economics of social networks in the context of 
software diffusion i.e. strategic location of firms in a network can significantly influence 
the process of software diffusion. The more interesting aspects of the results, however, 
were in the relative importance of the various centrality measures under different 
simulation conditions. 
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Eigenvector centrality based assignment of OSS at the start of the simulation 
resulted in the most number of diffusion cases (64 or 27%), followed by closeness (20%), 
degree (20%), betweenness (18%) and random assignment (15%). Diffusion occurred 
more in small-world networks (150 cases) than in random topology networks (84 cases). 
Within the random topology network, diffusion never occurred when the initial 
proportion of OSS adopters was low. Furthermore, the frequency of PS upgrades did not 
change the impact of the strategic assignment criteria on OSS diffusion. 
It was found that in random topology networks, regardless of network density, 
selection of the initial population of OSS on the basis of betweenness centrality resulted 
in the fastest rate of diffusion compared to any other OSS assignment criteria. This result 
suggests that in a random network, where firms do not form a very cohesive group, 
structural importance may not be determined by sheer number of neighbors (degree 
centrality), or connections to other significant firms (eigenvector centrality), or even 
average distance from other firms (closeness centrality). Rather the importance is 
determined by how central a firm is to the network-wide communication between various 
other pairs of firms. The explanation lies in the fact that no other centrality measure is 
able to exploit the characteristics of a random network to help differentiate between 
nodes as effectively as betweenness centrality: a firm with random connections is as close 
to other firms in the network as any other firm (so closeness centrality can be expected to 
be similar for the firms); random connections imply that there is no „order‟ in the 
connections which are spread all over the network and therefore firms cannot as easily 
distinguish themselves on the basis of their neighbors and neighbors‟ neighbors 
(eigenvector centrality);  similarly, having more connections (high degree centrality) can 
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help some firms but by virtue of the fact that the connections are random, such firms are 
unable to drive diffusion as rapidly as betweenness centrality. With random connections, 
some firms are likely to fall on the shortest paths between other pairs of nodes. Hence 
importance on the basis of betweenness centrality will automatically become a better 
differentiating factor for firms than any of the other centrality measures. 
Interestingly, however, in small-world networks no single OSS assignment 
criterion was found to be superior under all simulation conditions. Overall, eigenvector 
centrality-based assignment of OSS resulted in the highest number of diffusion cases 
(30%), followed by degree centrality (19%), closeness centrality (19%), betweenness 
centrality (16%) and random assignment (16%). Unlike in random topology networks, 
betweenness centrality based assignment of OSS was almost as ineffective as random 
assignment of OSS. The explanation lies in the structure of small world networks. 
Typically in small worlds, most firms are tightly clustered and some have global 
connections or less clustered connections (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Therefore, 
betweenness centrality of most firms will be somewhat the same. On the other hand, 
given the presence of global connections, some firms will be more influential than others 
i.e. the eigenvector centrality of some of the firms will be substantially different from 
those of the other firms in the network. In the context of software diffusion, this means 
that in small worlds, firms with both local (clustered) as well as global (random) 
connections are more important as they will drive the diffusion of OSS both locally and 
globally throughout the network. Notice also that having more connections (high degree 
centrality) in general is more valuable in a small world than in a random topology 
network. This is understandable because large cohesive set of firms of OSS adopters are 
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more likely to drive diffusion of OSS than large number of firms that are not well 
integrated. 
Tables 9 and 10 provide a more detailed look at OSS diffusion with different OSS 
assignment criteria under all possible experimental conditions. The actual numbers have 
been reported in Appendix A. Table 9 provides the details under small world networks 
whereas Table 10 provides the details for random topology networks. The columns in 
each table show different network densities, interoperability cost levels, OSS support 
costs and frequency of PS upgrades. The top half of each table shows results with low 
starting population of OSS adopters. The bottom half shows results with high starting 
population of OSS adopters. “No diffusion” means that no diffusion of OSS occurred 
regardless of how the initial population of OSS adopters was selected. In all other cells, if 
diffusion occurred with one or more assignment criterion, the criteria were listed in 
ascending order of rate of diffusion. To facilitate the interpretation of the tables, let us 
look at the highlighted cell in Table 9. The position of the cell signifies the following 
experimental setup: low density small world network, with low interoperability costs, low 
variability in OSS support costs, high frequency of PS upgrades (2 years) and a low 
starting population of OSS adopters. The cell contains the abbreviations of all the 
different assignment criteria: BC (betweenness centrality), CC (closeness centrality), DC 
(degree centrality), EC (eigenvector centrality) and RD (random assignment). This means 
that regardless of how OSS was assigned to the starting population in these network 
conditions, diffusion of OSS always occurred.  
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However, the relative order of these assignment criteria also tells us that diffusion 
was fastest when the initial population was chosen based on eigenvector centrality (EC), 
followed by CC and DC. RD and BC, unlike other assignment criteria, are on the same 
line and separated by a forward slash. This means that diffusion did occur with these 
assignment criteria, however, the rate of diffusion in these cases was statistically the 
same (i.e. p >= 0.05). Similarly, it can be seen that the last cell in this row in Table 9 only 
contains „EC‟ which means that in low density small worlds, with high interoperability 
costs, high variability in OSS support costs, low frequency of PS upgrades and low initial 
proportion of OSS, diffusion only occurred when the initial population was chosen based 
on eigenvector centrality. 
A detailed look at Table 10 did not reveal any additional interesting results other 
than the ones that have already been described earlier i.e. in random topology networks, 
diffusion did not occur with low initial proportion of OSS and with high initial proportion 
BC-based assignment of OSS always resulted in the fastest diffusion of OSS. On the 
other hand, a detail look at table 9 revealed additional interesting results: 
1. If the network environment is otherwise not conducive for OSS diffusion, 
eigenvector centrality is the best criterion for determining strategic importance of 
firms in a small world network. By stating that the environment is not conducive 
to diffusion of OSS the implication is that (based on our findings from Chapter 2), 
the interoperability costs, or frequency of PS upgrades or OSS support costs are 
not, in any case, favorable for OSS diffusion. Under such adverse conditions, who 
a firm is connected to (eigenvector centrality) is crucial to driving diffusion of 
OSS. For example, notice that with low initial population (top half of Table 7) it 
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would be difficult for OSS to diffuse throughout the network (look at the number 
of empty cells), and its best bet of spreading throughout the network is to start 
with a strategically selected population based on eigenvector centrality. 
2. Conversely, if the network conditions are otherwise favorable to diffusion of OSS, 
then eigenvector centrality is not as effective a measure for determining structural 
importance as some of the other measures in small world networks. Under 
favorable conditions for OSS diffusion such as low interoperability costs, low 
OSS support costs, high frequency of PS upgrades, firms in any case will be 
leaning towards adoption of OSS. These conditions will favor OSS diffusion and 
their effect will not be dampened by the way the firms are connected to each 
other. In fact, the local as well as global connections inherent in small world 
networks will quickly drive diffusion in clusters (locally) as well as globally 
across the network if there are low interoperability costs. Hence, it will be 
difficult to distinguish between firms in terms of their influence on the process of 
software diffusion just by observing their connections or neighbors‟ connections. 
Under such circumstances, targeting firms on strategic location alone may not be 
the best strategy. 
3. With a high starting population of OSS adopters the measure of structural 
importance changes with the level of interoperability costs and density of the 
network 
a. In low density small worlds OSS diffusion is fastest with DC-based 
assignment under low interoperability costs but as interoperability costs 
are increased, CC and EC-based assignments become more effective. DC-
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based assignment is effective under low interoperability costs because the 
more neighbors a firm has (high degree centrality), the higher its potential 
to quickly influence other firms throughout the network. In random 
topology networks high degree centrality firms are not as effective 
because of the random nature of the connections. In other words, a high 
degree centrality OSS adopter with neighbors randomly spread all over the 
network cannot exercise much influence on its neighbors or through its 
neighbors to drive OSS diffusion in a PS-dominated network because most 
of its neighbors (and/or neighbors‟ neighbors) will be PS adopters. On the 
other hand, in small worlds, despite overall PS dominance, the same high 
degree centrality firm‟s neighbors are in a position to spark diffusion 
locally (by virtue of the „clustered‟ nature of some of the connections) and 
drive it globally (by virtue of some „random‟ connections) as well. In 
other words, in small worlds, high degree centrality firms are more likely 
to be a part of a cluster of firms that may be OSS dominated which could 
become the driving force for network-wide diffusion of OSS. 
However, what is more interesting to note is that when interoperability 
costs are increased, then in a PS-dominated network, the „strength of the 
neighbors‟ used to drive OSS diffusion earlier (with low interoperability 
costs) now becomes more of a „weakness‟. An OSS firm with large 
number of neighbors (and high interoperability costs) is likely going to 
have many PS neighbors as well (since most of the network has PS 
adopters). Therefore, high interoperability costs will make it difficult for 
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the OSS firms from influencing its neighbors as effectively as it did earlier 
in driving diffusion. In fact, the large number of neighbors and high 
interoperability costs with (potentially most of) the neighbors might even 
force the OSS adopter to switch to PS. Under such circumstances, an 
influential firm will be the one that is less encumbered by its large number 
of immediate neighbors. Theoretically such influence could be defined by 
either betweenness, closeness or eigenvector centrality because neither 
one determines „influence‟ strictly on the basis of immediate set of 
neighbors. A closer inspection helps understand as to why closeness and 
eigenvector turn out to be better than betweenness as interoperability costs 
are increased. 
Betweenness centrality measures importance on the basis of how often a 
firm falls on the shortest path between pairs of other firms. In small 
worlds, most of the firms (by virtue of the mostly lattice-like structure of 
the network) will have similar betweenness centrality values. Therefore, 
betweenness centrality alone will not be as good a differentiating factor as 
closeness centrality. Closeness centrality measures importance on the 
basis of how close a firm is to all other nodes in the network. Despite the 
generally lattice-like structure of small worlds, even one „random‟ or 
„global‟ connection of a firm (connecting two clusters across the network) 
can dramatically change its closeness value (because suddenly that firm 
will be close to many other firms across the network). Similarly, 
eigenvector centrality measures importance by considering a firm‟s 
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neighbors and neighbors‟ neighbors. Again, the „random‟ or „global‟ 
connections will have the potential of quickly changing the eigenvector 
centrality value of a firm. It is worth reiterating at this point that it is 
precisely because of these reasons that betweenness centrality is able to 
exert greater influence than other centrality measures in random topology 
networks – when the connections to other firms are random, a firm is as 
close to the other firms in the network as its neighbor (closeness 
centrality); similarly, a firm‟s neighbors‟ neighbors will be equally well 
connected (or equally less well connected) as the next firm‟s neighbors 
and neighbors‟ neighbors. 
b. In high density small worlds, the effects described in 3a are in play but in 
a different manner. High density networks indicate that on average each 
firm has more neighbors. Therefore, in a PS dominated network, the 
importance of interoperability costs with respect to OSS diffusion will be 
magnified (regardless of whether interoperability costs are low or high). 
Theoretically, degree centrality-based assignment of OSS should still play 
the same role on the diffusion dynamics of OSS. However, with high 
density the total „weight‟ of interoperability costs on the decision function 
goes up. As a result, other cost factors interact. For example, in high 
density networks with high variability in OSS support costs, the increased 
effect of interoperability costs on the decision function is not discernable 
and degree-centrality based assignment of OSS still turns out to be the 
best. However, observe that in high density networks with low variability 
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in OSS support costs, degree centrality based assignment no longer 
appears to be the fastest. This is not because degree centrality is no longer 
affecting software diffusion in small worlds but because the low 
variability in OSS support costs means that firms are generally facing high 
OSS support costs. In other words, in dense networks, low interoperability 
costs are not low enough to drive OSS diffusion through high degree 
centrality firms. This explanation is lent further support by the fact that 
additional experiments were run for these network conditions with very 
low interoperability costs (0.1, 0.4 and 0.7). It was observed that for those 
levels of interoperability costs, even in higher density small worlds, degree 
centrality based assignment of OSS was generally the best in driving OSS 
diffusion. 
To come to the essence of this point, recall from bullet 1 that under 
adverse network conditions for OSS diffusion, eigenvector centrality is the 
best measure for identifying structurally important firms. Therefore, in the 
presence of high interoperability costs in dense small worlds, eigenvector 
centrality based assignment outperforms all other criteria. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that at times when diffusion does not occur at all with 
any other criteria, there are a few instances where it occurs with 
eigenvector centrality based assignment. Why is it that firms selected on 
the basis of eigenvector centrality are able to overcome the increased 
effect of density and interoperability costs? Simply because even if on 
average the number of connections of such firms (with high eigenvector 
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centrality) is high, they start the simulation as OSS adopters not because 
they have the most number of connections but because of their neighbors 
and neighbors‟ neighbors. Therefore, their decision functions incorporate a 
comparatively lesser influence from the density of connections and higher 
interoperability costs and they are able to drive diffusion better than any 
other centrality measure. 
Furthermore, it was found that the relative importance of the various centrality measures 
was robust even when a) diffusion was said to occur with a 50% increase in the number 
of OSS adopters, b) limited additional levels of interoperability costs were tried (as were 
tested in Chapter 2). 
3.3.1.2 Discussion of Individual Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
The results reinforced the findings in the literature of economics of social 
networks by demonstrating that the strategic location of a firm in a network can 
significantly influence the diffusion of OSS. This is a non-trivial outcome: reinforcement 
of known or existing concepts or replication of reality is a well-established practice in 
simulation modeling and builds confidence in the validity of the model (Kwon et al, 
2007; Manzoni and Angehrn, 1997). More interestingly, our results demonstrated that the 
criterion for determining strategic location changes depending on the network conditions 
and external environment within which diffusion takes place. This is an important finding 
from a research perspective as it discourages the use of just about any centrality measure 
for strategically targeting nodes in a network without understanding the prevalent 
network conditions and their relationship with the chosen centrality measure. Although 
the model was parameterized based on unique aspects of OSS, the framework itself can 
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be extended to the investigation of other types of software as well. Furthermore, the 
research has contributed to the literature on economics of social networks by developing 
a better understanding of the software diffusion-type processes in this context. This is a 
valuable addition to software diffusion theory for two reasons. First, globalization and 
technology trends are driving a greater degree of interconnectivity among organizations 
and software diffusion needs to be studied in this context. Second, increasing delivery of 
software as a service over network facilitates a high degree of data mining by vendors, 
potentially leading to more sophisticated marketing. We hope our research contributes to 
theory building in this context. From a practical perspective, this result suggests that 
information regarding structural importance of firms can be exploited by vendors and 
third-party software providers to facilitate or inhibit diffusion of software. For example, 
strategically located firms could be offered a better price structure to retain them as 
customers or induce them to switch from their existing software to another software. This 
idea will be explored in detail in Chapter 4. The following subsection discusses the 
practical implications of the results in more detail. 
3.3.1.3 Practical Implications of Individual Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
It is important to better understand the practical implications of these results. Let 
us first examine the results in the context in which the model was parameterized: desktop 
operating system software market. Software vendors are not in a position to change the 
inter-organizational relationships between the firms i.e. the network structure is an 
uncontrollable factor for the vendor. Other factors such as license costs, interoperability 
costs, setup costs, support costs etc. are controllable factors. Our research basically 
suggests that vendors should, a) invest in finding out the structure of their network; b) 
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measure the structural characteristics of the network; c) examine current cost/price 
structure of their software with respect to the network structure and use our results to 
determine what centrality criterion to use to target influential firms in the network. For 
example, if the vendor‟s analysis reveals that the target network has the characteristics of 
a low density small world network, then i) if there are no significant interoperability 
issues with the competitor‟s software, firms with the most number of connections to other 
firms should be targeted, ii) interoperability issues can be strategically manipulated to 
change the level of influence of some firms over other firms – the results had 
demonstrated that structural importance of firms would change with higher 
interoperability costs. What is more interesting is that with the changing market share, the 
vendor needs to adapt and target a different set of firms. For example, early on when the 
vendor does not have a large installed base of adopters then important firms are ones that 
have highest eigenvector centrality (in small world networks). On the other hand, as the 
market share of the vendor improves, depending on the density of connections and 
strength of interoperability costs, eigenvector centrality should not be used to identify 
important firms. These strategies would be applicable in case of other types of software 
markets as well particularly when proprietary and open source software vendors are 
competing for the same network of clients. Figure 11 provides a quick overview of the 
results and highlights the conditions under which different centrality measures would be 
appropriate for identifying strategically located firms in a network. Notice that all paths 
leading to eigenvector centrality being the appropriate measure of structural importance 
reflect difficult or adverse conditions for diffusion of OSS, whereas all other paths reflect 
favorable conditions for diffusion of OSS. 
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Figure 11.  Overview of individual centrality-based assignment results 
Next, the effect of selecting structurally important groups of nodes on OSS 
diffusion was analyzed. The following sections describe the experiment design, analysis 
and results for group centrality-based assignment of OSS to the starting population. 
3.3.2 Group Centrality-Based Experiments 
As mentioned earlier, research suggests that in very large networks, important 
groups need to be identified instead of important individuals to study any network-wide 
behaviors (Pandit et al 2008). However, there is no precedent in the academic or 
practitioner literature than can quantify the size of the network for which studying 
individuals may or may not be better. Therefore, in this exploratory study on the effect of 
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structural characteristics of diffusion of OSS, it was decided to investigate both 
individual centrality and group centrality measures. The results from experiments using 
individual centralities had demonstrated that a) strategic location of individual firms is 
important to the diffusion of software; b) the frequency of PS upgrades does not affect 
the relative importance of the various centrality measures; c) random assignment of OSS 
to the starting population was never better than strategic centrality-based assignment. 
These results informed the design of experiments for group centrality-based experiments. 
In this research, a group was defined to be a simple supply chain: one focal firm 
with its immediate partners. Therefore, in a 1000-node network, there were 1000 groups 
in which each firm was considered to be the focal firm in its own supply chain (or group). 
The group centrality measures were calculated by averaging the individual centrality 
measures of each member of a group (please refer to section 3.2.3 for details). The model 
used in Chapter 2 was used and a similar setup was employed as was used in the 
investigation of individual centrality-based experiments. The entire simulation process 
described in the previous section and depicted in Figure 1 remained the same with two 
major differences: a) instead of selecting the initial population of OSS adopters using 
individual centrality based assignment, group centrality measures were used, b) since 
individual centrality based experiments revealed that the frequency of PS upgrades did 
not significantly change the relative impact of the centrality measures, only one PS 
upgrade frequency was used in the experiment designs. Higher frequency of PS upgrades 
was chosen because that was the more realistic scenario for a PS vendor (Keizer 2007). 
First, all group centralities were computed and the firms were sorted in the order 
of highest group centrality (where in each case the firm was the focal firm of its own 
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group). Second, group members with the highest centrality value were assigned OSS. If 
the size of any group was bigger than the required initial proportion of OSS to be 
maintained for the experiments, then only the required number of individual nodes (with 
highest centrality within the group) were assigned OSS. It is important to understand this 
difference in assignment of OSS to the starting population in comparison with the 
individual centrality-based experiments. Under individual centrality-based assignment of 
OSS, individual firms could have been picked from anywhere within the network and 
their neighbors may or may not have been assigned OSS. On the other hand, with group 
centrality-based assignment, OSS always got assigned to a group of firms. This fact alone 
would impact the diffusion dynamics very differently because in one case strategically 
located OSS adopters were spread across the network (individual centrality assignment) 
and may or may not have been connected to each other, whereas in the other case they 
were directly connected to each other (group centrality assignment). 
Then the simulation (Steps 1 – 4 described in Figure 14) was run as usual. The 
rate of diffusion was measured across the different experimental conditions: 
2x3x2x3x1x2x5=360 – network topology (random and small-world), network density 
(low, medium and high), OSS support costs (low, high), interoperability costs (low, 
medium and high), duration of PS upgrade cycle (long), initial proportion of OSS 
adopters (low, high) and OSS assignment criterion at the start of the simulation 
(individual random assignment, group degree centrality based assignment, group 
betweenness centrality based assignment, group closeness centrality based assignment 
and group eigenvector centrality based assignment). The simulations were run on a 
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cluster and the results were analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA. All reported 
results were significant at p<0.05. 
Notice that as a comparison case, individual random assignment was used instead 
of group random assignment. There were two rationales for making that decision. First, 
individual centrality based assignment of OSS always produced superior results 
compared to random assignment of OSS. Therefore, group-random assignment-based 
experiments were not expected to produce any surprising results. Second, the objective 
with group-centrality based experiments fundamentally was to compare their 
performance with individual-centrality based experiments. Therefore, in some ways, the 
comparison cases for these experiments were the results from individual-centrality based 
experiments. 
3.3.2.1 Group Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
Diffusion occurred in 100 or about 28% of the 360 experiments. Diffusion mostly 
occurred in small world networks (66 of the 100 cases). Tables 11 and 12 show the 
detailed results for small world and random topology networks respectively. In small 
world networks individual random assignment was able to outperform group centrality 
based assignment in low density small worlds with high initial proportion of OSS 
adopters. Recall from our earlier discussion that by nature, in small worlds, there are 
groups of firms which are well connected with each other and have overlapping nodes 
and connections with some groups across the network. The overlapping groups point 
towards redundant connections in terms of software diffusion. Recall also that in low 
density small worlds with a high starting population of OSS adopters, the conditions are 
somewhat favorable for OSS diffusion. Therefore, targeting strategically located groups 
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that might be overlapping and interconnected will not increase the chances of spreading 
OSS throughout the network as much as targeting randomly selected firms across the 
network. The latter will increase the chances of promoting diffusion locally in groups 
across the network and then globally throughout the network as well. 
Table 11. Diffusion in small world networks with different group OSS assignment 
criteria 
 Low Initial Proportion of OSS 
Network 
Density 
Frequency of Proprietary Software Upgrades = 4 years 
Low Variability in OSS Support Costs High Variability in OSS Support Costs 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High Interop 
Low  
BC 
DC 
CC 
EC 
RD 
No diffusion 
BC/DC 
CC 
EC 
RD 
No diffusion 
Medium  
BC 
DC 
EC 
CC 
BC 
DC 
EC 
CC 
High  No diffusion 
EC 
DC/BC/CC 
 High Initial Proportion of OSS 
Low  
RD 
BC 
DC 
CC 
EC 
RD 
CC 
DC/BC/EC 
RD 
CC 
RD 
EC 
CC 
BC 
DC 
RD 
EC 
CC 
DC/BC 
RD 
CC 
Medium  
BC/CC/DC 
EC 
RD 
No diffusion 
RD 
CC 
DC/BC 
EC 
No diffusion 
High  
DC 
BC 
CC 
EC 
RD 
RD 
DC/BC 
CC/EC 
On the other hand, with low initial proportion of OSS, group betweenness 
centrality-based assignment resulted in the fastest diffusion of OSS. The explanation lies 
in the fact that if the installed base is going to be small, targeting groups whose members 
are strategically located on the shortest paths between other pairs of nodes in the network 
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makes more sense than randomly selecting nodes across the network. Random selection 
is able to take advantage of the large initial proportion. However, in the absence of that 
large installed base, it is more appropriate to target groups whose members are 
strategically located throughout the network. 
Table 12 shows that in random topology networks if the initial proportion of 
adopters is low then diffusion does not occur regardless of which OSS assignment 
criterion is used. However, if the installed base is large, then it should be targeted based 
on group degree centrality. This makes sense because in the absence of the inherent 
clustered and overlapping connections found in small worlds, diffusion can be driven 
rapidly in random topology networks by influencing as many nodes as possible. From 
that perspective, firms whose members are connected to most other firms in the network 
should be targeted. 
3.3.2.2 Discussion of Group Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
Our analysis revealed several interesting results for understanding structural 
importance of groups in the context of software diffusion: 
First, in random topology networks, strategic assignment of OSS based on group 
centrality measures is better than random assignment. Therefore, in random topology 
networks, vendors should invest in identifying and targeting influential groups to 
encourage diffusion of their software. Second, influential groups in random networks are 
those that have the most number of connections with other firms in the network. The 
underlying concept is that when the connections are not cohesive then the objective 
should be to target high degree centrality nodes to increase the chances of diffusion. 
Third, in small-worlds, where groups of firms are fairly cohesive but have some random 
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ties with other firms in the network, influential groups are those that are central to the 
network-wide communication between other groups in the network (high group 
betweenness centrality). 
Table 12. Diffusion in random topology networks with different group OSS 
assignment criteria 
 Low Initial Proportion of OSS 
Network 
Density 
Frequency of Proprietary Software Upgrades = 4 years 
Low Variability in OSS Support Costs High Variability in OSS Support Costs 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low  
No diffusion No diffusion Medium  
High  
 High Initial Proportion of OSS 
Low  
DC 
BC/CC/EC 
RD 
BC/CC/DC/EC 
No 
diffusion 
BC/CC/DC/EC 
DC 
BC 
EC 
CC 
RD 
No 
diffusion 
Medium  
DC 
BC 
CC 
EC 
RD 
No diffusion 
DC 
EC 
BC 
CC 
RD 
No diffusion 
High  
No 
diffusion 
DC 
EC 
BC 
CC 
RD 
Fourth, in low density small worlds randomly selected firms have a better chance 
of driving network-wide diffusion than strategically selected groups. This is somewhat 
counterintuitive. However, the explanation lies in the fact that in low density small 
worlds, diffusion of OSS might get „stuck‟ or slow down as it spreads within cohesive 
groups whereas randomly selected firms from all over the network are able to more 
quickly start and drive diffusion across different parts of the network. This offers some 
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very interesting implications, a) from a software vendor‟s perspective, targeting groups to 
encourage diffusion might not always be the best strategy, b) if the target network 
resembles a low density small world, lack of information regarding the details of 
interconnections between consumers may not be a disadvantage.  
3.3.3 Comparison between Individual and Group Centrality-Based Assignment Results 
An overview of the overarching results with individual centrality and group 
centrality based assignment is shown in Table 13.  
Table 13. Comparison between individual and group centrality based assignment results 
Topology Low Starting Population High Starting Population 
Low Density High Density Low Density High Density 
Random 
No diffusion 
Ind. BC 
Grp. DC 
Small World Ind. EC 
Grp. BC 
Ind. EC 
Ind. DC 
RD 
Ind. EC 
It is interesting to note that in random topology networks, if individuals have to be 
targeted, they should be targeted based on betweenness centrality. However, if groups 
have to be targeted then groups with most connections with other firms in the network 
should be targeted. It makes sense that given the nature of the „random‟ connections in 
random topology networks, targeting individuals with large number of connections (high 
degree centrality) may not be as effective as targeting individuals who are on the shortest 
paths between pairs of other nodes in the network. In other words, having more 
connections with other firms might not guarantee faster software diffusion by virtue of 
the lack of cohesion between those firms. Recall that in individual centrality based 
assignment firms getting OSS at the start of the simulation may not be connected to each 
other.  This means that they must be strategically placed to significantly affect the 
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process of diffusion. On the other hand, targeting groups whose members are connected 
to many other nodes (high group degree centrality) increases the chances of reaching out 
to more firms in the network. In such a case, even if the connections in the network are 
random, just by targeting firms that can target many other firms, the chances of diffusion 
are rapidly improved. Again it is important to take note that with group centrality-based 
assignment of OSS at the start of the simulation, the OSS firms are connected to each 
other in which case each one of those firms need not be located on some strategic path in 
the network. 
In low density small worlds, if the initial proportion is low, groups whose 
members are strategically placed on the shortest paths between other pairs of nodes (high 
group betweenness centrality), or individuals who have high eigenvector centrality, 
should be targeted. Recall that low initial proportion of OSS is not favorable for diffusion 
of OSS. Therefore, if individual firms have to be targeted, then the ones with well 
connected neighbors and neighbors‟ neighbors (highest eigenvector centrality) should be 
targeted. Individual betweenness centrality is not effective because given the nature of 
the low density small worlds most individual firms tend to have similar betweenness 
centrality values. However, what is more interesting is the fact that group betweenness 
centrality is very effective in driving diffusion instead of group eigenvector centrality. It 
is easy to understand that with a small installed base of adopters, targeting groups whose 
members are strategically placed on the shortest paths between pairs of other nodes 
should help. However, it was observed that individual betweenness centrality of firms in 
small worlds were not significantly different from each other and that is why in case of 
individual centrality-based assignment BC was not as effective as EC. The explanation 
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lies in the fact that group centralities are computed by averaging individual centrality 
values of the group‟s member firms. With eigenvector and closeness centrality, when 
averages are computed for a group, those averages reduce the differences between 
individuals (hence groups) in terms of group eigenvector and group closeness centralities. 
The group selected now may not have the most strategically located firms. On the other 
hand, since the individual betweenness centralities are somewhat similar, those values are 
not attenuated as much.  
Similarly, if there is high initial proportion of OSS in low density small worlds, 
then individual firms with most neighbors (high degree centrality) or randomly selected 
firms should be targeted (instead of any group centrality-based targets). The rationale for 
both choices is to take advantage of the high initial proportion and reach out to as many 
new firms across the network as possible. Individual degree centrality based assignment 
will allow that – by targeting firms first locally within the small worlds and then globally. 
Random assignment will achieve that by first reaching out to firms spread globally across 
the network and then initiating diffusion locally in different areas within the network.  
Surprisingly, it was found that the fastest rate of diffusion using group centrality-based 
assignment was always slower compared to the fastest rate of diffusion using individual 
centrality-based assignment for the same experimental conditions. This is a somewhat 
counterintuitive result as one might expect that a group of firms targeted simultaneously 
might speed up diffusion more than strategically located individuals spread throughout 
the network. Prior research points in some interesting directions in this regard. Some 
research suggests that in large networks groups might be more influential than individuals 
in affecting network-wide behavior (Pandit et al, 2008). Other findings, though in a 
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different context of diffusion, also suggest that “subgroup structure of social network 
affects the scale of computer epidemics indirectly through interaction with individual-
level centrality measures” (Cheng and Guo, 2008). Without further experiments and 
detailed analysis it would be difficult to accurately explain this result. However, based on 
the model and experiment design and known results, two explanations can be offered: 
First, it is possible that the size of our network (1000 firms) is too small and 
comparatively its density is very high. High density in small network would mean a 
number of redundant connections (for the purposes of diffusion) within a „group‟. 
Therefore, when we target groups, the redundant connections “lock down” diffusion 
within that dense group and if at all the members of the group start affecting other 
groups, the process is slow by virtue of the dense connections. On the other hand, for the 
same dense network, if individuals across the network are targeted, they are likely to 
speed up diffusion more than when groups are targeted because they may not be 
encumbered by each other‟s dense connections i.e. they may not end up being part of the 
same group. If this explanation is correct, then one could expect that networks whose size 
(number of nodes) to density (average number of links per node) ratio is high might allow 
group centrality based assignment to be superior compared to individual centrality-based 
assignment in the context of software diffusion. 
Second, the method of assigning OSS to the initial population using group 
centrality values might be slowing diffusion down in general as well. This is related to 
the first point mentioned above. If a group of firms are assigned OSS, as against 
individuals spread across the network, it can be expected that diffusion will be “locked 
in” (due to early PS domination) and will be slower to spread throughout the network. In 
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a low density network that may not happen as much compared to a higher density 
network. So for example, it was observed that the differences between the fastest rates of 
diffusion using individual and group centrality assignments increased  as the network 
density increased (regardless of network topology). In fact, in many cases diffusion failed 
to occur with group centrality based assignment as the density of the network was 
increased.  
3.4 Contributions to Research and Practice 
The overall results of our experiments demonstrated that a) strategically located 
firms or groups of firms within a network can significantly influence the diffusion of 
OSS. b) there is value in knowing the underlying structure of the network of consumers. 
Although the concept of targeting groups to drive network-wide adoption/diffusion is not 
new – AT&T offers myFavs which allows subscribers to identify their clique or group – 
these results enrich our understanding of network effects in the context of software 
adoption and diffusion. 
From a research perspective we have aimed at developing a better understanding 
of the commonly used centrality measures in the context of software diffusion at both 
individual as well as group levels: a) commonly used centrality measures can be 
effectively applied in the investigation of software diffusion type network flow processes, 
b) despite the same network conditions, individual and group centrality measures may 
behave differently in affecting network-wide phenomena, c) having deeper knowledge 
regarding interconnections in a social network may not always be a source of advantage 
in an attempt to influence network-wide phenomena (such as diffusion). This in particular 
is an important insight that should provide some guidance for future research on social 
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networks. Also, from a software diffusion perspective we have established the 
importance of understanding the social network of the target population in explaining 
network wide adoption and diffusion of OSS. Although the model was parameterized 
based on unique aspects of OSS, the framework itself can be extended to the 
investigation of diffusion of other types of software as well. It is possible that the degree 
of influence of some of the centrality measures, depending on the actual numbers being 
used in the simulation, might change. However, the direction of their effects should not 
vary significantly from what we have described. 
From a practitioner‟s perspective, we have demonstrated that if the strategic 
importance of firms can be established based on some criteria (betweenness, closeness 
etc.) in the context of software diffusion, vendors can take advantage of such insights and 
improve their targeted marketing and sales practices. This possibility is later explored in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
3.5 Assumptions, Limitations and Future Research 
There are a few limitations of this research. First, only two types of network 
topologies were used to investigate the effect of the various centrality measures. 
Although those two topologies are two of the most commonly used topologies in the 
literature on analysis of social networks, it would be worthwhile to run these experiments 
under other simulated (such as scale-free) or real world network topologies. 
Second, for measuring group centrality values, a group was defined to be a simple 
supply chain. In social network analysis and graph theory, there are various definitions of 
groups of nodes in a network. Many of those were explored in the context of our 
research, such as: cliques, N-cliques, clans, N-clans etc. However, it was concluded that 
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given the focus of our research (investigation of centrality measures) and the nature of 
our network flow process (software diffusion), a simple supply chain would be a simple 
yet powerful approximation of a „group‟ in a network of interconnected firms. Future 
research could further explore the robustness of our findings based on different 
definitions of a group. 
Third, we approximated group centrality measures based on individual centrality 
measures of members of the group. This method of computing group centrality does not 
pose a serious problem for the purpose of this investigation for the following four 
reasons: a) if large-sized groups have very important firms (or firms with high centrality 
values, regardless of which centrality measure is chosen), then their average will not be 
seriously attenuated; b) in our network, the average number of neighbors (density of the 
network) is the same and multiple replications of networks (with similar topology and 
density) are made to ensure that the effect of the various centrality measures can be 
robustly measured; c) in the absence of an agreed-upon definition of a group in the 
context of inter-organizational relationships, it is appropriate to assume the simple supply 
chain to be one representation of a group. This definition of a group allows firms that are 
part of multiple supply chains to contribute to the group centrality values different groups 
at the same time. This is important because there is no accepted norm for capturing 
overlapping group memberships in the computation of group centrality values in the 
literature on social networks; d) the average measure should theoretically bring the 
computed centrality values of the groups closer to each other and make it harder to 
differentiate between their effects in the statistical analysis. However, as was 
demonstrated earlier, the results for various group centrality measures did not always 
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come out to be statistically the same. Again, although using average as a surrogate for an 
actual group centrality measurement is an accepted approximation in the analysis of 
social networks, some nuances of the groups might be lost with such aggregate measures 
of group centrality. Future research could explore alternative measurements of group 
centrality and investigate their impact on diffusion of OSS. 
Fourth, it is important to note that the unit of analysis in our study was a firm. 
Although firm-level decisions may not always be made regarding various software 
solutions, the model and its findings can be extended to other levels of analyses. For 
example, the unit of analysis could be a department within a network of departments or a 
project in a portfolio of projects within an organization. At such levels of analysis the 
actual numbers adopted in the simulation model may vary, however, the behavior of the 
agents, the components of their decision functions and the nature of social and economic 
interdependence between agents (whether they be departments or projects) would still 
permit the application of the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF NETWORK-AWARE PRICING VERSUS 
TRADITIONAL SOFTWARE PRICING SCHEMES ON THE DIFFUSION OF OPEN 
SOURCE SOFTWARE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was shown that a starting population strategically 
located within the network can significantly influence the process of software diffusion. 
As a consequence it is natural to ask that if a software vendor were to have knowledge 
regarding the structural characteristics of the network, can the vendor target strategically 
located firms within the network to trigger or further drive the diffusion of its software? 
More specifically this chapter explores the concept of “network-aware” pricing i.e. price 
discrimination on the basis of location information of the firms. Since the objective is not 
to propose a new pricing scheme or to discuss the optimal conditions under which 
location-based pricing may or may not work, findings from Chapter 3 are used as a basis 
to simply demonstrate the concept of network-aware pricing.  
There are different ways in which vendors can target important firms. For 
example, vendors often resort to price discounting to attract larger customers (Geisman 
and Maruskin, 2006; Holden 2008). In this chapter, we explore the concept of price 
discounting on the basis of location information of the firms. The idea that a vendor has 
information regarding the network structure of the clients is not new. There are ways of 
estimating data regarding the network of customers through empirical and computational 
techniques (Westarp 2003).  
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Also, there is a possibility that customers may share some information regarding 
their network with the service provider in order to secure a better deal. For example in the 
cell phone industry AT&T‟s myFavs offers customers low calling charges to a select 
group of „favorite‟ numbers identified by the customers. Given the rising trend toward 
usage-based licensing or on demand software delivery, customers might be willing to 
share network or network-based usage information to secure a more economical deal with 
the service provider. Therefore, we evaluate the effectiveness of this pricing scheme 
against traditional size-based price discounting scheme in which discounts are offered 
based on the size of the deal (Geisman and Maruskin 2006). More formally, our research 
question is: From a vendor’s perspective, is network-aware pricing more effective than 
traditional pricing schemes? 
The model developed in the previous chapters is used in this chapter. In Chapter 2 
it was demonstrated that under some conditions the proprietary software (PS) vendor can 
eventually lose market share to OSS despite being vastly dominant in the market at the 
start of the simulation. In that model, the PS vendor was passive and did not react to the 
changing market conditions. However, in this study it is assumed that the PS vendor is 
aware of the strategic location of the firms and acts proactively by changing its pricing 
scheme to retain its dominance in the market. 
The rest of this chapter has been organized as follows: the next section provides a 
brief review of the traditional software pricing schemes. This is followed by a description 
of the model and experiments. Then the results are presented along with a discussion on 
the implication of these results. The chapter is concluded with a brief description of the 
limitations and ideas for future research. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
This section provides a brief review of the literature on traditional software 
pricing schemes. Since the objective of present research is not to evaluate or recommend 
optimal software pricing strategies in general, only relevant literature will be reviewed. 
For a detailed review of various software pricing strategies please refer to an exploratory 
study recently conducted by Lehmann and Buxmann (2009).  
4.2.1 Traditional Software Pricing Schemes 
There have been several studies in the past that have investigated the issue of 
pricing software or information goods (Bontis and Chung, 2000; Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer, 1996; Chakravarty et al, 2006; Foley, 2004; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; 
Sundararajan, 2004; Gandal, 2004). Determining the right price for software remains a 
“complex and subjective process” (Bontis and Chung, 2000: p. 247) primarily because it 
is hard to a) put a price on the development of such an “intangible asset” (Bontis and 
Chung, 2000), and b) determine what the customer will be willing to pay for it 
(Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Foley, 2004) as every customer may not derive the same 
level of value from the same software (Bontis and Chung, 2000). Other factors that might 
determine or affect the price of software include “network externalities, cross-market 
complementarities, standards, mindshare, trialability” (Gallaugher and Wang, 2002). 
Researchers do agree that any pricing scheme must take into consideration the 
value associated by the buyer with the software. In an attempt to more accurately capture 
this value proposition, vendors resort to price discrimination. Lehmann and Buxman 
(2009) discuss three types of price discrimination strategies in the context of pricing 
software: 1) in first-degree price discrimination consumers are offered a price based on 
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their willingness to pay or value proposition. As mentioned above, this is hard to 
accurately achieve in the case of software; 2) in second-degree price discrimination the 
consumer chooses between different price-product offerings that may vary on the basis of 
performance, timing of availability and quantity; 3) in third-degree price discrimination, 
as against second-degree, the vendor discriminates by segmenting the market into nature 
of use (e.g. business use, student use etc.) or region of use (e.g. based on country). 
Typically, vendors offer a combination of second- and third-degree price discrimination 
strategies (Lehmann and Buxman 2009). Functionality and version based pricing 
(Simonetto and Davidson 2005; Sundararajan 2004) can be considered to be examples of 
third-degree price discrimination whereas named user, volume-based, concurrent, site and 
upgrade pricing (Simonetto and Davidson, 2005; Sundararajan, 2004) can be considered 
examples of second-degree price discrimination. Some of these pricing schemes (such as 
volume-based and named user licensing) are usage dependent whereas others (such as 
functionality and version based licensing) are usage independent. Research suggests that 
vendors expected usage-dependent pricing schemes to gain prominence in the future, 
however, users preferred usage-independent schemes as these did not involve 
“problematic cost calculation, and the selection of a concrete, meaningful assessment 
base” (Lehmann and Buxmann 2009: p. 460). 
In addition to these pricing schemes that target customers on the basis of the value 
they associate with the software, vendors often resort to offering high discounts to further 
penetrate the market or to meet revenue targets (Holden 2008; Lehmann and Buxmann 
2009). This is similar to quantity-based second-degree price discrimination where key 
customers are large customers and are offered a reduced per-unit price. However, recent 
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empirical investigations have revealed that in the software industry vendors do not 
strategically plan the discount offerings and have limited understanding of their long-
term implications (Geisman and Maruskin, 2006). The evidence suggests that despite 
oversight on individual cases, the absence of an overarching strategy or budget results in 
arbitrary spending on discounts. Although conventional wisdom dictates that higher 
discounts should be offered to secure bigger deals, the empirical findings do not validate 
this idea (Geisman and Maruskin 2006). Therefore, there is a need for software vendors 
to be able to a) identify which potential or existing clients should be offered discounts, 
and b) better manage the discount dollars that are spent in the process of securing new 
customers and/or meeting revenue targets. 
In this chapter, we propose that information regarding a firms‟ strategic location 
in a network should be taken into consideration in order to determine which customers 
should be targeted for a discount. This notion stems from the understanding that 
strategically located firms can significantly influence software diffusion or market 
penetration (Chapter 3). Furthermore, if the use of software entails network externalities 
and interoperability issues are involved, a firm‟s value proposition of the software will 
likely be affected by its neighbors (or neighbors‟ neighbors). Therefore, from the 
perspective of targeting customers on the basis of their value proposition as well as their 
ability to penetrate the market, it is essential to take information regarding their location 
into account to inform any pricing strategy. The notion of understanding the network 
structure of existing or target clients is neither new nor extremely difficult. There are 
ways of estimating data regarding the network of customers through empirical and 
computational techniques (Westarp 2003). Also, there is a possibility that customers may 
108 
 
share some information regarding their network with the service provider in order to 
secure a better deal. For example in the cell phone industry AT&T‟s myFavs offers 
customers low calling charges to a select group of „favorite‟ numbers identified by the 
customers. Given the rising trend toward usage-based licensing or on demand software 
delivery, customers might be willing to share network or network-based usage 
information to secure a more economical deal with the service provider. 
4.3 Simulation Model 
The simulation model developed in Chapter 2 was used as the underlying 
framework in this study. The model simulated a network of 1000 firms using a desktop 
operating system. The firms chose between proprietary and open-source alternatives of a 
desktop OS while trying to maximize their cost savings. At the start of the simulation 
OSS was assigned to a small, randomly selected, population of the network. The model 
assumed that the PS vendor was passive to the zero license/upgrade price offered by the 
OSS vendor. In other words, if the PS vendor gained or lost market share or its 
profitability was affected, the price offered to the clients was never changed. The results 
demonstrated that under many conditions, the PS vendor did not lose market share and 
under other conditions, network topology, network density and interoperability costs 
were some of the more critical variables that affected the PS vendor‟s market share.  
In Chapter 3, the effects of network topology and network density were explored 
in more detail on the basis of the literature on economics of social networks. Instead of 
randomly assigning OSS to a small starting population in the simulation, OSS was 
assigned to selected firms based on structural importance (using various centrality 
measures). This investigation revealed that a) structurally important firms significantly 
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affected the course of diffusion of OSS, b) under different conditions (including network 
topology, network density and interoperability costs) the criterion for identifying 
structurally important firms was different. These results suggested that from a marketing 
perspective, if a PS vendor were to offer discounts to structurally important firms, the 
diffusion of competing software might be prevented or slowed down. Hence, the present 
study was designed to demonstrate the concept of “network-aware pricing”. 
There are three important points to be made at this point before describing the 
model for the present study in detail. First, it is essential to reiterate that the importance 
of structural information of firms was demonstrated in Chapter 3 when the starting 
population of OSS adopters was chosen on the basis of that information. In this study, 
however, as the rest of the section will demonstrate in detail, the structural information of 
the firms was not used in a similar manner. That defines a crucial difference between the 
two studies: just because structural information was found to significantly affect software 
diffusion in Chapter 3, it cannot be assumed that the use of that information in the 
present study will also significantly influence the outcomes. Second, in Chapter 3, it was 
found that firms selected on the basis of either individual or group centralities 
significantly affected the rate of diffusion of OSS. However, rate of diffusion of OSS 
with individual centrality-based assignment of OSS was always better than the rate of 
diffusion of OSS with group centrality-based assignment of OSS. Therefore, in this study 
it was decided to test the concept of network-aware pricing using only individual 
centrality-based assignment. Third, it was found in Chapter 3 that different centrality 
measures helped identify structurally important firms under different environmental 
conditions. These environmental conditions were defined by the six critical variables 
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investigated in Chapter 2: network topology, network density, interoperability costs, OSS 
support costs, frequency of PS upgrades and size of initial population of OSS adopters. 
Therefore, it was decided to use all four centrality measures to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of “network-aware” pricing. In order to do that, different environemtnal 
conditions, appropriate to the selected centraltiy measure, had to be setup. For example, 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of network-aware pricing using information on the 
betweenness centrality of firms, a random network had to be setup with a high initial 
population of OSS adopters. This is because it was found in Chapter 3 that a) diffusion in 
random networks only occurred with high initial population of OSS adopters, b) when 
diffusion did occur with high initial population of OSS adopters, it was fastest with 
betweenness centrality based assignment of the initial population of OSS. On the other 
hand, if the effectiveness of network-aware pricing had to be demonstrated with 
information on the eigenvector centralities of firms, a random topology network with 
high initial population of OSS adopters could not be used because results from Chapter 3 
had demonstrated that under those conditions structural importance of firms was more 
effectively captured using betweenness centrality instead of eigenvector centrality. With 
these important ideas in mind, let us now consider the design of the model for the present 
study in more detail (see Figure 12). 
Instead of strategically selecting a starting population of OSS adopters, OSS was 
assigned to a small randomly selected set of firms. At the start of the simulation, a 
competitive PS vendor offered per-license discounts to some firms in the network 
(regardless of whether they were PS or OSS adopters). In light of the research question, 
three criteria were used for selecting the firms for discounts: a) size-based discounts – 
111 
 
higher discounts to be offered to firms with larger number of licenses, b) location-based 
discounts – higher discounts to be offered to more structurally important firms, c) 
combined discounts – higher discounts to be offered to firms that were both larger and 
more structurally important. It is important to note that despite the different selection 
criteria, the discounts were always offered per license and the decision to accept or reject 
the offer was made at an aggregate/organizational level.  
 A network (with pre-specified topology and density) of 1000 firms is generated based on 
Watts and Strogatz algorithm (1998) 
 Network-level attributes such as frequency of proprietary and open source software 
upgrades, strength of interoperability costs etc. are assigned 
 Firm-level attributes such as size of the firm, current choice of software, level of OSS 
technical expertise etc. are assigned 
o Firms are sorted based on size and the level of per-license discounts for which the 
firms might be eligible are determined 
o Firms are sorted based on location (given a chosen centrality measure) and the level 
of per-license discounts for which the firms might be eligible are determined 
o Firms are sorted based on an average rank (of size and location) and the level of per-
license discounts for which the firms might be eligible are determined 
 For each firm the following steps are repeated for 50 simulated time periods 
Step 1: If the firm is at the beginning of its planning horizon, proceed to step 2, otherwise 
proceed to step 4 
Step 2: The firm evaluates its decision function to decide whether to upgrade existing 
software or switch to the alternative software. The decision function takes into 
account economic factors (such as costs in case of upgrading/switching the 
software) and social factors (such as the decision of the firm‟s neighbors). If 
discounts are being offered by the vendor then those discounts are taken into 
account when the upgrade/switching costs are computed 
Step 3: If the firm switches to the alternative software, it obtains new costs (setup, 
training, license, support costs etc.); otherwise, it upgrades existing software 
Step 4: The vendor monitors total market share (# of adopters) and revenue and compares 
the revenue at time „t‟ with the maximum revenue achieved with the previous 
version of the software. If the revenue falls by more than a certain level, the vendor 
decides to offer discounts to all eligible firms (i.e. firms who will be at the 
beginning of their planning horizon) in the next time period (time t+1) 
Step 5: Proceed to next simulated time period 
Figure 12.  Simulation Process with a Reactive PS Vendor 
The interesting implication of such discounts from a vendor‟s perspective is that i) 
with size based discounts there is a potential to offer deeper discounts to fewer firms with 
a certain amount of money, whereas, ii) with location-based discounts, for the same 
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amount of money, smaller discounts can be offered to a much bigger number of firms. 
Practically, for instance, a vendor can decide what type of clients to target in the short 
term or the long term. 
Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of discounts offered under different 
criteria during the simulation, the PS vendor monitored the market share (# of adopters) 
and profit (NPV based on revenue from licenses sold every year and support). If the 
profit in a given time period fell by more than a certain level compared to the maximum 
profit earned with the release of the previous version of the software, the PS vendor 
offered per-license discounts to all eligible firms in the next time period. The maximum 
profit with the release of the previous software was used as a benchmark. There is no 
empirical data which suggests what benchmark for profit is actually used by software 
vendors. It was assumed that with the release of a newer version the vendor would be 
looking to improve its position in the market and expect to earn more. Therefore, best 
performance with the previous version was deemed to be an appropriate comparison case. 
If the profit did not fall significantly, then the PS vendor did nothing to change its 
original pricing structure. Firms were only eligible for a discount if they were at the start 
of their planning horizon and not all firms were offered the same discount. 
4.3.1 Experiments and Simulation Parameters 
A 3x3x5 study was designed to address the research question by modifying three 
different variables: revenue threshold, type of discount and size of discount. Table 14 
provides an overview of the variables and chosen parameter values for the experiments. 
Three levels of revenue threshold (low, medium, high) were used to represent the drop in
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revenue which would trigger a reaction (in the shape of offering discounts) from the PS 
vendor. Low threshold was indicative of a more revenue-sensitive vendor followed by 
medium and high threshold. Three types of discounts (size-based, location-based, 
combined) were used to represent the different criteria adopted by the PS vendor for 
offering discounts. Size-based discounts were determined on the basis of the size of the 
firm – larger firms (with high number of machines) received higher per-license discounts 
whereas smaller firms received smaller discounts. 
The simulations were run for 50 time periods and 400 sample paths were 
generated for each parameter combination described in the previous paragraph. Number 
of OSS adopters and revenue were recorded throughout the course of the simulation. 
These dependent variables were chosen because one (# of adopters) measures market 
penetration whereas the other (revenue) measures profitability and both represent 
practical but different objectives of a typical software vendor when deciding pricing 
schemes (Lehmann and Buxmann 2009). NPV of the cash flows over the course of the 
simulation was computed using an interest rate of 4%. Estimating interest rate for 
evaluating investments is a complex problem which requires an understanding of the 
industry, past trends, type of investment etc. In the absence of empirical data on the 
actual interest rate used by vendors to evaluate revenue streams in the software market, 
the risk-free interest rate typically associated with government treasury bills was used as 
a conservative estimate. 
The computation of NPV facilitated a more accurate comparison of the 
profitability of the different price discounting schemes. Similarly, location-based 
discounts were determined by offering high discounts to the more strategically located 
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firms in the network. Strategic location was determined by choosing an appropriate 
centrality measure (either betweenness, closeness, degree or eigenvector centrality). 
Results from Chapter 3 were used to determine the appropriate centrality measure for 
each experiment. Combined discounts were determined by offering high discounts to 
strategically located, large firms. The combined ranking of the firms was determined by 
computing the average rank based on size as well as location. Five sizes of discounts were 
used to represent varying levels of per license discounts offered by the PS vendor to 
retain or improve market share and increase net revenue. The five levels were: no 
discount (as a comparison or base case), very low discount, low discount, high discount 
and very high discount. Within each level of size of discount, regardless of the criteria for 
selecting the firms for discounts, a “step-wise” function was used to determine actual per-
license discount for each firm. For example, if very low size-based discounts were being 
offered then, 20% of the largest firms were offered 10% per-license discount; the next 
60% of smaller firms were offered a 5% per-license discount; and the smallest 20% of the 
firms were offered no discount. Similarly, if very low location-based discounts were 
being offered then, 20% of the most strategically located firms (based on the selected 
centrality measure) received a 10% per-license discount; 60% of the next most 
strategically located firms received a 5% per-license discount and 20% of the least 
strategically located firms received no discount. 
As mentioned earlier, in addition to these three key variables, 6 other parameter 
values had to be chosen that described the market conditions: network topology, network 
density, interoperability costs, OSS support costs, frequency of PS upgrades and size of 
initial population of OSS adopters. One route would have been to setup all possible 
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network conditions (324 that were used in Chapter 2) and use each one of the centrality 
measures in those conditions to offer location-based discounts and compare them with 
size-based discounts. However, this was an infeasible route for two reasons: First, results 
from Chapter 3 had shown that the most appropriate criteria for defining the structural 
importance of a firm (degree, closeness, betweenness or eigenvector centrality) changed 
with the network conditions. For example, betweenness centrality was effective in 
spreading diffusion only in random topology networks with high initial proportion of 
OSS adopters; closeness centrality was effective in small world networks with high 
interoperability costs and high initial proportion of OSS adopters, and so on. Therefore it 
did not make sense to ignore those findings. Second, the objective in this chapter was to 
simply demonstrate whether location-based discounts can be more effective than 
traditional size-based discounts or not. Since a formal analytical proof-of-concept cannot 
be developed, a demonstration was required to convey the point. Therefore, it was 
decided to choose experiments with the following criteria in mind 
1. Experiments should be conducted that demonstrate the concept of location-based 
discounts for all four centrality measures that were studied and found to be 
important in chapter 3. This was important because a) it had been found in 
Chapter 3 that each one of the four measures was important under some 
conditions, b) it would allow us to show that the concept of location-based 
discounts is not limited to one centrality measure – so long as an appropriate 
criteria for measuring structural importance can be identified, location-based 
discounts can be applied. 
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2. Experiments should span the different network conditions that were depicted in 
Chapter 3. In other words, location-based discounts should not just be tested for 
random topology or small world networks, or low density or high density 
networks etc. Again, the motivation was to separate the concept of network-aware 
pricing from actual numbers used in the simulation model by demonstrating the 
concept under different conditions. 
3. In the selected experiments, diffusion of OSS should not occur very fast i.e. the 
time for diffusion of OSS to occur should not be a few years. This was important 
because both Chapters 2 and 3 had shown that if the diffusion of OSS occurred 
very rapidly or if the network environment was very conducive to the diffusion of 
OSS, then location was less important to the process of diffusion. Therefore, in 
those conditions location-based discounts cannot be expected to be significantly 
better than size-based discounts. 
4. In the selected experiments, diffusion of OSS based on random selection of the 
initial OSS population should be clearly slower than the rate of diffusion with 
centrality-based selection of the initial OSS population (from Part 2). Simple 
statistical difference between the rates of diffusion with random and centrality-
based assignment could not have been used as a suitable criterion. This is because 
in many conditions, statistical difference did not reflect „practical difference‟. For 
instance, consider the following network condition: low density random topology 
network, low interoperability costs, high starting population of OSS and low 
variability in OSS support costs, diffusion of OSS: in this case diffusion of OSS 
occurred in 4 years with betweenness centrality-based selection of the starting 
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OSS population and 4.168 years with random selection of the starting OSS 
population. These two numbers were found to be statistically different. However, 
it can be argued that they may not be too different, practically, from a software 
vendor‟s perspective. 
Consequently, four experimental conditions were setup, one for each one of the centrality 
measures that matched the above mentioned criteria: 
For betweenness centrality-based discounts: high density random topology 
network, high variability in OSS support costs, low interoperability costs, low PS 
upgrade frequency and high starting OSS population. For closeness centrality:-based 
discounts low density small world network, high variability in OSS support costs, high 
interoperability costs, low PS upgrade frequency and high starting OSS population. For 
degree centrality-based discounts: low density small world network, low variability in 
OSS support costs, medium interoperability costs, low PS upgrade frequency and high 
starting OSS population. For eigenvector centrality-based discounts: low density small 
world network, high variability in OSS support costs, low interoperability costs, high 
frequency of PS upgrades, low starting OSS population 
Table 15 provides a quick overview of the selected market conditions for each 
one of the centrality measures. Repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine the 
effectiveness of the three types of price discounting schemes. All reported results were 
significant at p < 0.05. The results being reported and discussed in the following section 
are those in which the dependent variables (# of OSS adopters and profit of the vendor) 
were measured at the end of the simulation i.e. time t=50.   
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However, another set of analyses were also performed in which the dependent 
variables were measured at T=25 to understand the robustness of the effect of location-
based discounts. That analysis did not reveal any new or surprising results compared to 
the ones that were found when the dependent variables were measured at T=50. 
Therefore, the following section does not discuss those results. Details of those results 
can be found in Appendix B. 
4.3.2 Results and Analysis 
In general the results demonstrated that all three types of discounts offered by the PS 
vendor (size-based, location-based and combined) were effective in reducing the rate of diffusion 
of OSS. In most cases, increasing the size of the per-license discount helped the vendor and a 
delayed response from the vendor to the falling profits (i.e. when revenue threshold was high), 
adversely affected the vendor‟s market share and profitability. These are trivial results but they 
are important because they lend some level of face validity to the model. The results also revealed 
that with higher discounts, location-based discounts can be better than size-based discounts in 
terms of both profitability as well as market share. On the other hand, low discounts do not 
provide sufficient incentive to enough number of strategically located firms to out-perform size-
based or combined discounts. Detailed results based on all the different centrality measures used 
to offer location-based and combined discounts have been reported in Tables 16-21. 
High level of location-based discounts offered on the basis of closeness centrality, 
outperformed size and combined discounts both in terms of number of adopters (Table 16) and 
NPV (Table 17). When lower level discounts were offered then location-based discounts were 
less or equally effective compared to the other two types of discounts. Offering higher discounts 
reduced the diffusion of OSS (lower number of adopters at the end of the simulation) and 
increased the NPV of the PS vendor (higher NPV at the end of the simulation).  
121 
 
 
 
Table 16. Number of adopters when closeness centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 416.725 ≈404 (S/L/C) ≈389 (S/L/C) 
377.67(L) 
380.25(C) 
381.40(S) 
359.76(L) 
370.41(C) 
373.79(S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
416.725 ≈408 (S/L/C) ≈398 (S/L/C) 
388.83(L) 
391.90(C) 
393.25(S) 
371.10(L) 
382.73(C) 
386.67(S) 
High 
(10%) 
416.725 ≈412 (S/L/C) ≈406 (S/L/C) 
396.77(L) 
401.19(C) 
402.86(S) 
378.92(L) 
392.60(C) 
396.92(S) 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. NPV in $ when closeness centrality was used for location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 1.92E+10 
1.929E+10 (S/C) 
1.9285E+10 (L) 
1.93E+10 
(S/L/C)  
1.931E+10 (L) 
1.927E+10 (C) 
1.925E+10 (S) 
1.940E+10 (L) 
1.929E+10 (C) 
1.924E+10 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
1.92E+10 
1.928E+10 (S/C) 
1.927E+10 (L) 
1.928E+10 
(S/L/C) 
1.930E+10 (L) 
1.926E+10 (C) 
1.924E+10 (S) 
1.939E+10 (L) 
1.928E+10 (C) 
1.923E+10 (S) 
High 
(10%) 
1.92E+10 
1.927E+10 (S/C) 
1.926E+10 (L) 
1.927E+10 
(S/L/C) 
1.929E+10 (L) 
1.925E+10 (C) 
1.923E+10 (S) 
1.939E+10 (L) 
1.927E+10 (C) 
1.922E+10 (S) 
* Sample size is 400 in each cell 
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Also, a delayed response to changing market conditions from the PS vendor (i.e. 
higher revenue thresholds) resulted in lower revenue for the PS vendor. Very similar 
results were observed when betweenness centrality was used to offer size-based discounts 
(Tables 18 and 19). These results validate the concept that was proposed in Chapter 3, i.e. 
PS vendors can benefit from offering better pricing scheme to strategically located firms 
in a network. The results provide strong support also because compared to the model in 
Chapter 3, the structural information was used differently in this study and still found to 
be significant. 
In Chapter 3 structural information contributed to the selection of the starting 
population of OSS adopters whereas in this study it was used to offer discounts to the 
firms. Furthermore, despite the fact that for both betweenness and closeness centrality, 
the other market conditions (network topology, network density, level of interoperability 
costs etc.) were different (refer to Table 15) and that both reflect differently on the 
concept of importance of a firm in a network, location based discounts still proved to be 
quite effective. 
When location-based discounts were offered using eigenvector centrality, it was 
observed that size-based discounts were statistically more effective or equally effective in 
slowing down the diffusion of OSS (Table 20). However, in terms of NPV, location-
based discounts appeared to be better (Table 21). Furthermore, higher discounts resulted 
in a loss of revenue. These results require some explanation. In Chapter 3 it was found 
that under adverse conditions for OSS, if at all diffusion occurred, it occurred with 
eigenvector centrality. Therefore, when discounts were offered under those conditions to 
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prevent diffusion of OSS, the conditions were made more difficult for OSS diffusion to 
occur. 
Table 18. Number of adopters when betweenness centrality was used for location-
based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 709.452 
601.28 (S) 
614.14 (C) 
638.67 (L) 
415.58 (S) 
421.93 (C) 
460.77 (L) 
374.47 (L) 
380/380.25 (S/C) 
315.77 (L) 
350.53 (C) 
363.91 (S) 
Medium (5%) 709.452 ≈690 (S/L/C) 
579.17 (S) 
599.22 (C) 
616.33 (L) 
≈490 (S/L/C) 
331.42 (L) 
401.59 (C) 
433.10 (S) 
High (10%) 709.452 ≈695 (S/L/C) 
664.63 (L) 
677.93 (C) 
683.71 (S) 
572.75 (L) 
641.02 (C) 
670.12 (S) 
359.71 (L) 
544.05 (C) 
617.12 (S) 
 
 
 
Table 19. NPV in $ when betweenness centrality was used for location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 1.72E+10 
18702266981 (S) 
18620699013 (C) 
18397616190 (L) 
18990691230 (S) 
18958447719 (C) 
18876345263 (L) 
19008931070 (L) 
18939157447 (C) 
18887554565 (S) 
19406481658 (L) 
19067142478 (C) 
18864968947 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
1.72E+10 
18237309572 (S) 
18150600109 (C) 
17981150641 (L) 
18775248835 (S) 
18697020184 (C) 
18571145501 (L) 
18839008503 (L) 
18786418754 (C) 
18733396726 (S) 
19380739534 (L) 
18997522093 (C) 
18764853111 (S) 
High 
(10%) 
1.72E+10 
17715984227 (S) 
17656682257 (C) 
17554185678 (L) 
18125298874 (S) 
18092358680 (C) 
18041260182 (L) 
18548816889 (L) 
18309350543 (C) 
18189822375 (S) 
19352939185 (L) 
18759264730 (C) 
18398309728 (S) 
* Sample size is 400 in each cell 
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As a result, firms that were in any case not considering adoption of OSS, received 
discounts from the PS vendor which unnecessarily lowered the revenue of the PS vendor. 
Since size-based discounts given on number of machines meant higher dollar amount 
spent on discounts, those discounts were most effective in preventing OSS diffusion 
(Table 20) but least effective in improving the revenue of the PS vendor (Table 21). 
When location-based discounts were offered using degree centrality, it was 
observed that size-based discounts were generally better in terms of slowing diffusion of 
OSS (Table 22) and improving the revenue of the PS vendor (Table 23). It was also 
observed that when very high discounts were offered, PS vendors revenue fell compared 
to when high discounts were offered. These are interesting results and warrant some 
explanation. In Chapter 3 it was observed that degree centrality based assignment of OSS 
to the starting population was only effective in low density small worlds with 
low/medium interoperability costs and high initial proportion of OSS. 
Table 20. Number of adopters when eigenvector centrality was used for location-
based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 172.83 
169 (S)* 
≈170 (L/C) 
≈165 (S/C) 
167 (L) 
162.66 (S) 
163.25 (C) 
163.91 (L) 
≈160 (S/L/C) 
Medium 
(5%) 
172.83 
170 (S) 
≈171 (L/C) 
167.59 (S) 
168.15 (C) 
169 (L) 
≈166 (S/C) 
167 (L) 
≈165 (S/L/C) 
High (10%) 172.83 
170 (S) 
≈171 (L/C) 
168.49 (S) 
169.05 (C) 
169.98 (L) 
167.66 (S) 
≈168 (L/C) 
≈166 (S/L/C) 
 
* Sample size is 400 in each cell 
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Table 21. NPV in $ when eigenvector centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 2.54E+10 
2.5354E+10 
(S/L/C) 
2.527E+10 (L) 
2.526E+10 (S/C) 
2.518E+10 (L) 
2.515E+10 (C) 
2.514E+10 (S) 
2.508E+10 (L) 
2.504E+10 (C) 
2.502E+10 (S) 
Medium (5%) 2.54E+10 
2.5353E+10 
(S/L/C) 
2.5268E+10 (L) 
2.5262E+10 (C) 
2.5259E+10 (S) 
2.517E+10 (L) 
2.515E+10 (C) 
2.514E+10 (S) 
2.508E+10 (L) 
2.504E+10 (C) 
2.502E+10 (S) 
High (10%) 2.54E+10 
2.5353E+10 
(S/L/C) 
2.57E+10 (L) 
2.526E+10 (S/C) 
2.517E+10 (L) 
2.515E+10 (C) 
2.514E+10 (S) 
2.508E+10 (L) 
2.504E+10 (C) 
2.502E+10 (S) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Number of adopters when degree centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 598.695 
544.08(S) 
546.13(C) 
553.20(L) 
489.52(S) 
494.15(C) 
502.33(L) 
464.07(S) 
466.09(C) 
473.43(L) 
449.73(S)/450.32(C) 
454.66(L) 
Medium 
(5%) 
598.695 
560.93(S) 
562.89(C) 
568.61(L) 
520.68(S) 
522.73(C) 
530.07(L) 
498.43(S) 
501.29(C) 
507.67(L) 
486.38(S) 
488.50(C) 
491.16(L) 
High (10%) 598.695 
580.28(S) 
582.01(C) 
585.12(L) 
557.02(S) 
559.96(C) 
565.79(L) 
544.27(S) 
546.90(C) 
552.39(L) 
536.46(S) 
538.04(C) 
540.12(L) 
 
* Sample size is 400 in each cell 
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Table 23. NPV in $ when degree centrality was used for location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 
1.82E+10 
1.8454E+10 (S) 
1.8431E+10 (C) 
1.8377E+10 (L) 
1.8669E+10 (S) 
1.8641E+10 (C) 
1.8571E+10 (L) 
1.8676E+10 (S) 
1.8656E+10 (C) 
1.8601E+10 (L) 
1.86E+10 
(S/L/C) 
Medium 
(5%) 
1.82E+10 
1.8376E+10 (S) 
1.8354E+10 (C) 
1.8306E+10 (L) 
1.8552E+10 (S) 
1.8529E+10 (C) 
1.8456E+10 (L) 
1.8565E+10 (S) 
1.8541E+10 (C) 
1.8482E+10 (L) 
1.85E+10 (S/C)  
1.847E+10 (L) 
High 
(10%) 
1.82E+10 
1.8301E+10 (S) 
1.8279E+10 (C) 
1.8239E+10 (L) 
1.8438E+10 (S) 
1.8407E+10 (C) 
1.8341E+10 (L) 
1.8441E+10 (S) 
1.8412E+10 (C) 
1.8350E+10 (L) 
1.8375E+10 (S) 
1.8364E+10 (C) 
1.8340E+10 (L) 
* Sample size is 400 in each cell 
All of these conditions strongly favored diffusion of OSS. Under such conditions, 
it made sense that a starting OSS population of firms with highest number of neighbors 
on average (high degree centrality) would further speed up diffusion of OSS. However, in 
the present study, the favorable conditions are not significantly offset by simply offering 
discounts to high degree centrality firms. Size-based discounts translate into greater 
discounts which are able to slow diffusion more than location-based discounts. This 
suggests that perhaps degree-centrality based discounts might not be effective at all 
because the market conditions under which degree centrality was found to be effective (in 
Chapter 3) dramatically favor diffusion of OSS. Hence, location-based (degree centrality-
based) discounts do not provide sufficient incentive to firms to switch compared to size-
based discounts. 
 
127 
 
4.4 Discussion  
Overall the results have demonstrated that location-based discounts offered under 
appropriate market conditions can be effective both in terms of penetrating the market 
and achieving revenue targets. This concept was suggested on the basis of experiments 
run in Chapter 3. In that study, the starting population of OSS adopters was chosen on the 
basis of the structural information. In the present study, however, the same structural 
information was simply used to offer discounts to strategically located firms in the 
network. A comparison between those types of discounts and traditional size-based 
discounts revealed that if strategically located firms are offered a big enough discount, 
that can be more favorable for a vendor in terms of both profitability as well as market 
share. 
The peculiar results in the cases of eigenvector and degree centrality-based 
discounts offer two additional insights: first, if other factors (such as interoperability 
costs, support costs etc.) favor the diffusion of the vendor‟s software then of course the 
vendor need not offer any additional discounts because that results in falling profits; 
second, if other factors are highly conducive to the diffusion of the competitor‟s software 
then targeting discounts (low or high) alone to strategically located firms may not be 
enough. Under such circumstances, the vendor would have to react with more than just a 
price change to compete. At this point present research merely suggests that under those 
circumstances offering per-license discounts to strategically located firms would not be 
sufficient. These results also suggest that having location information need not always 
mean that the vendor should incorporate it in its pricing strategy. Interestingly, 
„combined‟ discounts strategy for selecting firms never outperformed purely location or 
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size-based selection strategies. In the combined strategy, firms were given an average 
rank on the basis of their structural as well as size-based importance. On the basis of the 
average rank, the best firms were offered the largest discounts. The fact that combined 
discount strategy never outperformed the other strategies in our case could have been 
because of the way the combined rank was computed using simple averages. Different 
„combined‟ strategies could be explored at a later stage which compute a weighted 
average by placing more weight on location information than size information (or vice 
versa) depending on other network conditions. However, such an investigation is beyond 
the scope of the present research. 
Recall the discussion on the practical implications of the results in Chapter 3 
(section 3.3.1.3). The results in the present study provide credence to some of the ideas 
discussed in that section. Different network conditions dictate which firms have the 
potential of dramatically changing the diffusion dynamics in a software market. Attempts 
by vendors to capture large firms may make business sense from an isolated case-by-case 
perspective. However, our research strongly suggests that sufficient inducements offered 
to strategically located (and not necessarily the largest) firms can significantly trigger the 
diffusion of the vendor‟s software both locally as well as globally across the network. 
Furthermore, since strategically located individual firms may not end up receiving deep 
discounts (as against large firms), targeting such firms results in better revenue figures as 
well.  
4.5 Limitations 
There are a few areas that may limit the generalizability of the findings of this 
research. First, it is assumed that the OSS vendor does not react to the changing market 
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conditions. Given the research question, this is not a limiting assumption. The model was 
designed to study if location-based information can effectively inform pricing decisions 
of a vendor. To that end, the assumption does not limit the findings of the study. As an 
extension, the OSS vendor‟s reaction can be modeled along similar lines as well i.e. OSS 
vendor starts offering discounts as well on the basis of size and strategic location of the 
firms. However, there are two issues that would have to be considered: a) that would be 
an economic game which would have to be modeled differently with entirely different 
objectives for observing the various strategies and counter strategies of the vendors; b) 
typically OSS vendors do not offer discounts on license costs so a price-discounting 
scheme in such a case might have to focus on discounting the overall package of the OSS 
clients. 
Second, it is assumed that different types of per-license discounts are offered by 
the PS vendor. Typically, discounts are offered on the deal and the volume of the 
discounts matters instead of the actual component on which the discounts get applied. 
Again, given the context of the study, the assumption that discounts are applied on 
license costs is not a limiting assumption. They could have been applied to a different 
cost component. The objective fundamentally was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
location-based discounts and compare their effectiveness against traditional types of 
discounts. Furthermore, literature suggests that discounting licenses is not an uncommon 
practice. 
Third, it was assumed that the PS vendor does not modify its pricing structure if 
the market share or profit does not fall significantly enough to warrant a reaction. 
Although practically a vendor can proactively modify the price to chase out the 
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competition, the modeling of such a strategy was not crucial to the investigation of our 
research question. Whether a vendor chooses to act proactively or reactively is 
inconsequential to the point that was being made in this study: location-based discounts 
under some conditions can be more effective than traditional size-based discounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
5.1 Research Overview 
The thesis discussed the issue of adoption and diffusion of open source software 
(OSS). A review of the literature had revealed that there was some understanding of the 
factors that affected the decision of firms to adopt open source software. Two additional 
findings emerged from the review of the literature: a) there was no comprehensive model 
that addressed the inter-relationships between different factors and their effect on 
adoption and diffusion of OSS. Although some factors had been identified in various 
studies but their collective effect on diffusion of OSS had not been studied; b) there was a 
specific call in prior research that asked for more research to investigate “strategic 
variables other than price” to “better understand the drivers of adoption” of OSS 
particularly in the context of Windows and Linux (Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006: p. 
1083). As a result, this thesis was designed to systematically address the gaps in the 
literature through a series of three inter-related studies. 
In the first study (Chapter 2), a comprehensive model was developed to identify 
critical factors other than price that could significantly affect the adoption and diffusion 
of OSS. Some of the factors modeled in the study were taken from prior research whereas 
a few new factors were introduced as well whose affect on the diffusion of OSS had not 
been investigated in prior research (Table 2 in Chapter 1).  
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An agent-based simulation model was designed that modeled a network of 1000 
interconnected firms interacting with each other. The firms were assigned a desktop 
operating system (proprietary or open source) at the start of the simulation. During the 
course of the simulation each firm had to choose between upgrading its existing software 
and switching to the alternative software. The decision was made on the basis of a 
decision function that considered a series of economic and social factors. The economic 
factors included license, support, training, interoperability costs etc. and the social factors 
included the network of neighbors, software being used by neighbors etc. (see Section 2.3 
for details). The results revealed that the starting population of the OSS adopters, 
followed by interoperability costs, network density, high variability in OSS support costs 
and network topology were the most critical variables (other than price) that affected the 
diffusion dynamics of OSS. Seven propositions were presented that highlighted the main 
and interaction effects of these critical variables.  
The second study (Chapter 3) was designed to better understand the interaction 
effects between network topology, network density and interoperability costs. The 
objective was that if network structure is so critical to the diffusion of OSS, a more 
systematic and detailed analysis must be conducted to explain its effect on the diffusion 
of OSS. Therefore, an economics of social networks approach was adopted that 
emphasized the network structure and its effect on the economic decisions of the firms. 
Prior research on the analysis of social networks looked at a set of centrality measures 
that identified the importance of nodes in a network from different perspectives. In the 
absence of guidelines for using particular set of centrality measures for investigating 
diffusion type processes, four commonly used centrality measures were employed in the 
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study. A starting population of OSS adopters was chosen on the basis of these measures 
to see which one of them would be more suited in identifying strategically located firms 
that could significantly affect the process of OSS diffusion. These measurements were 
taken at the level of individual as well as groups of firms to identify important individuals 
and groups of firms that could shape the process of diffusion. The results revealed that 
strategically located individual firms and groups of firms can significantly impact the 
process of diffusion. Furthermore, it was found that the criteria for identifying structural 
importance varied under different network topologies, network densities, size of the 
starting population of OSS adopters and interoperability costs. The results contributed to 
the literature on the analysis of social networks by identifying suitable centrality 
measures that could be used in the investigation of software diffusion type process. From 
a practical perspective the results also suggested that if strategically located firms in a 
network can significantly affect the process of diffusion, software vendors can exploit 
that information by offering a different pricing structure to the strategically located firms. 
The third study was designed to further explore and validate this point.  
In the third study (Chapter 4), the concept of „network-aware‟ pricing was 
introduced that simply stated that a better package should be offered by software vendors 
to the strategically located firms in a network. In this case, strategic location was 
contextualized on the basis of the centrality measures whose importance in the context of 
software diffusion had already been investigated in Chapter 3. The objective was to 
measure the effectiveness of such a pricing scheme against a traditional software pricing 
scheme that generally offer better packages to larger firms. Experiments were setup that 
allowed the PS vendor to offer per-license discounts to selected firms. The firms were 
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selected on the basis of their size, or location, or both criteria (size and location). The 
effectiveness of these various approaches was measured by monitoring the market share 
and profit of the PS vendor. The experiments revealed that in several cases location-based 
discounts outperformed traditional size-based discounts in terms of both market share and 
profit. Table 24 provides an overview of the three studies. 
5.2 Contributions 
The following subsections review the contributions made through the thesis to 
both research and practice. 
5.2.1 Research Contributions 
There are several ways in which the thesis has contributed to the literature on OSS 
diffusion, software diffusion, analysis of social networks and software pricing. First, a 
framework has been developed that can be used to study the diffusion process of 
competing software. Although the model was contextualized for studying desktop 
operating system market only, there is nothing in the characteristics of the agents, their 
behavior or other simulation conditions that could prevent it from being used to 
investigate diffusion of other types of software. For example, in the server operating 
system (OS) market, the initial number of OSS adopters, setup costs, support costs and 
training costs will be higher than those in the desktop OS market, but the model will still 
be applicable. Similarly, in the open source ERP market, the strength of interoperability 
issues may be higher than those described in our model in the context of the desktop OS, 
however the propositions should still hold. The framework presented in this thesis models 
the simple behavior of the individual agents while capturing the inherent heterogeneity 
between them and within their interactions.  
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The use of the agent-based computational economics approach results in a simple yet 
powerful model that facilitates the investigation of macro-level behavior (diffusion 
dynamics) by accurately modeling the micro-level (firm-level) characteristics and 
behaviors. 
Second, the thesis has demonstrated that the diffusion of software is dependent on 
strategic factors other than price, such as interoperability costs, variability in support 
costs, network topology and network density. What makes these findings more powerful 
and robust is the fact that they have been established while incorporating significant 
heterogeneity among firms and considering factors such as the threat of withdrawal of 
support by the PS vendor and the influence of centrality of neighbors on adoption 
decisions – interrelated factors that were never considered in prior research on software 
diffusion. The research has also added to the software diffusion literature by providing a 
framework that can model a heterogeneous set of economic and social factors to study the 
process of diffusion. 
Third, the research has demonstrated that strategic location of individual or 
groups of firms can significantly impact the process of software diffusion. Prior research 
did not have any study that a) formally demonstrated the effect of location on the process 
of software diffusion, b) provide guidelines for appropriate use of structural (centrality) 
measures in the context of software diffusion type processes. Borgatti (2005) did propose 
a set of centrality measures to investigate certain types of diffusion processes. However, 
that taxonomy did not cover software diffusion type processes. Therefore, not only did 
this thesis formally demonstrate the effectiveness of individual as well as group centrality 
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measures, it also highlighted the conditions under which four of the commonly used 
centrality measures can be applied in the analysis of software diffusion.  
Fourth, as a proof-of-concept, the thesis also demonstrated that strategic location 
of firms can be used effectively by software vendors to influence the process of software 
diffusion. Such use of location information to inform pricing decisions had not been 
investigated in prior research.  
5.2.2 Practical Contributions 
There are several important practical implications of this research. Overall, the 
thesis has demonstrated that the process of software adoption and diffusion is 
significantly affected by a series of interrelated economic and social factors. Although the 
proposed framework was contextualized in the context of a software market involving 
open source and proprietary software, certain overarching arguments that can be applied 
in practice, need to be highlighted. 
First, the agent-based simulation model presented in the thesis can be applied by a 
vendor, with adjustments to the specific parameters in the model, to run market 
simulations. The model is useful as it a) tries to capture the heterogeneity encountered in 
reality, and b) exhibits behavior which closely resembles reality (i.e. has face validity). 
The model can be used by the vendor as an effective tool to study the effect of different 
critical variables in the context of his/her own specific market. Given the behavior of the 
agents and the modeling of the interaction between the agents, the model can also be 
applied to the investigation of other types of software markets as well (and not just 
desktop OS software market). 
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Second, the research has demonstrated that there are several critical variables 
other than price that a software vendor can focus on to compete in a software market. For 
example, interoperability and support costs can significantly impact the process of 
diffusion. Notwithstanding the specific numbers used the model, which might be 
different for other types of software markets or might have been parameterized 
differently had another research investigated the same problem, the elaborate set of 
experiments in Chapter 2 provide sufficient basis for a software vendor to at least more 
carefully evaluate some of these cost components when deciding any market strategy. 
Third, the research showed that the timing of software upgrades can significantly 
affect the process of software diffusion. The implications are that a PS vendor should 
consider evaluating its upgrade policy on the basis of the frequency and additional cost of 
upgrades – factors that can potentially impact the diffusion of its software. 
Fourth the analysis of the social network of firms revealed that strategically 
located firms within a network can significantly impact the process of software diffusion.  
The implication is that vendors should be aware of the basic structural characteristics of 
the network of their clients. To that extent the research also revealed the criteria for 
identifying strategically located individual firms and groups of firms under different 
network conditions. For example, if the vendor‟s analysis reveals that the target network 
has the characteristics of a low density small world network, then i) if there are no 
significant interoperability issues with the competitor‟s software, firms with the most 
number of connections to other firms should be targeted, ii) interoperability issues can be 
strategically manipulated to change the level of influence of some firms over other firms 
– the results had demonstrated that structural importance of firms would change with 
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higher interoperability costs. What is more interesting is that with the changing market 
share, the vendor needs to adapt and target a different set of firms. For example, early on 
when the vendor does not have a large installed base of adopters then important firms are 
ones that have highest eigenvector centrality (in small world networks). On the other 
hand, as the market share of the vendor improves, depending on the density of 
connections and strength of interoperability costs, eigenvector centrality should not be 
used to identify important firms. These strategies would be applicable in case of other 
types of software markets as well particularly when proprietary and open source software 
vendors are competing for the same network of clients. 
Fifth, the research demonstrated the potential of using location information of 
firms to effectively compete in a software market. Although, a limited set of experiments 
were run in Chapter 4, the results did highlight the potential use of location information 
in any pricing strategy adopted by a software vendor. Given the rising trend toward 
usage-based licensing or on demand software delivery, vendors can further explore the 
possibility of becoming „network-aware‟ while coming up with better, newer pricing 
schemes. 
Sixth, the findings from Chapter 2 highlighted the fact that under some market 
conditions even a passive PS vendor – one who does not react to fluctuations in the 
market conditions by changing its pricing structure – might not be severely threatened by 
OSS. In fact, the simulation results revealed that the PS vendor is only threatened by OSS 
if interoperability costs are low and there is high variability in OSS support costs. 
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5.3 Future Research 
There are some limitations of the thesis which have been discussed separately at 
the end of each study (in chapters 2, 3 and 4). This section presents some ideas for future 
research. 
First, the model was contextualized for studying the desktop operating system 
market. Future research can investigate the diffusion dynamics in other markets as well 
such as application software, enterprise software etc. The actual numbers used in the 
model will change, however, the behavior of the model and findings are not expected to 
change significantly. Second, in highlighting strategically located groups, one definition 
of a group was used: a simple supply chain. In other words, each firm was the focal firm 
of its own group (or immediate set of neighbors). Future research could explore other 
definitions of group definitions as well. This may require the use of additional network 
topologies (like scale-free networks) and densities as well. Third, in testing the concept of 
network-aware pricing a simple price discounting scheme was used. Future research 
could explore the use of location information in coming up with newer ways of pricing 
software. For example, with the growing trend toward on demand or cloud computing 
that will look to track the actual use of the software, software providers could come up 
with newer pricing schemes that offer favorable prices to strategically located users of the 
software. Furthermore, additional investigation is required into the factors that can affect 
the performance of various network-aware pricing schemes. 
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Table 27. Time for diffusion of OSS to occur in small world networks with different 
group OSS assignment criteria* 
 Low Initial Proportion of OSS 
Network 
Density 
Frequency of Proprietary Software Upgrades = 4 years 
Low Variability in OSS Support Costs High Variability in OSS Support Costs 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low  
38.0108 
39.3520 
55.9228 
66.3484 
100.862 
No diffusion 
46.2/46.4 
60.1132 
75.5856 
81.5419 
No diffusion 
Medium  
53.4200 
55.3116 
67.0960 
81.3572 
52.3924 
54.4776 
62.8508 
76.4516 
High  
No diffusion 
100.64 
≈100.9 
 High Initial Proportion of OSS 
Low  
8.5592 
25.0004 
30.0980 
31.6824 
33.1472 
55.9692 
94.1688 
≈97 
99.189 
100.8576 
6.45439 
15.1976 
20.8060 
22.7312 
24.5244 
22.58 
94.6240 
95.4052 
≈98 
87.2724 
100.9724 
Medium  
≈33.9 
35.4616 
48.289 
No diffusion 
12.704 
33.8312 
≈34 
36.1708 
No diffusion 
High  
49.706 
50.38 
50.962 
51.510 
98.50519 
39.7519 
≈56 
≈58 
* This table should be interpreted in conjunction with Table 11 
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Table 28. Time for diffusion of OSS to occur in small world networks with different 
group OSS assignment criteria* 
 Low Initial Proportion of OSS 
Network 
Density 
Frequency of Proprietary Software Upgrades = 4 years 
Low Variability in OSS Support Costs High Variability in OSS Support Costs 
Low 
Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low Interop 
Medium 
Interop 
High 
Interop 
Low  
No diffusion No diffusion 
Medium  
High  
 High Initial Proportion of OSS 
Low  
7 
≈7.02 
8.3459 
100.3472 
≈100.7 
No 
diffusion 
≈6 
6.348 
17.9296 
18.4028 
18.8652 
19.0548 
38.0412 
No 
diffusion 
Medium  
45.474 
46.796 
47.98 
75.512 
94.45479 
No diffusion 
10.0176 
10.1220 
10.1776 
10.9372 
13.12 
No diffusion 
High  
No 
diffusion 
17.094 
17.286 
17.575 
30.027 
57.0672 
* This table should be interpreted in conjunction with Table 12 
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4 WITH DEPENDENT VARIIABLES 
MEASURED AT T=25 
 
 
Table 29. Number of adopters when closeness centrality was used for location-
based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 349.31 
≈342 (S/C) 
343 (L) 
≈335 (S/L/C) 
328.04(L) 
329.81(C) 
330.49(S) 
317.31(L) 
323.56(C) 
325.99(S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
349.31 
≈344 (S/C) 
345 (L) 
≈338(S/C) 
340 (L) 
332.72(L) 
334.70(C) 
335.55(S) 
322.39(L) 
328.94(C) 
331.13(S) 
High 
(10%) 
349.31 
≈345 (S/C) 
346 (L) 
≈341 (S/C) 
342 (L) 
335.42(L) 
337.61(C) 
338.63(S) 
325.11(L) 
332.27(C) 
334.61(S) 
 
 
 
Table 30. NPV in $ when closeness centrality was used for location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 8.83E+09 
8.82094E+09 (S/C) 
8.818E+09 (L) 
8.8788E+09 (L) 
8.78+09(S/C) 
8.7619E+09 (L) 
8.7352E+09 (C) 
8.7238E+09 (S) 
8.7600E+09 (L) 
8.7062E+09 (C) 
8.6823E+09 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
8.83E+09 
8.82099E+09 (S/C) 
8.8176E+09 (L) 
8.879E+09 (L) 
8.786+09(S/C) 
8.7661E+09 (L) 
8.7410E+09 (C) 
8.7295E+09 (S) 
8.7663E+09 (L) 
8.7136E+09 (C) 
8.6906E+09 (S) 
High 
(10%) 
8.83E+09 
8.82088E+09 (S/C) 
8.81786E+09 (L) 
8.79E+09 (L) 
8.787+09(S/C) 
8.7672E+09 (L) 
8.7420E+09 (C) 
8.7312E+09 (S) 
8.7681E+09 (L) 
8.7158E+09 (C) 
8.6933E+09 (S) 
 
* The sample size is 400 in each cell 
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Table 31. Number of adopters when degree centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 423.937 
398.66 (S) 
399.85 (C) 
403.44 (L) 
372.98 (S) 
374.88 (C) 
379.55 (L) 
361.38 (S) 
362.71 (C) 
367.34 (L) 
355.69 (L) 
357.08 (C) 
359.21 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
423.937 
405.59 (S) 
406.76 (C) 
409.56 (L) 
386.66 (S) 
387.96 (C) 
392.27 (L) 
377.22 (S) 
378.78 (C) 
382.89 (L) 
≈373 (S/C) 
376.04 (L) 
High (10%) 423.937 
412.79 (S) 
413.98 (C) 
416.32 (L) 
399.85 (S) 
402.03 (C) 
405.88 (L) 
393.57 (S) 
395.70 (C) 
400.08 (L) 
390.96 (L) 
392.34 (C) 
394.83 (S) 
 
 
 
 
Table 32. NPV in $ when degree centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 8.6E+09 
8.648E+09 (S) 
8.641E+09 (C) 
8.629E+09 (L) 
8.650E+09 (S) 
8.644E+09 (C) 
8.626E+09 (L) 
8.600E+09 (S) 
8.596E+09 (C) 
8.586E+09 (L) 
8.537E+09 (L) 
8.525E+09 (C/S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
8.6E+09 
8.639E+09 (S) 
8.632E+09 (C) 
8.620E+09 (L) 
8.643E+09 (S) 
8.637E+09 (C) 
8.618E+09 (L) 
8.599E+09 (S) 
8.594E+09 (C) 
8.583E+09 (L) 
8.540E+09 (L) 
8.530E+09 (C/S) 
High 
(10%) 
8.6E+09 
8.633E+09 (S) 
8.627E+09 (C) 
8.615E+09 (L) 
8.638E+09 (S) 
8.631E+09 (C) 
8.613E+09 (L) 
8.596E+09 (S) 
8.591E+09 (C) 
8.580E+09 (L) 
8.540E+09 (L) 
8.53E+09 (C/S) 
 
* The sample size is 400 in each cell  
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Table 33. Number of adopters when eigenvector centrality was used for 
location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 128.12 
126.41 (S) 
126.66 (C) 
126.94 (L) 
≈125 (S/C) 
126 (L) 
123.48 (S) 
123.96 (C) 
124.57 (L) 
≈123 (S/L/C) 
Medium 
(5%) 
128.12 
126.48 (S) 
126.75 (C) 
127.02 (L) 
≈125 (S/C) 
126 (L) 
123.77 (S) 
124.14 (C) 
124.75 (L) 
≈123 (S/L/C) 
High 
(10%) 
128.12 
126.48 (S) 
126.75 (C) 
127.02 (L) 
≈125 (S/C) 
126 (L) 
123.77 (S) 
124.14 (C) 
124.75 (L) 
≈123 (S/L/C) 
 
 
Table 34. NPV in $ when eigenvector centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 1.15E+10 
1.1468E+10 (L) 
1.1466E+10 (S/C) 
1.1399E+10 (L) 
1.1388E+10 (C) 
1.1384E+10 (S) 
1.132E+10 (L) 
1.130E+10 (C) 
1.129E+10 (S) 
1.125E+10 (L) 
1.121E+10 (C) 
1.120E+10 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
1.15E+10 
1.1469E+10 (L) 
1.1466E+10 (S/C) 
1.1399E+10 (L) 
1.1388E+10 (C) 
1.1384E+10 (S) 
1.132E+10 (L) 
1.130E+10 (C) 
1.129E+10 (S) 
1.125E+10 (L) 
1.121E+10 (C) 
1.120E+10 (S) 
High 
(10%) 
1.15E+10 
1.1469E+10 (L) 
1.1466E+10 (S/C) 
1.1399E+10 (L) 
1.1388E+10 (C) 
1.1384E+10 (S) 
1.132E+10 (L) 
1.130E+10 (C) 
1.129E+10 (S) 
1.125E+10 (L) 
1.121E+10 (C) 
1.120E+10 (S) 
 
* The sample size is 400 in each cell 
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Table 35. Number of adopters when betweenness centrality was used for 
location-based discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 471.045 
341.71(S) 
346.73(C) 
356.46(L) 
331.71(S) 
332.34(C) 
333.90(L) 
323.75(L) 
327.81(C) 
329.69(S) 
302.79(L) 
318.01(C) 
324.98(S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
471.045 
364.20(S) 
368.25(C) 
378.08(L) 
342.10(S) 
344.38(C) 
347.31(L) 
333.51(L) 
337.66(C) 
339.83(S) 
305.38(L) 
325.64(C) 
334.68(S) 
High 
(10%) 
471.045 
413.57(S) 
419.03(C) 
427.85(L) 
373.33(L) 
375.07(C) 
378.31(L) 
347.13(L) 
360.99(C) 
366.48(S) 
306.58(L) 
337.89(C) 
353.84(S) 
 
 
Table 36. NPV in $ when betweenness centrality was used for location-based 
discounts* 
Revenue 
Threshold 
Size of Discount 
No 5%,10% 15%,30% 25%,50% 35%,70% 
Low (3%) 
8.43E+09 
8.653E+09 (S) 
8.631E+09 (C) 
8.589E+09 (L) 
8.660E+09 (S) 
8.646E+09 (C) 
8.519E+09 (L) 
8.614E+09 (L) 
8.597E+09 (C) 
8.578E+09 (S) 
8.693E+09 (L) 
8.594E+09 (C) 
8.524E+09 (S) 
Medium 
(5%) 
8.43E+09 
8.604E+09 (S) 
8.582E+09 (C) 
8.548E+09 (L) 
8.641E+09 (S) 
8.620E+09 (C) 
8.586E+09 (L) 
8.601E+09 (L) 
8.591E+09 (C) 
8.573E+09 (S) 
8.696E+09 (L) 
8.607E+09 (C) 
8.535E+09 (S) 
High 
(10%) 
8.43E+09 
8.558E+09 (S) 
8.536E+09 (C) 
8.505E+09 (L) 
8.602E+09 (S) 
8.583E+09 (C) 
8.552E+09 (L) 
8.589E+09 (L) 
8.571E+09 (C) 
8.548E+09 (S) 
8.696E+09 (L) 
8.603E+09 (C) 
8.528E+09 (S) 
 
* The sample size is 400 in each cell 
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APPENDIX C: NETLOGO CODE FOR THE SIMULATION MODEL 
 
 
;****************************** 
;******DEFINING BREEDS********* 
;****************************** 
;NOTE: any line starting with a semicolon contains comments (or code that will not be executed) 
breed [ firms firm ] 
 
firms-own 
[ 
  standard  ;each firm's standard OSS or PS 
  currentversion  ;version of the standard adopted by this firm 
  PH  ;planning horizon given current standard 
  sPH  ;planning horizon if it were to adopt the other standard 
  numberofmachines  ;size of the firm represented by number of machines 
  osstechnicalcapability  ;representing technical capability of the firm 
  cliquishness  ;cliquishness of the neighborhood of this firm 
  centrality  ;level of social influence of this firm in its neighborhood 
              ;based on number of neighbors with respect to network size 
              ;this is basically degree centrality 
              ;it is used in the decision function 
              ;and it is used to determine the order in which the firms 
              ;evaluate their decision function               
  betweennesscentrality 
  closenesscentrality 
  eigenvectorcentrality   
     
  ;defining current costs 
  clicensecosts 
  csetupcosts 
  ctrainingcosts 
  csupportcosts 
  cinteropcosts 
   
  ;defining costs if the firm were to upgrade 
  ulicensecosts   
  ;defining costs if the firm were to switch 
  slicensecosts 
  ssetupcosts 
  strainingcosts 
  ssupportcosts 
  sinteropcosts 
   
  ;aggregate costs at time t+1 if the firm were to upgrade 
  ucostsattplusone 
   
  ;aggregate costs at time t+1 if the firm were to switch 
  scostsattplusone 
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  ;number of neighbors using same or different standard 
  similarneighbors 
  dissimilarneighbors 
   
  ;* SIZE OF DISCOUNT - WILL DEPEND ON THE CRITERION 
  ; THAT IS USED TO COMPUTE IT 
  sizebaseddiscount 
  locationbaseddiscount 
  combineddiscount 
  ;RANKS WILL BE USED TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF THE 
  ;sizeandlocationdiscount or combined discount 
  centralityrank 
  sizerank 
  centralitysizeaverage 
  combinedrank 
   
  numberofswitches   
] 
 
links-own 
[ 
  rewired?  ;;to check whether this link has been rewired or not 
  vot  ;;for storing volume of transactiosn associated with this link 
] 
 
;****************************** 
;**DEFINING GLOBAL VARIABLES*** 
;****************************** 
 
globals 
[ 
  averagecliquishness 
  versionOSS 
  versionPS 
   
  citeration  ;;current iteration number 
  attributesassigned?  ;;boolean variable to see whether attributes have been assigned 
                       ;;to each firm at the start of the simulation or not 
   
  osssc_mean  ;;for storing actual values of OSS support cost distribution mean 
  osssc_sd  ;;for storing actual values of OSS support cost distribution sd 
   
  lastPSupgrade  ;for storing the iteration number when PS was last upgraded 
  lastOSSupgrade  ;for storing the iteration number when OSS was last upgraded 
   
  ;********** PART 3 VARIABLES FOR THE PS VENDOR *************** 
  prev_licenses  ;licenses sold in the previous time period 
  prev_revenue  ;revenue from the previous time period 
   
  curr_licenses  ;licenses sold in the current time period 
  curr_revenue  ;reveune from the current time period 
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  curr_license_revenue  ;revenue from licenses 
  curr_support_revenue  ;revenue from support costs 
   
  max_licenses   ;maximum licenses sold with the current upgrade 
  max_revenue  ;maximum revenue from maximum licenses sold with the current upgrade  
  ;max_license_revenue  ;maximum revenue from licenses 
  ;max_support_revenue  ;maximum revenue from support costs 
   
  prev_max_licenses ; maximum licenses sold with the previous upgrade 
  prev_max_revenue  ;maximum reven from maximum licenses sold with the previous upgrade 
   
  total_revenue  ;adds up prev_max_revenue  
] 
 
;****************************** 
;**SETTING UP THE SIMULATION*** 
;****************************** 
 
to setup 
  ca  ;clear screen 
  ;random-seed 1 
   
  set attributesassigned? false 
   
  ;set the OSS support cost distribution parameters 
  if osssc = 0 
  [ 
    set osssc_mean 200 
    set osssc_sd 50 
  ] 
   
  if osssc = 1 
  [ 
    set osssc_mean 200 
    set osssc_sd 200 
  ] 
   
  if osssc = 2 
  [ 
    set osssc_mean 800 
    set osssc_sd 200 
  ] 
   
  setup-firms  ;initialize firms 
  read-network  ;read in the network structure for these firms 
  read-centrality  ;read centrality values depending on what is the 'typeofcentrality' 
  compute-centrality  ;compute DEGREE centrality 
  determine-centrality-rank  ;determine ranking of each firm based on centrality value 
   
  ;****** INITIALIZE GLOBALS ******** 
  set curr_licenses 0 
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  set curr_revenue 0 
  set curr_license_revenue 0 
  set curr_support_revenue 0 
  set max_licenses 0 
  set max_revenue 0 
  set prev_licenses 0 
  set prev_revenue 0 
  set prev_max_licenses 0 
  set prev_max_revenue 0 
  set total_revenue 0 
  set offerdiscounts? true 
   
  ;set the version numbers for the PS and OSS vendors 
  set versionOSS 1 
  set versionPS 1 
  set lastOSSupgrade 0 
  set lastPSupgrade 0 
   
  setup-plot 
  ;when the firms start, they start with version numbers 0 
  ;we assume at the start of the simulation that they have been using some version 
  ;and that at the first time period or step, the vendors offer a new version 
end 
 
to setup-firms 
  ;This function basically creates 'numberoffirms' firms 
  ;gives them white color and spreads them around in a circle 
  set-default-shape firms "dot"  ;create turtles or firms with default shape 'dot' 
                                 ;use ';show shapes' to see other possibilities 
  create-firms numberoffirms  ;create firms 
  layout-circle (sort firms) max-pxcor - 8 
                                 ;layout the turtles in sorted order by 'who' number 
                                 ;over a cirlce of radious 'max-pxcor' where 
                                 ;max-pxcor is the maximum_width/2 of the screen 
  ask firms 
  [ 
    set color white 
    set numberofswitches 0 
  ]  ;;change the color of all firms to white 
end 
 
to read-network 
  ;This will read the network from one of 9 files 
  ;the procedure assumes that 1000 firms/agents/turtles 
  ;have already been created 
  let firm_i 0 
  let firm_j 0 
   
  ifelse (count links != 0) 
  [ 
    clear-links 
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  ] 
  [ 
    ;;assuming firms have been created 
    file-open (word "nw" (word rewiringcode (word neighborhoodcode (word 
networknumber".txt")))) 
    while [file-at-end? = false] 
    [ 
      set firm_i file-read 
      set firm_j file-read 
      ask firm firm_i [ create-link-with (one-of firms with [who = firm_j])] 
    ] 
    file-close 
  ] 
end 
 
to read-centrality 
  ;this funciton will only be used when centralities 
  ;have already been computed and need to be read from the files 
  ;the centralities in the file are not standardized 
  ;but it doesn't matter because the size of the network is 1000 
  ;all the time so there is no need to come up with a standardized 
  ;measure of centrality 
   
  if typeofcentrality != "dc" 
  [ 
    file-open (word typeofcentrality (word rewiringcode (word neighborhoodcode (word 
networknumber ".txt")))) 
    let firmid 0 
    let temporarycentrality 0 
    repeat numberoffirms 
    [ 
      set temporarycentrality file-read 
      if typeofcentrality = "bc" [ask firm firmid [set betweennesscentrality temporarycentrality]] 
      if typeofcentrality = "cc" [ask firm firmid [set closenesscentrality temporarycentrality]] 
      if typeofcentrality = "ec" [ask firm firmid [set eigenvectorcentrality temporarycentrality]] 
      set firmid (firmid + 1) 
    ] 
    file-close 
  ] 
end 
 
to determine-centrality-rank 
  if typeofcentrality = "bc" [compute-betweenness-rank] 
  if typeofcentrality = "cc" [compute-closeness-rank] 
  if typeofcentrality = "dc" [compute-degree-rank] 
  if typeofcentrality = "ec" [compute-eigenvector-rank] 
end 
 
to compute-betweenness-rank 
  let rankcounter 1000 
  foreach sort-by [([betweennesscentrality] of ?1) > ([betweennesscentrality] of ?2)] firms 
164 
 
  [ 
    ask ? 
    [ 
      set centralityrank rankcounter 
      ifelse centralityrank >= 800 
      [ 
        set locationbaseddiscount high_discount 
      ] 
      [ 
        ifelse centralityrank >= 200 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount low_discount 
        ] 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount 0 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
    set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
  ] 
end 
 
to compute-closeness-rank 
  let rankcounter 1000 
  foreach sort-by [([closenesscentrality] of ?1) < ([closenesscentrality] of ?2)] firms 
  [ 
    ask ? 
    [ 
      set centralityrank rankcounter 
      ifelse centralityrank >= 800 
      [ 
        set locationbaseddiscount high_discount 
      ] 
      [ 
        ifelse centralityrank >= 200 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount low_discount 
        ] 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount 0 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
    set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
  ] 
end 
 
to compute-degree-rank 
  let rankcounter 1000 
  foreach sort-by [([centrality] of ?1) > ([centrality] of ?2)] firms 
  [ 
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    ask ? 
    [ 
      set centralityrank rankcounter 
      ifelse centralityrank >= 800 
      [ 
        set locationbaseddiscount high_discount 
      ] 
      [ 
        ifelse centralityrank >= 200 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount low_discount 
        ] 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount 0 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
    set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
  ] 
end 
 
to compute-eigenvector-rank 
  let rankcounter 1000 
  foreach sort-by [([eigenvectorcentrality] of ?1) > ([eigenvectorcentrality] of ?2)] firms 
  [ 
    ask ? 
    [ 
      set centralityrank rankcounter 
      ifelse centralityrank >= 800 
      [ 
        set locationbaseddiscount high_discount 
      ] 
      [ 
        ifelse centralityrank >= 200 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount low_discount 
        ] 
        [ 
          set locationbaseddiscount 0 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
    set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
  ] 
end 
 
 
 
to compute-centrality 
  ;This procedure computes centrality of each firm 
  ;and stores it in the 'centrality' variable of each firm 
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  ask firms [ set centrality ((count link-neighbors) / (numberoffirms - 1)) ] 
end 
 
to compute-cliquishness 
  ;This procedure computes cliquishness 
  ;for the neighborhood of each firm 
  ifelse all? firms [count link-neighbors <= 1] 
  [ 
    ;; it is undefined 
    ;; what should this be? 
    set averagecliquishness 0 
  ] 
  [ 
    let total 0 
    ask firms with [ count link-neighbors <= 1] 
    [ set cliquishness "undefined" ] 
    ask firms with [ count link-neighbors > 1] 
    [ 
      ;let 'n' be the firms neighbors (gathered in localneighborhood variable) 
      ;cliquishness wants to see how well connected your neighbors are with each other 
      ;hence --> count links with [in-neighborhood? localneighborhood] 
      ;tries to find exactly that 
      ;(n * (n-1))/2 gives total number of possible links in your neighborhood 
      ;imagine that to be a fully connected neighborhood 
      ;so cliquishness then is the number of connections your neighbors have 
      ;with each other, divided by the number of possible links in your neighborhood 
      let localneighborhood link-neighbors 
      set cliquishness (2 * count links with [ in-neighborhood? localneighborhood ] / 
                                         ((count localneighborhood) * (count localneighborhood - 1)) ) 
      ;; find the sum for the value at turtles 
      set total (total + cliquishness) 
    ] 
    ;; take the average 
    set averagecliquishness (total / (count firms with [count link-neighbors > 1])) 
    ;;;show averagecliquishness 
  ] 
end 
; Part of the cliquishness and network generation code taken from Uri Wilenski‟s Net Logo 
distribution. 
;Cliquishness is not actually used anywhere in the simulation. 
to-report in-neighborhood? [ lnhood ] 
  report ( member? end1 lnhood and member? end2 lnhood ) 
end 
;****DRIVING THE SIMULATION**** 
;****************************** 
to go 
    ; so that it gets reported at each run and then initialized at the start of each run 
  assign-attributes  ;this will basically assign cost and other values to the firms 
                     ;it must be called once during one run i.e. in the first step 
                     ;of the run - hence the use of the 'attributesassigned?' variable 
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  ;show curr_license_revenue 
  ;show curr_support_revenue 
  ;show max_revenue 
  set curr_license_revenue 0 
  set curr_support_revenue 0 
 
  compute-interoperabilitycosts 
   
  take-decision citeration   
   
  update-vendor-variables 
   
  ;the following to be used only if experiments are not being run on a cluster 
  ;if numberOSS >= (2 * proportionofOSS * numberoffirms) 
  ;[ 
  ;  update-plot 
  ;  stop 
  ;] 
  ;update-plot 
end 
 
to display-stats 
  file-open "stats.txt" 
    foreach sort firms 
    [ 
      ask ? 
      [ 
        file-type sizerank 
        file-type " " 
        file-type centralityrank 
        file-type " " 
        file-print combinedrank 
      ] 
    ] 
  file-close 
end 
 
to setup-plot 
  set-current-plot "Revenue" 
  set-plot-y-range max_revenue (500 * 1000 * 199) 
  set-current-plot "Licenses" 
  set-plot-y-range max_licenses (500 * 1000) 
  set-current-plot "PS Adopters" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 1000 
end 
 
to update-plot 
  set-current-plot "Revenue" 
  set-current-plot-pen "max_revenue" 
  plot prev_max_revenue 
  set-current-plot-pen "curr_revenue" 
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  plot prev_revenue 
  set-current-plot-pen "license_revenue" 
  plot curr_license_revenue 
  set-current-plot-pen "support_revenue" 
  plot curr_support_revenue 
   
  set-current-plot "Licenses" 
  set-current-plot-pen "max_licenses" 
  plot prev_max_licenses 
  set-current-plot-pen "curr_licenses" 
  plot prev_licenses 
   
  set-current-plot "PS Adopters" 
  plot numberPS 
end 
 
to update-vendor-variables 
  ;update prev and curr licenses/revenue variables 
  ;also update the maximum licenses/revenue variables if necessary 
  if offerdiscounts? = true [set offerdiscounts? false] 
  ;;show offerdiscounts? 
  ;show prev_max_revenue 
  ;show max_revenue 
  ;show curr_revenue 
  set prev_licenses curr_licenses 
  set prev_revenue curr_revenue 
  ;show curr_revenue 
  set curr_licenses 0 
  set curr_revenue 0 
  set total_revenue (total_revenue + prev_revenue) 
   
  ;first update the current (or running maximum) 
  ;if (prev_licenses >= max_licenses) or (prev_revenue >= max_revenue) 
  if (prev_revenue >= max_revenue) 
  [ 
    ;if the revenue from the previous time period 
    ;was better than the last recorded maximum 
    ;then update maximum 
    set max_revenue prev_revenue 
    set max_licenses prev_licenses 
  ] 
   
  if prev_max_licenses != 0 
  [ 
    ifelse (((prev_max_revenue - prev_revenue) / prev_max_revenue) >= revenue_threshold) 
    [ 
        ;then offer discounts to some selected firms in the next time period 
        set offerdiscounts? true 
        ;show "offer discounts in next time period" 
    ] 
    [ 
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        ;do nothing because even though the revenue has fallen 
        ;it hasn't fallen enough to warrant any action from the vendor 
        set offerdiscounts? false 
    ] 
  ] 
   
  set citeration (citeration + 1) 
   
  if (remainder citeration 2) = 0 
  [ 
    set versionOSS (versionOSS + 1) 
    set lastOSSupgrade citeration 
  ] 
   
  if (remainder citeration lengthofPSUC) = 0 
  [ 
    set versionPS (versionPS + 1) 
    set lastPSupgrade citeration 
 
    set prev_max_licenses max_licenses 
    set prev_max_revenue max_revenue 
    set max_licenses 0 
    set max_revenue 0 
  ] 
   
end 
 
;****************************** 
;*******ASSIGN ATTRIBUTES****** 
;****************************** 
to assign-attributes 
  let cuc 0  ;temporary variable used in assigning planning horizon PH to each firm 
  let suc 0  ;temporary variable used in assign the planning horizon sPH to each firm 
  let randomvalue 0  ;randomvalue generated to assign PH to each firm 
  let temporarycounterforOSS 0  ;this will keep track of how many firms have been assigned the 
OSS standard 
   
  if attributesassigned? = false ;i.e. if this is the first time this procedure is being 
                                 ;called in this run 
  [ 
    set attributesassigned? true  ;so that this procedure is not called again 
     
    foreach (sort firms) 
    [ 
      ask ? 
      [ 
        ;assign number of machines per firm 
        set numberofmachines ((random (ubmachinesperfirm - lbmachinesperfirm)) + 
lbmachinesperfirm) 
             
        ;;assign OSS technical capability 
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        set osstechnicalcapability (random-normal TCOSSmean TCOSSsd) 
        ;if OSS technical capability is less then 0, truncate it to 0 
        if osstechnicalcapability < 0 [set osstechnicalcapability 0] 
         
        ;;assign standard 
        ifelse ((random-float 1.0 < proportionofOSS) and (temporarycounterforOSS < 
(proportionofOSS * numberoffirms))) 
        [ 
          ;if enough OSS standards have not been assigned 
          ;then keep assigning them :) 
          set temporarycounterforOSS (temporarycounterforOSS + 1) 
          ;;OSS 
          set standard "OSS" 
          set color blue 
          set currentversion 0 
          ;;assign planning horizon 
          set cuc 2 
          set suc lengthofPSUC 
         
          ;assign current and upgrade costs based on "OSS" 
          ;multiply the costs by number of machines in the firm 
          set clicensecosts (cLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
          set csetupcosts (cSTcOSS * numberofmachines) 
          set ctrainingcosts (cTRcOSS * numberofmachines)           
          set csupportcosts (random-normal osssc_mean osssc_sd) 
          ;if support costs are less than 0, truncate them to 0 
          if csupportcosts < 0 [ set csupportcosts 0] 
          set csupportcosts (csupportcosts * numberofmachines) 
           
          set ulicensecosts (uLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
           
          ;since this is an OSS firm 
          ;multiply its support costs by its OSS technical capability 
          set csupportcosts (csupportcosts * osstechnicalcapability) 
         
          ;assign costs in case this firm switches to "PS" 
          set slicensecosts (cLcPS * numberofmachines) 
          set ssetupcosts (cSTcPS * numberofmachines) 
          set strainingcosts (cTRcPS * numberofmachines) 
          set ssupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
        ] 
        [ 
          ;;PS 
          set standard "PS" 
          set currentversion 0 
          set color red 
         
          ;;assign planning horizon 
          set cuc lengthofPSUC 
          set suc 2 
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          ;;assign current and upgrade costs based on "PS" 
          set clicensecosts (cLcPS * numberofmachines) 
          set csetupcosts (cSTcPS * numberofmachines) 
          set ctrainingcosts (cTRcPS * numberofmachines)           
          set csupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
           
          set ulicensecosts (uLcPS * numberofmachines) 
                 
          ;assign costs in case this firm switches to "OSS" 
          set slicensecosts (cLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
          set ssetupcosts (cSTcOSS * numberofmachines) 
          set strainingcosts (cTRcOSS * numberofmachines) 
          set ssupportcosts (random-normal osssc_mean osssc_sd) 
          if ssupportcosts < 0 [set ssupportcosts 0] 
          ;if support costs are less than 0, truncate them to 0 
          set ssupportcosts (ssupportcosts * numberofmachines) 
           
          ;if this PS firm were to switch to OSS, its support costs 
          ;for OSS should be multiplied by its OSS technical capability 
          set ssupportcosts (ssupportcosts * osstechnicalcapability) 
           
          ;******** UPDATE THE MAXIMUM LICENSES AND REVENUE VARAIBLES 
********** 
          ;THIS WILL BE DONE ONLY ONCE AT THE START OF THE SIMULATION 
          set max_licenses (max_licenses + numberofmachines) 
          ;set max_revenue (max_revenue + (numberofmachines * uLcPS)) ;cLcPS = 199 
          set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * uLcPS)) 
          set curr_support_revenue (curr_support_revenue + csupportcosts) 
          set max_revenue (max_revenue + curr_license_revenue + curr_support_revenue) 
          set prev_max_licenses 0 
          set prev_max_revenue 0 
        ] 
         
        ;;ASSIGN THE PLANNING HORIZON 
        set randomvalue (random-float 1.0) 
        ifelse (randomvalue < 0.10) 
        [ 
          ;;assign uc as ph 
          set PH cuc 
          set sPH suc 
        ] 
        [ 
          ifelse (randomvalue < 0.50) 
          [ 
            ;;assign uc+1 as ph 
            set PH (cuc + 1) 
            set sPH (suc + 1) 
          ] 
          [ 
            ifelse (randomvalue < 0.90) 
            [ 
172 
 
              ;;assign uc+2 as ph 
              set PH (cuc + 2) 
              set sPH (suc + 2) 
            ] 
            [ 
              ;;assign uc+3 as ph 
              set PH (cuc + 3) 
              set sPH (suc + 3) 
            ] 
          ] 
        ] 
      ]       
    ] 
    set max_revenue (curr_license_revenue + curr_support_revenue) 
     
    ;;sort 'links' by their 'who' number and assign each one a volume of transactions 
    foreach (sort links) 
    [ 
      ask ? 
      [ 
        ;go to the link and read in its volume of transactions 
        set vot (random (ubvot - lbvot) + lbvot) 
      ] 
    ] 
     
    ;****** UPDATE THE PREVIOUS LICENSES AND REVENUE VARIABLES 
    ;BASED ON THE VALUES ASSIGNED TO THE MAXIMUM LICENSES AND 
REVENUE VARIABLES 
    ;THIS WILL BE DONE ONLY ONCE AT THE START OF THE SIMULATION 
    set prev_licenses max_licenses 
    set prev_revenue max_revenue 
    set prev_max_licenses max_licenses 
    set prev_max_revenue max_revenue 
    ;the idea is that the benchmark or prev_max_revenue at the start 
    ;should be total number of licenses * 199 (assuming that at t = -1) 
    ;the firms who are using PS have upgraded 
     
    let rankcounter 1000 
    foreach sort-by [([numberofmachines] of ?1) > ([numberofmachines] of ?2)] firms 
    [ 
      ask ? 
      [ 
        set sizerank rankcounter 
        ifelse sizerank >= 800 [ set sizebaseddiscount high_discount] 
        [ ifelse sizerank >= 200 [ set sizebaseddiscount low_discount] [ set sizebaseddiscount 0]] 
        set centralitysizeaverage int (((sizerank + centralityrank) / 2)) 
      ] 
      set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
    ] 
     
    set rankcounter 1000 
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    foreach sort-by [([centralitysizeaverage] of ?1) > ([centralitysizeaverage] of ?2)] firms 
    [ 
      ask ? 
      [ 
        set combinedrank rankcounter 
        ifelse combinedrank >= 800 [ set combineddiscount high_discount] 
        [ ifelse combinedrank >= 200 [ set combineddiscount low_discount] [ set combineddiscount 
0]] 
      ] 
      set rankcounter (rankcounter - 1) 
    ] 
    ;update-plot 
  ] 
end 
 
;****************************** 
;COMPUTE INTEROPERABILITY COSTS 
;****************************** 
to compute-interoperabilitycosts 
  ;This procedure computes interoperability costs for each firm 
  ;based on volume of transactions on its links 
   
  let volumeoftransactions 0 
   
  ask links 
  [ 
    ;reset the interoperability cost variables 
    ;of the respective firms on this link to 0 
    ask both-ends 
    [ 
      set similarneighbors 0 
      set dissimilarneighbors 0 
      set cinteropcosts 0 
      set sinteropcosts 0 
    ] 
  ] 
   
  foreach (sort links)  ;sorts links by who number 
  [ 
    ask ? 
    [ 
      set volumeoftransactions vot 
       
      ifelse ([standard] of end1 = [standard] of end2) 
      [ 
        ;if the existing standards of both firms are the same 
        ;use volume of transactions to adjust the sinteropcosts 
        ;for both these firms in case they were to switch their standard 
        ;sinteropcosts are interoperbaility costs that would be incurred 
        ;if a firm were to switch its standard 
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        ask both-ends 
        [ 
          set similarneighbors (similarneighbors + 1) 
          set sinteropcosts (sinteropcosts + (interoperabilitycosts * volumeoftransactions)) 
        ] 
      ] 
      [ 
        ;if the existing standards of both firms are different 
        ;then compute cinteropcosts or current interoperability costs 
        ;and increment the counter for dissimilar neighbors 
        ask both-ends 
        [ 
          set dissimilarneighbors (dissimilarneighbors + 1) 
          set cinteropcosts (cinteropcosts + (interoperabilitycosts * volumeoftransactions)) 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
  ] 
end 
 
to take-decision [iterationnumber] 
  ;This is the procedure where the firms will make a decision 
  ;regarding upgrades or a switch 
     
  let LHS 0  ;for storing the aggregated LHS of the decision function 
  let RHS 0  ;for storing the aggregated RHS of the decision function 
  let tempSC 0  ;for temporarily storing support costs 
  let lastupgrade 0 ;for storing the iteration number for last upgrade depending on the standard of 
this firm 
   
  foreach (sort-by [([centrality] of ?1) > ([centrality] of ?2)] firms) 
  [ 
    ask ? 
    [ 
      ;A firm will only consider such a decision if its planning horizon PH has expired 
      ifelse (iterationnumber = 0 or ((remainder iterationnumber PH) = 0)) 
      [ 
        ;FIRST, adjust the support costs 
        ;if it is a PS firm adjust its current support costs 
        ;the firm should look ahead to see if it will be more than X versions 
        ;behind the vendor's version at the end of this planning horizon 
        ;it must take the increased support costs into consideration 
        ;the X number of versions can be decided by 'withdrawsupportafter' 
        let safetytime 0  ;the time period after which support costs should be bumped up 
        let safetyperiod 0  ;the duration of time for which support costs should not be bumped up 
        let dangerousperiod 0  ;the duration of time for which support costs should be bumped up 
         
        set safetytime (lastPSupgrade + (withdrawsupportafter * lengthofPSUC)) 
        set safetyperiod (safetytime - iterationnumber)         
         
        ;Adjust support costs ONLY IF 
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        ;the safetytime comes before the planning horizon expires 
         
        if standard = "PS" 
        [ 
          ifelse (safetytime < iterationnumber + PH) 
          [ 
            set dangerousperiod (PH - safetyperiod) 
            set csupportcosts ( (safetyperiod * 50) + (dangerousperiod * 100) ) / PH 
            set csupportcosts (csupportcosts * numberofmachines) 
          ] 
          [ 
            ;this is to ensure that if costs were adjsuted in one cycle 
            ;next time around, if the firm has upgraded, it should face support costs = 50 
            ;and not the adjusted one it had estimated over its previous PH 
            set csupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
          ] 
        ] 
         
        if standard = "OSS" 
        [ 
          ifelse (safetytime < iterationnumber + sPH) and standard = "OSS" 
          [ 
            set dangerousperiod (sPH - safetyperiod) 
            set ssupportcosts ( (safetyperiod * 50) + (dangerousperiod * 100) ) / sPH 
            set ssupportcosts (ssupportcosts * numberofmachines) 
          ] 
          [ 
            set ssupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
          ] 
        ] 
         
        ;SECOND, THIRD assuming that the support costs 
        ;have been adjusted, compute the costs if the firm were to upgrade or switch 
         
        ;THIS FIRST SET OF NESTED IF-CONDITIONS WILL CHECK IF DISCOUNTS ARE 
BEING OFFERED 
        ; AND THAT IF THIS IS A PS FIRM THEN THE DISCOUNTS SHOULD BE APPLIED 
TO THE UPGRADE COSTS 
        ifelse standard = "PS" and offerdiscounts? = true 
        [ 
          ifelse typeofdiscount = "sizebased" [set ucostsattplusone ( (ulicensecosts * (1 - 
sizebaseddiscount)) + csupportcosts + cinteropcosts)] 
          [ifelse typeofdiscount = "locationbased" [set ucostsattplusone ( (ulicensecosts * (1 - 
locationbaseddiscount)) + csupportcosts + cinteropcosts)] 
          [set ucostsattplusone ( (ulicensecosts * (1 - combineddiscount)) + csupportcosts + 
cinteropcosts)]] 
        ] 
        [ 
          ; NO DISCOUNTS WILL BE APPLIED TO THE UPGRADE COSTS 
          ; IF THIS IS NOT A PS FIRM OR IF THE DISCOUNTS ARE NOT BEING OFFERED 
          set ucostsattplusone (ulicensecosts + csupportcosts + cinteropcosts) 
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        ] 
         
        ;THIS SET OF NESTED IF-CONDITIONS WILL CHECK IF THE DISCOUNT SHOULD 
BE APPLIED TO THE SWITCHING COSTS 
        ;THEY WILL BE APPLIED ONLY IF THIS IS AN OSS FIRM 
        ifelse standard = "OSS" and offerdiscounts? = true 
        [ 
          ifelse typeofdiscount = "sizebased" [set scostsattplusone ( (slicensecosts * (1 - 
sizebaseddiscount)) + ssupportcosts + sinteropcosts + ((ssetupcosts + strainingcosts) / sPH))] 
          [ifelse typeofdiscount = "locationbased" [set scostsattplusone ( (slicensecosts * (1 - 
locationbaseddiscount)) + ssupportcosts + sinteropcosts + ((ssetupcosts + strainingcosts) / sPH))] 
          [set scostsattplusone ( (slicensecosts * (1 - combineddiscount)) + ssupportcosts + 
sinteropcosts + ((ssetupcosts + strainingcosts) / sPH))]] 
        ] 
        [ 
          set scostsattplusone (slicensecosts + ssupportcosts + sinteropcosts + ((ssetupcosts + 
strainingcosts) / sPH)) 
        ] 
         
        ;FOURTH, compute LHS of the decision function if upgrade costs are not 0 
        ;i.e. avoid division by 0 
        ifelse ucostsattplusone != 0 
        [ 
          set LHS ((ucostsattplusone - scostsattplusone) / ucostsattplusone) 
        ] 
        [ 
          ;if upgrade costs are 0, the firm will upgrade 
          ;since RHS can never be <= 0 
          set LHS 0 
        ] 
         
        ;FIFTH, compute RHS of the decision function 
        set RHS ( (1 - centrality) * (1 - (dissimilarneighbors / (similarneighbors + 
dissimilarneighbors)))) 
         
        ;SIXTH, if LHS >= RHS 
        ;change standards, costs, version numbers and planning horizons 
         
        let tempPH 0 
         
        ifelse LHS >= RHS 
        [ 
          ;;then switch the standard of the firm 
          ;show "switched" 
          ;show standard 
          set numberofswitches (numberofswitches + 1) 
          ifelse (standard = "OSS") 
          [ 
            ;;make new standard "PS" 
            set standard "PS" 
            set color red 
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            set currentversion versionPS  ;;assign latest version of PS 
            ;;swap current and switching planning horizons 
            set tempPH PH 
            set PH sPH 
            set sPH tempPH 
            ;;re-assign the other costs 
            ;;assign current and upgrade costs based on "PS" 
            set clicensecosts (cLcPS * numberofmachines) 
            set csetupcosts (cSTcPS * numberofmachines) 
            set ctrainingcosts (cTRcPS * numberofmachines) 
             
            set ulicensecosts (uLcPS * numberofmachines) 
         
            ;;assign costs in case this firm switches to "OSS" 
            set slicensecosts (cLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
            set ssetupcosts (cSTcOSS * numberofmachines) 
            set strainingcosts (cTRcOSS * numberofmachines) 
             
            ;;swap the support costs 
            ;;this was an OSS firm with csupportcosts based on a distribution 
            ;;before you set its csupportcosts to 50 * numberofmachines 
            ;;save them in a temporary location and make them the ssupportcosts 
            set tempSC csupportcosts 
            set csupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
            set ssupportcosts tempSC  ;;no need to multiply with osstechnical capbaility 
                                      ;;since that has been done already 
             
            ;***IF AN OSS FIRM SWITCHED TO PS 
            ;THAT MEANS AN INCREASE IN LICENSES/REVENUE FOR PS 
            ;SO ADJUST THE CURRENT LICENSES VARIABLE 
            set curr_licenses (curr_licenses + numberofmachines) 
            ifelse offerdiscounts? = true 
            [ 
              ;show "switched with discounts" 
              ifelse typeofdiscount = "sizebased" [set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + 
(numberofmachines * cLcPS * (1 - sizebaseddiscount)))] ;cLcPS = 299 because this is a new 
adopter 
              [ifelse typeofdiscount = "locationbased"[set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue 
+ (numberofmachines * cLcPS * (1 - locationbaseddiscount)))] ;cLcPS = 299 because this is a 
new adopter 
              [set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * cLcPS * (1 - 
combineddiscount)))]] ;cLcPS = 299 because this is a new adopter 
            ]  
            [ 
              ;show "switched without discounts" 
              set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * cLcPS)) 
            ] 
            set curr_support_revenue (curr_support_revenue + csupportcosts) 
            ;set curr_revenue (curr_revenue + curr_license_revenue + curr_support_revenue) 
          ] 
          [ 
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            ;;make new standard "OSS" 
            set standard "OSS" 
            set color blue 
            set currentversion versionOSS ;;assign latest version of OSS 
            set cinteropcosts 0  ;;since these will be re-computed 
            set sinteropcosts 0  ;;since these will be re-computed 
            set similarneighbors 0  ;;these will have to be recomputed when interoperability costs are 
recomputed 
            set dissimilarneighbors 0  ;;these will have to be recomputed when interoperability costs 
are recomputed 
            ;;swap planning horizons 
            set tempPH PH 
            set PH sPH 
            set sPH tempPH 
            ;;re-assign the other costs 
            ;;assign current and upgrade costs based on "OSS" 
            set clicensecosts (cLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
            set csetupcosts (cSTcOSS * numberofmachines) 
            set ctrainingcosts (cTRcOSS * numberofmachines) 
            set ulicensecosts (uLcOSS * numberofmachines) 
         
            ;;assign costs in case this firm switches to "PS" 
            set slicensecosts (cLcPS * numberofmachines) 
            set ssetupcosts (cSTcPS * numberofmachines) 
            set strainingcosts (cTRcPS * numberofmachines) 
             
            ;;swap the support costs 
            ;;this was a PS firm with csupportcosts based on $50/year 
            ;;OR those costs were spread over additional years depending on 
            ;;the planning horizon 
            set tempSC ssupportcosts 
            set csupportcosts tempSC 
            set ssupportcosts (50 * numberofmachines) 
             
            ;show "switched to OSS" 
            ;**** IF A FIRM MOVED AWAY FROM PS, NO NEED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS 
            ;TO THE CURRENT LICENSES/REVENUE VARIABLES FOR THE PS VENDOR 
            ;SINCE THOSE VALUES ARE BEING CALCULATED FROM SCRATCH AND THIS 
            ;DECISION FROM PREVIOUS PS ADOPTERS WILL AUTOMATICALLY FIGURE 
INTO 
            ;THE COMPUTATION OF THE CURRENT LICENSES AND REVENUE 
VARIABLES 
          ] 
        ] 
        [ 
          ;set the upgrade license costs to current license costs 
          set clicensecosts ulicensecosts 
           
          ;update the version number of this firm since it has upgraded 
          ifelse standard = "OSS" 
          [ 
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            set currentversion versionOSS 
            ;show "upgraded OSS" 
          ] 
          [ 
            set currentversion versionPS 
            ;**** THIS MEANS THAT A PS ADOPTER UPGRADED 
            ;SO THIS WILL BE FACTORED INTO THE CALCULATION OF 
            ;CURRENT LICENSES AND REVENUE 
            set curr_licenses (curr_licenses + numberofmachines) 
            ifelse offerdiscounts? = true 
            [ 
              ifelse typeofdiscount = "sizebased" [set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + 
(numberofmachines * uLcPS * (1 - sizebaseddiscount)))] ;uLcPS = 199 
              [ifelse typeofdiscount = "locationbased" [set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue 
+ (numberofmachines * uLcPS * (1 - locationbaseddiscount)))] 
              [set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * uLcPS * (1 - 
combineddiscount)))]] 
              ;show "upgraded PS with discounts" 
            ]  
            [ 
              set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * uLcPS)) 
              ;show "upgraded PS without discounts" 
            ] 
            set curr_support_revenue (curr_support_revenue + csupportcosts) 
            ;set curr_revenue (curr_revenue + curr_license_revenue + curr_support_revenue) 
          ] 
        ] 
      ] 
      [ 
        ;IF THE PLANNING HORIZON IS NOT BEGINNING 
        ;REVENUE STILL NEEDS TO BE COMPUTED IF THIS IS A PS ADOPTER 
        if standard = "PS" 
        [ 
            set curr_licenses (curr_licenses + numberofmachines) 
            set curr_license_revenue (curr_license_revenue + (numberofmachines * uLcPS)) 
            set curr_support_revenue (curr_support_revenue + csupportcosts) 
        ] 
      ] 
    ] 
  ] 
  set curr_revenue (curr_license_revenue + curr_support_revenue) 
end 
 
to-report numberOSS 
  report (count firms with [standard = "OSS"]) 
end 
 
to-report numberPS 
  report (count firms with [standard = "PS"]) 
end 
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to-report report-versionOSS 
  report versionOSS 
end 
 
to-report report-versionPS 
  report versionPS 
end 
 
to-report total-revenue 
  report total_revenue 
end 
 
to-report license-revenue 
  report curr_license_revenue 
end 
 
to-report support-revenue 
  report curr_support_revenue 
end 
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE FILES FOR UCINET 
With 2 network topologies, 3 network densities and 50 replications each, 300 networks 
(2x3x50) were generated using the Watts and Strogatz (1998) algorithm. UCINET was used to 
compute the different individual centrality values. To compute these values, the 300 networks 
had to be represented in a certain format to allow UCINET to read the network. DL files read by 
UCINET allow different formats for storing a network. Following is just a snapshot of a DL file 
that was created for use with UCINET. 
 
The first line indicates that UCINET should expect to read a network of a 1000 nodes in 
the „nodelist1‟ format. The „nodelist1‟ format indicates that each node in the network will be 
listed in one line and next to it will be a list of all other nodes that this node is connected to. For 
example, in the illustration above, node 1 is connected to nodes 4, 5, 8, 13 etc.; node 20 is 
connected to nodes 7, 14, 15 etc. Once 300 files were created for the various networks, UCINET 
was used to compute the different centrality measures. These values were stored in text files 
which were then read, as and when required, at the start of each experiment. Group centrality 
values were computed separately by writing another short program and stored in separate text 
files. 
